Amir Shivuk 2025: Feed Carries the Profit, Bnei Brak Holds the Value, and the Bank Funds the Bridge

Company Overview

At first glance Amir Shivuk still looks like what it has long been: a veteran agricultural-input distributor with 27 branches, about 8,000 active customers, around 750 suppliers, roughly 230 employees, and a broad basket of products for farmers. That reading is no longer sufficient. Behind NIS 1.268 billion of revenue now sits a group with four agricultural engines, a feed plant that can produce up to about 200,000 tons a year, investment property in Bnei Brak and Haifa, and a growing set of adjacent holdings meant to deepen feed demand around the company.

What is working right now is not the whole company equally. It is mainly the feed business. In 2025 feed generated NIS 312.1 million of revenue, only 24.6% of sales, but NIS 51.2 million of operating profit, almost 73% of the group total. Anyone stopping at the top line can miss the real shift in Amir's economics: crop protection and nutrition is still the largest revenue segment, 41.7% of the group, but it is no longer where the earnings engine sits.

What remains messy is cash. Operating profit rose to NIS 70.2 million and net income to NIS 45.2 million, but operating cash flow swung to negative NIS 7.8 million. Receivables, inventory, and weaker supplier financing absorbed more than NIS 83 million, and the company had to raise short-term bank credit to NIS 113.3 million, more than double the year-end 2024 level, to bridge the gap.

That is also why 2025 matters now. On one side, Amir holds a Bnei Brak property with NIS 171.6 million of disclosed fair value against a NIS 44.7 million book value, almost NIS 127 million of hidden value. On the other side, that value is still not free cash. The commercial center in Bnei Brak is expected to begin operating during the second quarter of 2026, and until that happens the bridge period is funded mainly by the bank rather than by a property already sending stable cash upward.

For scale, at a share price of NIS 34.71 and roughly 13.16 million shares, market value is around NIS 457 million. That means the Bnei Brak value gap is already large enough to matter for the equity story, but the market still lacks cash evidence. Even the market layer is not doing much of the work here: short interest is just 0.08% of float, and the latest trading snapshot showed negligible turnover. So 2026 looks less like a fast rerating year and more like a proof year.

Amir Shivuk's quick economic map looks like this:

Events and Triggers

The events around the report tell a consistent story. Amir is no longer content to remain a classic agricultural distributor. It is building a poultry-centered ecosystem around the feed mill, while also trying to turn Bnei Brak from dormant real estate into an active commercial-rent asset. That can create value, but in 2025 more cash left the system than entered it.

First growth engine: Mekor Hod Amir

The first trigger: the Mekor Hod Amir partnership, in which Amir holds 50%, is already changing the feed picture. The transaction closed on October 1, 2024. Amir paid NIS 7 million for 50% of the related assets, committed to additional consideration of at least NIS 3 million after roughly three years, and together with its partner extended shareholder loans of about NIS 5.9 million per side to acquire inventory and fixed assets.

Operationally, the move is beginning to work. In 2025 Amir sold about 26,430 tons of feed to Mekor Hod Amir, and the partnership is already described as one of the two largest customers in the feed business. The company estimates that the partnership holds about 12% of the Israeli turkey-meat market and that its annual revenue should average around NIS 120 million starting in 2026.

But there is a counter-side. In 2025 Amir's share of Mekor Hod Amir's losses was NIS 1.704 million, after only a NIS 295 thousand profit in the reported 2024 period. So the synergy is already adding feed volume, but the partnership itself has not yet crossed into a harvesting phase.

Second growth engine: Leser Amir and Yeadim

The second trigger: Amir is extending the same logic into layers and agricultural equipment. Leser Amir, a 50% partnership focused on investments and loans for laying-hen facilities, started operating in the third quarter of 2025. At this stage it has signed several agreements with growers, the company estimates a build period of up to 3 years, and at full completion the business is expected to reach about 1 million laying hens and NIS 120 million to NIS 130 million of revenue.

The important point here is not only the potential revenue. The company explicitly says it cannot accurately estimate the future contribution to feed volumes because some of the growers were already Amir customers before the venture. That wording matters. There is upside, but not yet a clean measurable bridge.

On the other side of the map stands Yeadim LeShivuk, in which Amir holds 50%. In 2025 Amir's share of Yeadim's profit was NIS 826 thousand, down from NIS 1.022 million in 2024, and in January 2026 Amir announced its intention to exercise the option to acquire full ownership after approval of Yeadim's financial statements. Strategically, this is interesting because it could pull agricultural equipment imports, packing-house systems, tractors, and service capabilities into the same broader platform. It also raises a capital-allocation question in the middle of a year when group cash generation is already tighter.

The trigger that carries the hidden value: Bnei Brak

The third trigger: Bnei Brak is now the clearest gap between value created and value accessible. In November 2025 the company signed a second amendment with the master tenant of the commercial center. The change came after meaningful shifts in the local rental market and delays in completion. The first lease term was extended to 6 years from January 2026, the minimum annual rent was revised downward to about NIS 4.58 million for the first three years and NIS 4.88 million from year four, and the company had to add another NIS 3 million of investment to the project.

By year-end 2025 total investment in the project had reached about NIS 31.2 million. On one side, this is no longer a theoretical project. The company is already receiving rent from that part of the asset from January 2026, and the presentation points to roughly NIS 9 million of annual rent from the full complex. On the other side, the lease has already been reset once, both downward on minimum rent and upward on required capex. So 2026 now needs to deliver not another valuation line, but actual operation.

Even the compensation layer points to 2026

The fourth trigger: the equity-compensation layer approved at the end of 2025 and beginning of 2026 is not the main event of the story, but it is a useful clue. The company granted 393,200 restricted shares to 13 executives and employees, equal to about 2.97% of fully diluted share capital. About 71% of the award is tied to average annual EBITDA targets of NIS 90 million, NIS 94 million, and NIS 96 million. After NIS 88.9 million of EBITDA in 2025, those hurdles do not imply a dramatic leap. They imply a push just above the current level and a need to prove that the company can sustain it.

Efficiency, Profitability and Competition

The easiest number to miss in Amir is this one: the group's profitability improvement was not broad. It was extremely concentrated. Anyone reading the report as if all engines improved together is reading it incorrectly.

Feed is now the business

Feed is the real story of 2025. Revenue rose only 2.2% to NIS 312.1 million, but gross profit jumped to NIS 69.4 million from NIS 51.1 million, and gross margin rose to 22.2% from 16.7%. Operating profit reached NIS 51.2 million versus NIS 33.7 million in 2024. Production volume rose to 192,726 tons from 179,178 tons.

What matters here is that the improvement did not come from a pure price story. In fact, the company says feed selling prices declined because raw-material prices fell and because of the decline in the dollar. So this is not a scarcity or pricing-power story. It is a story of higher volume, better mix, and synergy with the poultry-related moves the company is building around the feed mill.

The number that turns this from data into a thesis is feed's share of group operating profit. With only 24.6% of revenue, it generated nearly 73% of the operating profit. That means Amir is no longer truly diversified at the economic layer, even if it remains diversified in product categories.

Crop protection and packaging still add revenue, not necessarily value

Crop protection and nutrition remained the largest revenue segment, but it had a weak year. Revenue fell 4.3% to NIS 528.9 million. Gross profit slipped more modestly, to NIS 67.8 million from NIS 69.5 million, and gross margin actually improved slightly to 12.8% from 12.6%. Yet operating profit was nearly cut in half, to NIS 6.8 million.

That matters. The small gross-margin improvement did not translate into operating earnings because the segment was hit by lower fertilizer prices, volume weakness, weather effects, reduced water quotas, and stronger generic competition. In plain terms, this is still a large segment with a broad customer network, but it is no longer the segment driving the group's earnings improvement.

Packaging tells a less exciting story than the top-line growth suggests. Revenue rose 11.3% to NIS 257.2 million, but gross margin fell to 14.1% from 15.2%, and operating profit dropped to NIS 3.6 million from NIS 6.7 million. So the company sold more, broadened its offering, and also benefited from price increases by corrugated-carton producers, but the economic quality of the growth weakened.

The other segment repeated the same pattern. Revenue rose 3.2% to NIS 164.7 million, gross profit edged up to NIS 37.7 million, but operating profit fell to NIS 3.8 million from NIS 6.8 million. That is another way of saying the group may be diversified in revenue, but in 2025 not every engine that sold more also created more value for common shareholders.

Who paid for the result

The clearest answer is that the balance sheet paid for it. Higher volumes, a broader offering, and wider commercial reach did not come free. The company held more receivables, more inventory, and less supplier funding. That is why 2025 cannot be read as just a clean earnings year. It was also a year in which part of the improvement was pre-funded.

Competitively, Amir benefits from a very old and sticky customer base, nationwide reach, and a product basket that lets farmers buy several categories under one roof. On the other hand, the company itself describes growing generic competition in crop protection, sharp price changes in fertilizers, and higher raw-material costs in packaging. So its advantage is mainly in distribution, availability, and relationships, not in immunity from price pressure.

Cash Flow, Debt and Capital Structure

This is where the Amir story becomes sharp. If 2025 is read through net income, it looks like a decent year of improvement. If it is read through all-in cash flexibility, it looks like a year in which the company bought time.

The full cash picture: the bank bridged almost the entire gap

On an all-in cash flexibility basis, 2025 did not generate excess cash. Operating cash flow was negative NIS 7.8 million. Investing cash outflow was NIS 28.7 million. On top of that came NIS 15.0 million of dividends paid, NIS 6.2 million of lease-liability repayments, and NIS 4.3 million of contingent-consideration payments.

In other words, before bank financing the company faced a gap of about NIS 62 million. That almost exactly matched the NIS 62.0 million net increase in short-term bank credit. Cash did not weaken because of one single event. It weakened because day-to-day business required more working capital at the same time that investments and deal-related obligations kept consuming cash.

Working capital: the issue is not demand, it is the cost of the sale

The main balance-sheet change sat in working capital. Receivables rose to NIS 539.6 million from NIS 499.3 million. Inventory rose to NIS 155.4 million from NIS 132.7 million. At the same time trade payables fell to NIS 346.3 million from NIS 368.4 million. The company itself explains that current-asset growth came mainly from about NIS 40.3 million of additional receivables and NIS 22.7 million of additional inventory, while the current-liability movement reflected about NIS 62 million of higher bank credit partly offset by about NIS 22.1 million less supplier financing.

That says something deeper about growth quality. Amir sold more where it was worth selling, but it did not simultaneously preserve the same trade-funding discipline. Average customer-credit days rose to 128 days from 121 days. Supplier days stood at 107. In that kind of balance-sheet structure, even real profit improvement can get stuck before it becomes cash.

The implication matters even more because receivables are now 55% of total assets. Gross receivables stood at NIS 541.2 million and the allowance for expected credit losses at NIS 26.7 million. The auditors flagged the receivables-loss estimate as a key audit matter. That does not mean a collection problem is already proven. It does mean receivables should not be treated as just another line item in the balance sheet. They now hold a meaningful share of the accounting and economic risk.

Debt, contingent consideration, and the real flexibility line

Short-term bank credit carries a weighted variable interest rate of 5.73%. That is not dramatic on its own, but it says something important about Amir's funding layer: flexibility is still there, but it is being purchased through bank lines rather than through surplus cash generation. Next to that sits NIS 35.2 million of contingent-consideration liabilities, with NIS 19.6 million already sitting in current payables, and one deal-related amount of NIS 14.5 million expected to be paid in the second quarter of 2026.

This matters because part of Amir's strategy is already pre-funded. The acquisitions and partnerships were meant to strengthen feed and broaden the offer to the agricultural customer, but they did not arrive free. That is why the gross-profit improvement cannot be read without also looking at contingent consideration, equity-method investments, and the jump in short-term bank borrowing.

The balance sheet is not weak. Equity rose to NIS 425.8 million and funded 43.1% of assets, versus 43.2% a year earlier. The presentation shows 21.3% leverage on a net debt to net cap basis. So this is not a company pushed into a balance-sheet corner. But its real capital-allocation room is tighter than the equity ratio alone suggests, because working capital is absorbing a large share of the movement.

Bnei Brak is value, but not yet flexibility

The real-estate layer sharpens that gap. Investment property is carried at NIS 44.7 million of depreciated cost, while disclosed fair value stands at NIS 171.6 million. That is real value. But it is still not the same as future dividends, easier refinancing, or free corporate cash.

The reason is simple. The commercial portion of the asset has already gone through one lease reset that reduced minimum rent and increased required investment, and the project is still in completion mode. Until the market sees the center operating with real rent receipts and stable execution, this value layer remains mostly strategic and accounting-based.

Outlook

Before talking about 2026, four points need to be fixed in place because they do not stand out enough on a first read:

• Feed has already become Amir's real profit engine, even if not yet its largest revenue line.
• The profitability improvement of 2025 did not convert into cash. It was absorbed by receivables, inventory, and weaker supplier funding.
• Bnei Brak already contains a meaningful value layer, but 2026 will have to prove access to that value rather than just display it.
• The new growth engines around turkeys, layers, and equipment are still in build mode, not in a clean cash-harvest phase.

2026 is a proof year, not a harvest year

The company did not publish a full consolidated formal guidance framework for 2026, so the forward read has to be built from events, transaction structures, and operating patterns. The right label for the next year is a proof year. Not because the business is weak, but because it has already shown it can generate earnings and now has to prove that those earnings can also come through as cash and accessible value.

The first proof point is working capital. Amir cannot afford another year in which receivables and inventory grow faster than the company can fund them through suppliers and operating profit. If customer-credit days remain around 128, if inventory keeps rising, and if bank credit remains the main swing funding source, even higher EBITDA will not fully clean up the story.

The second proof point is Bnei Brak. The company is already receiving rent from the commercial portion from January 2026, and the complex is expected to begin operating during the second quarter. The market does not need another fair-value number. It needs to see the property become a recurring rent source that reduces dependence on agricultural working-capital swings.

The third proof point is what happens to the poultry ecosystem. Mekor Hod Amir has already lifted feed volumes, but the partnership itself still lost money. Leser Amir is still in build mode. If 2026 shows a shift from pure volume effect to real profit contribution, the read on feed becomes much stronger. If not, part of 2025 may look in hindsight like a build year in which Amir absorbed the investment before harvesting the full benefit.

The fourth proof point is capital allocation. Amir wants to exercise the option to acquire the rest of Yeadim, and it continues to manage a layer of contingent considerations and equity-method investments. That may strengthen the broader agricultural platform. It can also extend the financing bridge if those moves do not reach cash contribution quickly enough.

The fourth quarter reinforces that reading. Sales were almost flat versus the third quarter, NIS 317.7 million against NIS 315.7 million, but operating profit nearly doubled to NIS 24.3 million. At the same time finance expense jumped to NIS 7.4 million from NIS 3.4 million in the third quarter. That is a very Amir-like picture for this stage: clear operating improvement, but with financing cost attached to it.

Even the compensation structure points in the same direction. The EBITDA hurdles of NIS 90 million, NIS 94 million, and NIS 96 million sit above 2025 but not dramatically above it. That is an important signal. Even internally, 2026 does not look like a comfort year. It looks like a year in which the company needs to prove it can move above the current operating level without leaning even harder on the balance sheet.

What has to happen over the next 2 to 4 quarters for the thesis to strengthen is relatively clear:

• Receivables and inventory need to stop outgrowing sales, and operating cash flow needs to turn positive again.
• Bnei Brak needs to open in practice and start producing stable rent, not just fair value.
• Feed needs to preserve its profit level even as the new turkey and layer-related moves shift from construction mode to normal operation.
• If Amir exercises the Yeadim option, it will need to show that the move strengthens the commercial system without opening another financing hole.

Risks

The main risk in Amir is not business collapse. It is a widening gap between earnings, cash, and accessible value. That gap has to be broken down into a few separate layers.

Receivables are both the largest asset and the largest pressure point

Receivables stand at NIS 541.2 million gross, 55% of total assets. That is material enough for the auditors to identify the expected-credit-loss calculation as a key audit matter. The allowance itself stands at NIS 26.7 million, and the company describes a monitoring system that uses collateral, security interests, and at times credit insurance.

But there is friction here too. The company insures only customers with at least NIS 1 million of exposure, excluding kibbutzim and purchasing organizations of kibbutzim, and the insured ceiling at the end of 2025 was NIS 57 million. So there is a real protection layer, but it does not cover the full receivables book. As long as collection discipline holds, this works. If credit terms keep stretching, the concern does not need to come from one sharp event. It can come from a slow erosion in receivables quality.

Feed is strength, but also a hidden concentration

Amir looks diversified by product, but 2025 showed that earnings are much more concentrated. Feed almost alone carried the improvement in operating profit. On top of that, Mekor Hod Amir is already defined as one of the two largest customers in the feed segment. That is a strong strategic synergy as long as the partnership improves. It also means that Amir's central earnings engine is already partly tied to a venture that still posted losses in 2025.

Funding, FX, and contingent obligations

Short-term bank credit carries variable rates, and the company explicitly notes foreign-exchange exposure, mainly to the dollar and euro, because of imported goods. To reduce part of the exposure it sometimes prepays certain suppliers using shekel bank financing. That is practical, but not free. Once the short-term bank layer has already grown to NIS 113.3 million, any further inventory build or FX-protection action comes with a real financing cost.

Alongside that sits the NIS 35.2 million contingent-consideration liability. This is not a number that should trigger alarm on its own, but it does have to be counted as part of the capital structure. It says that part of the strategic expansion of recent years has still not been fully paid for.

Bnei Brak still has to move from promise to operation

Bnei Brak is both a value engine and a risk point. The lease was revised because of market changes and completion delays. Minimum rent was cut, required investment rose, and the project still was not fully complete at year-end. If opening slips again, if sub-tenant take-up is slower than expected, or if actual rent comes in below market expectations, the gap between fair value and accessible cash will remain open.

The supply chain is broad, but not immune

The company has roughly 700 suppliers in Israel and another 50 abroad, and about 94% of purchases are made in Israel. That is a strong diversification base. Still, the company also says it has three material suppliers, each representing more than 10% of total purchases. Management argues there is no material dependency because substitute products exist in several categories. That is a relative strength, but it is not full insurance against disruption, price spikes, or tighter availability.

Conclusions

Amir Shivuk comes out of 2025 with two true stories at the same time. At the operating level, the feed mill and the moves around it have upgraded earnings quality far more than the consolidated revenue figure suggests. At the cash level, this is still a company that needed the bank to finance the bridge period while the Bnei Brak real-estate layer remained mostly a value story waiting for full operation.

The current thesis in one line: In 2025 Amir effectively became a feed-driven earnings story wrapped in a broad distribution platform, but cash has not yet caught up with that shift.

What changed versus the older way of reading the company is the center of gravity. Amir could once be read mainly as a broad agricultural-input distributor. Today earnings already sit mainly in feed, in the adjacent moves built around feed, and in real estate that still needs to convert from embedded value into actual cash flow.

The strongest counter-thesis is that this caution may be too harsh. The company still has a broad customer and supplier base, NIS 425.8 million of equity, a NIS 171.6 million disclosed fair value for Bnei Brak, and a feed engine that already proved real improvement. On that reading, the 2025 cash pressure could turn out to be a temporary investment-year effect.

What can change the market reading over the short to medium term is relatively clear. A smooth Bnei Brak opening, better operating cash flow, stabilization or reduction in bank credit, and continued strong feed profitability would make the story much cleaner. On the other hand, if receivables keep expanding, the bank keeps funding the gap, and Mekor Hod Amir remains loss-making, the read shifts from improvement story to bridge story.

Why this matters: in an agricultural distribution and feed business, the difference between earnings that remain on the statements and earnings that reach the cash box is the difference between a real improvement year and an interim year waiting for proof.

What must happen over the next 2 to 4 quarters for the thesis to strengthen: working capital needs to stabilize, Bnei Brak needs to generate actual rent, and feed needs to preserve profitability without rising dependence on short-term bank funding. What would weaken the thesis is another year of good earnings with weak cash conversion, or another widening gap between operating improvement and financing needs.