Amir Shivuk: How Much the Turkey, Layer, and Yeadim Moves Really Build a New Feed Engine

What This Follow-Up Is Actually Testing

The main article already established that feed is now the core earnings engine at Amir. This continuation isolates a narrower question: are the turkey, layer, and Yeadim moves already turning the feed mill into a broader growth platform, or are they still a set of adjacent initiatives that look coherent strategically but do not yet close into one clean economic engine?

That matters because the mill is already strong even before the surrounding story is fully proven. In 2025 the feed segment generated NIS 312.1 million of revenue, NIS 69.4 million of gross profit, a 22.2% gross margin, and production of 192,726 tons. The presentation says annual capacity reaches up to about 200,000 tons. In other words, the mill is already operating at a high level. The next step cannot rest only on adding more customers. It has to rest on better demand quality, stability, and ideally demand that improves earnings rather than only throughput.

The local evidence leads to a fairly sharp conclusion: these moves do not all sit on the same maturity curve. Mekor Hod Amir already creates measurable feed demand, Leser Amir is a long-dated option on future demand that the company itself still cannot measure cleanly, and Yeadim is really a commercial-control and service layer for the agricultural customer more than a direct feed engine. Putting all three under one headline of a "new feed engine" is a stronger statement than the evidence currently supports.

Mekor Hod Amir: The Strongest Proof, but Not Yet the Cleanest One

If there is one piece of evidence that the strategy can truly pull feed through the mill, Mekor Hod Amir is where it starts. It is also the only move where the direct link is already measurable. The partnership was set up in April 2024, the transaction closed on October 1, 2024, and Amir paid NIS 7 million for 50% of the related assets. On top of that, additional consideration is due in about three years based on results, with a floor of NIS 3 million. The partnership also acquired inventory and fixed assets using shareholder loans of about NIS 5.9 million from each partner.

The strength of the move is that it already shows up in real mill demand. Most of the feed consumed by Mekor Hod Amir is supplied by Amir through its feed mill. In 2025 Amir sold about 26,430 tons of feed to the venture, and Mekor Hod Amir is already described as one of the two largest customers in the feed business. This is no longer synergy as a slogan. It is real throughput.

There is also enough scale here to matter. Amir estimates that Mekor Hod Amir holds about 12% of the Israeli turkey-meat market and that its annual revenue should average around NIS 120 million starting in 2026. If those expectations hold, the venture can become a real anchor customer for the mill rather than a temporary launch effect.

But this is exactly where the line between volume and a new earnings engine matters. In 2025 Amir's share of Mekor Hod Amir's losses was NIS 1.704 million, after only a NIS 295 thousand profit in the reported 2024 period. So at the mill level the move is already supporting demand. At the venture level it has not yet proven that it can produce profit for shareholders without leaning on more capital and future contingent consideration.

That distinction matters. Mekor Hod Amir already creates a large customer, but it has not yet proven self-contained economics. At this stage it improves mill utilization and demand visibility more than it proves a clean new earnings layer at the equity-accounted level. That is very different from saying a new engine is already fully built.

Leser Amir: A Long Option, with Potential but Without a Measurable Bridge Yet

Leser Amir looks, on paper, like the logical next move. The partnership was signed in February 2025, started operating in the third quarter, and is meant to operate in investments and lending for the construction of layer facilities. Strategically the story is attractive: at full build-out the company expects about 1 million laying hens and revenue of around NIS 120 million to NIS 130 million.

The funding structure is also more attractive than the turkey venture. The build period is estimated at up to 3 years, the construction of the farms is expected to be financed by bank financing raised by Leser Amir and by grants received by the growers, and Amir says it is not expected to invest material amounts in the venture. From a capital-allocation perspective that is a much easier shape: if the move works, Amir may get future feed demand without carrying a heavy direct equity burden of the type seen in the turkey move.

But that advantage comes with a very clear weakness: there is still no way to measure how much of the future demand will really be incremental. The company explicitly says that once the farms are completed it expects to increase feed consumption in the layer field, but because some of the growers with whom Leser Amir has contracted were already Amir customers, it cannot accurately estimate the future effect on feed volumes.

That may be the single most important sentence in this entire continuation. It says clearly that not every projected increase in Leser Amir's activity automatically translates into new demand for the mill. Part of the move may end up being a deepening of relationships with existing customers, part of it a defense of market share, and only part of it genuinely incremental mill demand.

On current results, this is still a very early-stage story. Amir's share of Leser Amir's losses since completion is only NIS 172 thousand. That is not alarming. It does, however, underline that the venture is still in a build phase, not in a thesis-proving phase.

So for now Leser Amir is best understood as a strategic option, not as an established engine. It may turn out to be an excellent move if it creates new demand with little direct capital from Amir. But as long as the company itself says that the future feed contribution cannot yet be measured accurately, there is no basis to describe it today as a proven new feed engine.

Yeadim: More Control of the Farmer Wallet, Less Direct Demand for the Mill

The third link, Yeadim LeShivuk, is fundamentally different from the two poultry-related ventures. Amir has owned 50% of it since January 1, 2022. Yeadim imports, markets, and sells agricultural machinery and tractors in Israel, and also provides maintenance and repair services. The presentation says its 2025 revenue was about NIS 38 million, and Amir's share of Yeadim's profit was NIS 826 thousand, down from NIS 1.022 million in 2024.

That already shows why it is hard to place Yeadim under the same headline of a new feed engine. Yeadim does not consume feed. It does not directly pull tons into the mill. If it contributes, it does so elsewhere: by broadening Amir's touch points with the farmer, tying equipment, spare parts, packing-house systems, tractors, and service into the same commercial envelope, and perhaps strengthening Amir's ability to be a broader supplier to the same customer.

That is also why the more interesting line in Yeadim is not only the equity-accounted profit but the financial link. In the investment table Amir shows a NIS 4.045 million loan balance to Yeadim carrying 10.25% real interest, and in the related-company income table Amir recorded NIS 526 thousand of interest income from Yeadim in 2025. Unlike the turkey and layer moves, then, Yeadim is already generating not only a share of profit but also a financing return for Amir.

This is exactly why Yeadim needs to be classified correctly. Yeadim is a commercial-control layer with positive financial contribution, not a direct feed-demand layer. It may be a very good move. It is just good for a different reason.

That brings the capital-allocation question into focus. Under the shareholder agreement Amir has an option to acquire full ownership from 2026 based on Yeadim's 2025 financial statements, and in January 2026 Amir already said it intends to exercise the option after the statements are approved. What is missing is the single most important number: price. Without price, it is hard to know whether this is a sensible platform-deepening acquisition or a capital decision that may divert resources from the most direct feed-adjacent opportunities.

What Is Already Working, and What Is Still Open

The table leads to a simple conclusion. Amir is not currently building one move but three very different layers. Mekor Hod Amir is meant to pull physical demand into the mill. Leser Amir is meant to build future demand, but over a longer time frame and with uncertainty over the true net addition. Yeadim is meant to broaden control over the customer interface.

Once the picture is broken down that way, the need for caution becomes clear. If all three moves are merged into one headline, the narrative becomes smoother than the evidence. If they are separated, the company looks like it has one proof point, one option, and one capital-allocation decision.

So Is a New Feed Engine Being Built Here

At this stage the answer is yes, but only halfway. A new feed engine starts to exist when the mill is surrounded by anchor customers, wider control points in the agricultural customer relationship, and demand that does not depend only on spot selling into the open market. Mekor Hod Amir already offers partial proof of that. Leser Amir may add another layer later. Yeadim may widen the commercial grip on the customer.

But to call this a true new engine, three things still need to happen. First, Mekor Hod Amir has to move from being a large customer to being a profitable venture. Second, Leser Amir has to show how much of the future demand is genuinely new to the mill rather than recycled from existing customers. Third, any full exercise of the Yeadim option has to come with clear capital logic, because without that a move that broadens commercial control can start to look like capital dispersion rather than reinforcement of the feed core.

There is also an operating point worth watching closely. With mill output already at 192,726 tons in 2025 against stated annual capacity of up to about 200,000 tons, it is easy to see why these adjacent moves matter. If the mill is already relatively close to its stated ceiling, the value of each additional ton will not be determined only by volume. It will be determined by customer quality, demand stability, and the ability to preserve high profitability. In other words, the ecosystem matters not just to sell more, but to sell better.

Conclusion

The main article was right to identify feed as the center of gravity. This continuation sharpens the point that the ventures around the mill are not one uniform bloc. Mekor Hod Amir is already a demand proof, Leser Amir is an option on future demand, and Yeadim is a commercial-control move.

The current thesis in one line: Amir is building a business envelope around the feed mill that could become a new engine, but as of the end of 2025 only one part of that envelope is already proven, while the rest is still being tested through patience, capital, and execution.

That matters because the line between "synergy" and a real engine runs exactly here. A real engine does not only pull more tons. It also holds profit, requires reasonable capital, and can explain what is truly incremental versus what already existed inside the system. In 2025 Amir took a meaningful step in that direction. It has not yet fully proven the case.