Amir Shivuk: Bnei Brak Between NIS 44.7 Million and NIS 171.6 Million, and When the Value Really Becomes Liquid
The main article already showed that Bnei Brak is Amir Shivuk's largest value layer. This follow-up explains why the NIS 44.7 million versus NIS 171.6 million headline is still not cash: the lease terms were reset, the investment bill grew, and the real proof only arrives once 2026 rent shows up in reported numbers.
Where Bnei Brak Sits in the Thesis
The main article argued that Amir Shivuk's 2025 profit moved ahead of cash. This follow-up isolates Bnei Brak because it is the sharpest gap between value that looks obvious on paper and value that can actually be seen in the bank. The broad headline is NIS 44.7 million of carrying value versus NIS 171.6 million of fair value for investment property. But almost the entire story sits in one asset: Bnei Brak alone is carried at NIS 40.3 million and valued at NIS 163.2 million.
That is also what makes Bnei Brak the real test point. The value already exists in accounting terms. The commercial agreement is no longer theoretical either: from January 2026 the company has been receiving rent from the refurbished portion, and the full complex is expected to begin operating in the second quarter of 2026. Still, that value is not truly liquid yet. The reason is simple: the lease was reset to lower minimum rent, cumulative project investment climbed to about NIS 31.2 million, and there is still NIS 2.822 million of betterment levy left to pay through 2028. The road from fair value to cash still runs through execution.
The non-obvious point is that the NIS 171.6 million headline can make this look like a diversified real-estate portfolio. That is wrong. Bnei Brak accounts for about 95% of total investment-property fair value and roughly 97% of the total gap between carrying value and fair value. So the question here is not how much Amir Shivuk's real estate is worth. The question is when Bnei Brak stops being an appraisal and starts becoming rent that shows up in results.
What Changed in the Deal Economics
The key axis here is not just asset value, but the terms under which that value is supposed to turn into rent. In December 2021, Amir started the move with expected investment of about NIS 10 million and annual minimum rent of NIS 4 million. In October 2022, after the planned built area was expanded from 3,906 square meters to 5,321 square meters, expected investment rose to about NIS 20 million and the minimum rent stepped up to NIS 5 million, with completion targeted for the second quarter of 2025.
Then came November 2025, which is the clause that matters most for the 2026 read. Because of major changes in the Bnei Brak rental market and because the works took longer to complete, the parties signed a second addendum. This time the tenant committed to complete the works by January 1, 2026, the first lease period was extended to 6 years, but the minimum annual rent dropped to NIS 4.58 million for the first three years and NIS 4.88 million from year four. At the same time, the company paid another NIS 3 million into the project, and cumulative investment had already reached about NIS 31.2 million by the end of 2025.
| Stage | Investment | Annual minimum rent | Timeline | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| December 2021 | About NIS 10 million expected | NIS 4.0 million | Adaptation through end 2024 | Starting point of the value-creation plan |
| October 2022 | About NIS 20 million expected | NIS 5.0 million | Completion by Q2 2025 | More area, more investment, more rent |
| November 2025 | NIS 31.2 million cumulative by end 2025 | NIS 4.58 million for the first three years, NIS 4.88 million from year four | Rent from January 2026, opening expected in Q2 2026 | Higher contractual certainty, but lower near-term return and higher cost |
The economic meaning is blunt. In 2022 the project looked like a simple progression toward more area, more investment, and more rent. By 2025 the picture had become more complicated: investment ballooned well beyond NIS 20 million, the rent floor was cut versus the 2022 plan, and the opening was pushed back by about a year. The value can still be very high, but the path to cash is less generous than it looked in the interim phase.
When the Value Actually Turns Liquid
There are three different stages here, and only the last one gives the market a real reason to grant full credit.
The first stage is fair value. That explains why the asset matters, but it is still accounting value. Total investment-property fair value stood at NIS 171.6 million at the end of 2025, slightly below NIS 173.4 million at the end of 2024, even as carrying value rose to NIS 44.7 million from NIS 41.7 million. That matters. More investment did not create more fair value at the portfolio level in 2025. Another valuation discussion on its own is unlikely to change the read.
The second stage is contracted rent. From January 2026 the company has already been receiving rent from the refurbished portion. That is the point where value stops being only an appraiser's line item and starts running through cash collection. But even here, caution matters: the NIS 4.58 million floor tells you the minimum the agreement guarantees at the start, not the full economics of the complex.
The third stage is full operation. The company estimates that total rent from the full complex will be about NIS 9 million a year, and the site is expected to open in the second quarter of 2026. That is the real test. If that number materializes, Bnei Brak moves from an asset with a high paper valuation to an asset that shows almost double the 2025 rental income from Bnei Brak, which stood at NIS 4.415 million.
This is the core issue. Anyone looking only at NIS 171.6 million can think the value is already here. In practice, it moves through a ladder: first the agreement, then minimum rent, and only then a fully operating complex that shows whether the roughly NIS 9 million annual target is actually achievable. Until that last stage appears in reported numbers, the market is likely to keep some execution discount on the asset.
What Still Stands Between Value and Cash
Even after rent has started, not every shekel of the gap becomes free for shareholders. In June 2023 the company reached a betterment-levy settlement with the Bnei Brak municipality for a total of NIS 5.644 million. By the end of 2025 it had paid NIS 2.822 million, and the balance will be paid in three annual installments through 2028. This is not an existential issue, but it is another reminder that the path from real-estate value to free cash also runs through municipal payments, project completion, and residual property-related uses of cash.
That is why the important question for the next reports is not whether Bnei Brak is worth a lot. That is already clear. The question is how quickly that value becomes visible through rental income, and how close the actual number gets first to the contractual floor and then to the company's roughly NIS 9 million annual estimate for the full complex.
Bottom Line
Bnei Brak is no longer a dormant-land story. It is also not a clean-cash story yet. As of the end of 2025, Amir Shivuk owns an asset whose fair value is very high relative to carrying value, but whose practical economics are still unfinished: the lease terms were reset downward, the investment bill grew, and the real proof now runs through 2026.
The current thesis in one line: Bnei Brak is a real value layer, but it only becomes liquid value if 2026 proves that actual rent is catching up with what the valuation already assumes.
The strongest counter-thesis is that the market is being too harsh. The agreement is already signed, rent already began in January 2026, and the company is talking about roughly NIS 9 million of annual rental income from the full complex. On that view, the gap between NIS 44.7 million and NIS 171.6 million is not really a liquidity problem. It is simply a reporting lag.
What could change the read in the near term is fairly clear: reports that show steady rent collection from January 2026, a smooth opening in the second quarter of 2026, and evidence that the full complex is moving toward a rental run rate that supports the asset value. On the other hand, any further delay, extra cost, or visible gap between the contractual floor and actual rent would keep Bnei Brak in the category of value that exists, but has not fully broken free.
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