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  <title>Deep TASE RSS</title>
  <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/rss.xml</link>
  <description>Latest Deep TASE analyses on Israeli listed companies.</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  <item>
    <title>Amram: How much of the profit comes from revaluation, and how much from operating economics</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3546</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3546</guid>
    <description>In 2025, Amram did not build all of its profit on revaluation, but a large share of the improvement versus 2024 did run through that line. Without fair-value gains, pretax profit would have been only NIS 170.0 million, while net finance cost stood at NIS 111.9 million and financial liabilities of NIS 4.30 billion still require real cash earnings.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 22:12:01 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Penthouse: Does The Development Pipeline Really Justify The Valuation Jump</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3545</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3545</guid>
    <description>The development-heavy asset cluster at the center of Penthouse&#39;s 2025 story reached about ILS 1.04 billion, up from about ILS 773.4 million a year earlier. But most of that increase did not come from assets already producing stable NOI. It came from projects still waiting on permits, openings, lease-up, or operational ramp.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 22:06:36 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Netanel Group: When permits and signatures actually become revenue</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3544</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3544</guid>
    <description>In 2025 Netanel showed a sharp gap between what is already close to revenue and what still sits at the permit, signature, or option stage. Modiin has moved into marketing and execution prep, but Ramat Gan and Beit Dagan mainly add future depth to the pipeline, while most of the NIS 1.33 billion of projected revenue in planning-stage projects is scheduled around 2029.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:54:19 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Amram: What the March 2026 urban-renewal acquisition really adds</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3543</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3543</guid>
    <description>The Sinco deal gives Amram more than another 50% stake in an urban-renewal company. It adds an execution platform built around tenant signing and planning work, with a heavier financing layer than the headline suggests.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:53:38 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Gaon Holdings: Series D, Series E, and what really remains of covenant headroom</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3542</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3542</guid>
    <description>At the end of 2025 Gaon Holdings looked far from a covenant breach, but that is not the same as real financial freedom. On a standalone basis it had NIS 14.26 million of cash against NIS 21.45 million of current financial liabilities, so 2026 still depends on upstream dividends and precise execution.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:52:09 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Penthouse: The Debt, Collateral And Covenant Test Behind Series A</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3541</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3541</guid>
    <description>Penthouse’s Series A bond looks very comfortable on three solo covenants, but its real protection layer is less spacious than the headline equity implies: debt to collateral stood at 69.9% at the end of 2025 against a 75% warning line, while asset-level bank debt, PAI Siam bonds, and hotel operating claims already sit beneath it.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:45:23 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Copperline: What Really Happened at Hyde Park and Why It Changes the Picture</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3540</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3540</guid>
    <description>Hyde Park did not suddenly become a weak Tampa asset. 22 of the 29 vacant units are concentrated in the flooded 16 Davis building, and the appraisal assumes full repair within a year with insurance covering the cost. So the real question is not 90% occupancy. It is whether the repair timeline and the insurance assumption actually hold.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:38:48 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Blue Wave-Sh: How Much Runway the Fundraisings Buy, and What Shareholders Pay for It</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3539</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3539</guid>
    <description>Blue Wave-Sh ended 2025 with only NIS 19 thousand of cash, while another NIS 452 thousand was still sitting in receivables from a share issuance. Even after that amount was collected after the balance-sheet date, the company says cash was down to about NIS 9 thousand near report approval, meaning 2025 dilution bought very little time and left a large overhang of warrants and options still hanging over shareholders.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:38:00 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Hila&#39;s Israeli Value Stack: The Tel Aviv Hotel and Ra&#39;anana Versus Today&#39;s NOI</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3538</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3538</guid>
    <description>Hila Offices&#39; two largest Israeli assets, the Tel Aviv hotel and Ra&#39;anana, are worth a combined ILS 306.1 million, while the two mature leased assets in Israel are worth only ILS 73.6 million and generate ILS 3.5 million of NOI. The local value is already on the balance sheet, but most of the local cash flow is still waiting for delivery, operation, and stabilization.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:37:15 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Netanel Group: How much covenant room is really left after the private placement</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3537</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3537</guid>
    <description>At the end of 2025 Netanel was still inside its covenant limits, but a 16.98% equity-to-balance-sheet ratio and an 82.4% net financial debt to net CAP ratio left little room for mistakes. The NIS 45 million January 2026 transaction buys time, but against NIS 130.6 million of current bank and bond maturities and NIS 206.0 million of expected equity needs across bank-financed projects, it still does not create a relaxed balance-sheet buffer.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:35:36 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Amram: The real test is working capital and funding, not just revenue</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3536</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3536</guid>
    <description>In 2025, Amram moved from a model where customer advances funded a meaningful part of activity to one where the balance sheet had to do much more of the work. Contract assets rose above customer liabilities, operating cash flow was negative even before land purchases, and NIS 1.13 billion of financing cash closed the gap.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:35:09 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Simad after the bond: the debt structure, related parties, and what really backs the notes</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3535</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3535</guid>
    <description>At Simad, the notes do not sit on a long-standing public company. They sit on a 2025 structure that includes a $50 million payment to the controllers, an ongoing related-party layer, and a pass-through tax setup. The real credit question is not only leverage, but what actually remains inside the pledged ring-fence.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:32:48 GMT</pubDate>
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  <item>
    <title>Gaon Holdings: Why earnings are not yet turning into cash</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3534</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3534</guid>
    <description>Gaon Holdings improved earnings in 2025, but NIS 34.7 million was absorbed by working capital, mainly receivables and inventory. That leaves financing flexibility still dependent on working-capital turnover and bank funding rather than on newly created surplus cash.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:29:45 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Birman: The Funding Model Holding Up Inventory and Growth</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3533</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3533</guid>
    <description>Birman ended 2025 with only NIS 244 thousand of cash, but this is not a cash-hoarding company. The model supporting growth rests on more than NIS 310 million of inventory and receivables, rolling bank facilities, and working-capital discipline that cannot afford to slip.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:27:42 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Penthouse: How Much Of 2025 Profit Actually Turned Into Cash</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3532</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3532</guid>
    <description>Penthouse reported ILS 170.1 million of net profit in 2025, but cash flow from operations was negative ILS 9.8 million and investing cash flow absorbed another ILS 146.9 million. The year-end cash balance was built mainly through financing, while most of the profit came from property revaluations and bargain-purchase accounting.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:23:54 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Copperline: Mapping the 2026-2028 Refinancing Wall</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3531</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3531</guid>
    <description>Copperline’s refinancing picture is no longer a vague cloud of debt. After the first-quarter actions, the remaining wall is mainly four asset-level loans in 2026, followed by a public debt schedule that steps up again in 2027 and especially in 2028.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:22:46 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>De Leser Follow-Up: lockboxes, cross-default, and how much flexibility is really left</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3530</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3530</guid>
    <description>This follow-up isolates the debt architecture itself: three assets with active lockboxes generated just over $6.1 million of annual NOI at year-end 2025, specified Cross Default links connect property loans to wider obligations, and the new Monsey financing buys time only under tight distribution limits. In other words, property-level debt does not fully ring-fence the risk.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:22:30 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Blue Wave-Sh: What Really Supports Kopter’s Carrying Value</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3529</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3529</guid>
    <description>Blue Wave-Sh carries its Kopter stake at NIS 1.676 million at the end of 2025, even though its share of Kopter’s net assets is already negative NIS 106 thousand. For that number to hold, Kopter has to move quickly from tiny revenue to sharp commercialization, and Blue Wave-Sh itself has to fund and execute.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:21:16 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Hila Offices in the UK: Double-Digit Yields Versus Collateral Complexity</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3528</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3528</guid>
    <description>Hila Offices&#39; UK portfolio offers long leases and roughly 11% to 13% NOI yields, but the 2026 filing thread shows that collateral perfection is not keeping pace with the assets themselves. When an English mortgage needs extensions and bondholder approval, and each building depends on a single tenant, credit risk becomes legal and operational, not just real-estate based.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:18:38 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Simad Holdings: How customer advances fund the seasonality</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3527</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3527</guid>
    <description>Simad’s working-capital deficit looks heavy only at first glance. In practice it is driven mainly by customer advances for the 2026 season, so the real question is not whether the cash exists, but when it is truly locked in for the company and when it is still seasonal customer money.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:14:54 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Birman in 2025: Sales Rose, but Cash Stayed Trapped in Inventory and Short-Term Credit</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3526</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3526</guid>
    <description>Birman grew sales in 2025, cleaned up customer-credit quality, and reduced long-term bank debt, but the business did not become more relaxed. Cash at year-end was nearly zero, growth came mainly from import-led categories, and the post-balance-sheet management handover opens a new reading of the company.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:10:10 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Netanel Group in 2025: Sales came back, but the margin for error is still thin</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3525</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3525</guid>
    <description>Netanel Group ended 2025 with a sharp rebound in revenue, gross profit, and net income, but operating cash flow deteriorated further, cash was cut almost in half, and leverage metrics still leave little room for mistakes. The private placement, the Modiin permit, and the progress in Ramat Gan support the story, but they also make clear that the next phase will be decided by execution and cash conversion, not by pipeline headlines.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:08:48 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Gaon Holdings in 2025: the margin recovery is real, but cash is still stuck in working capital</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3524</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3524</guid>
    <description>Gaon Holdings ended 2025 with a sharp improvement in gross margin, operating profit, and net income, alongside a cleaner debt picture and a broader operating platform. The next test is no longer just earnings, but whether the company can release working capital, integrate the acquisitions, and turn the recovery into real balance-sheet flexibility.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:07:44 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Penthouse in 2025: Revaluations Built Equity, but the Real Test Is Turning Projects Into Cash</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3523</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3523</guid>
    <description>Penthouse ended 2025 with ILS 184.2 million of comprehensive income, ILS 747.7 million of equity and wide bond covenant headroom. But the headline still rests mainly on revaluations and acquisition accounting, while operating cash flow stayed negative and a very large pipeline still has to turn into revenue, NOI and cash.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:07:35 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Amram in 2025: Revenue surged, but the sales engine is already under more strain</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3522</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3522</guid>
    <description>Amram finished 2025 with a sharp rise in revenue, equity, and project scale, but the underlying picture is more complicated than the headline suggests. Free-market sales weakened, inventory and funding needs expanded, and part of the profit improvement came from property revaluations rather than only from deliveries.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:07:06 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Copperline 2025: The Portfolio Stabilized, but Cash and Refinancing Still Run the Story</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3521</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3521</guid>
    <description>Copperline ended 2025 with modest revenue and NOI growth and a sharp reduction in fair-value losses, but lower free cash, heavy financing costs, and a large refinancing agenda keep the story centered on the balance sheet rather than on operations.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:04:00 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>De Leser in 2025: NOI is still alive, but the real story is the financing test</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3520</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3520</guid>
    <description>De Leser ended 2025 with higher revenue and higher NOI, but that is no longer the core story. Financing costs, deeply negative FFO, a heavy maturity wall, and immediate post-balance-sheet asset sales and refinancing steps turn 2026 into a liquidity test rather than a comfortable holding year.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:02:47 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Blue Wave-Sh 2025: Equity Turned Positive, but the Story Is Still Funded by Issuances</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3519</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3519</guid>
    <description>Blue Wave-Sh ended 2025 with positive equity of NIS 338 thousand, but not because it built a working operating engine. The cash came from share issuances, year-end cash fell to NIS 19 thousand, and the balance sheet leans mainly on an accounting investment in a water-tech company.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 21:02:14 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Hila Offices 2025: Leverage Is Running Ahead of NOI</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3518</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3518</guid>
    <description>Hila Offices ended 2025 with ILS 634.4 million of assets and ILS 491.7 million of liabilities, while rental revenue rose only to ILS 6.5 million. The real test now is whether the new UK assets, the Tel Aviv hotel and Ra&#39;anana can turn balance-sheet growth into real NOI.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 20:59:17 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Simad Holdings in 2025: The camp engine is strong, but the story is already bigger</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3517</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3517</guid>
    <description>Simad finished 2025 with higher revenue, EBITDA, and cash flow, but the key issue is not just next summer. The company replaced bank debt with public bonds, relies on customer advances as its working-capital engine, and has already started moving into real estate outside the core camp portfolio.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 20:58:48 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>De Leser Follow-Up: the four-asset sale, the lower closing price, and what is left in the portfolio</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3547</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3547</guid>
    <description>Between the January agreement and the March closing, De Leser&#39;s four-asset sale moved from an approximately $28 million headline to a $26.7 million closing, and part of the reset was quickly recycled into a partial Series H redemption. This is why the story is not just about selling assets, but about what the company now has left and how concentrated the remaining operating value has become.</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 08:00:55 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Merchavia Follow-Up: Holdco Liquidity, Dilution, and the Cost of Staying in the Cap Table</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3310</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3310</guid>
    <description>Merchavia ended 2025 with only NIS 352 thousand at the bottom of the cash flow statement, against NIS 8.466 million of current liabilities at the parent-company level. That gap turns financing and dilution into the core question behind the portfolio story.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:59:22 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Hourly After 2025: How Much Of The US Optionality Is Actually Economic</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3306</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3306</guid>
    <description>The US story around Hourly comes with a large addressable market, a strong partner, and a control structure that lets weSure consolidate the business from the fourth quarter of 2025. What is still missing is the economic core: revenue, payroll volume, premiums, conversion rates, and margins that would show whether this is already an earnings unit or still mainly a strategic option.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:58:19 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>MDG and Related-Party Operators: The Operating Moat That Is Also the Core Credit Risk</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3307</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3307</guid>
    <description>Nearly 39% of MDG&#39;s 2025 revenue came from companies tied to the controlling shareholder. When the tenants, the management platform, and the key decision-maker sit inside the same ecosystem, rent quality and governance quality become the same question.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:58:17 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Follow-up to Geshem LaMishtaken: How Much of the Expected Gross Profit Is Really Protected</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3304</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3304</guid>
    <description>Geshem LaMishtaken&#39;s project tables show NIS 427.7 million of expected gross profit across planning-stage projects, but only part of that figure looks truly locked in. In the projects explicitly exposed to selling-price changes, a 5% price decline erases NIS 37.3 million of gross profit and a 10% decline nearly wipes it out.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:58:10 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Satelle: How Much Of The Valuation Depends On Timely Delivery And Operating Assumptions</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3303</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3303</guid>
    <description>At year-end 2025 only SMB 8 was already operating and generating revenue and NOI, while SMB 9, SMB 3 and SMB 16 carried a combined value of EUR 24.7 million without proven operations. The real risk in Satelle is therefore not only how much it will cost to complete the assets, but how much of the value already rests on timely handover, rent-free periods, FF&amp;E, stabilization and yield assumptions.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:56:53 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Identi Healthcare: Related-Party Funding, Parallel Loans, and the Real Financing Flexibility</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3301</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3301</guid>
    <description>Identi ended 2025 with no current bank debt, but not with true financing independence. Year-end cash depended on an equity raise, a Back-to-Back loan through the controlling shareholder, and a procurement-and-overhead layer that already runs through related parties.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:56:52 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Modiin Follow-Up: Chittim Between a $6 Million Exit and a Funded Expansion</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3298</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3298</guid>
    <description>Chittim no longer sits on a simple line between a small asset and a clean disposal. After a $6 million buyout proposal, a new producing well, and the LFO deal that adds $10 million of cash plus up to $30 million of development funding, the question has shifted from selling at a known price to staying inside a funded but diluted option.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:56:07 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Equital: How much of the value really comes from Tamar?</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3297</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3297</guid>
    <description>Equital’s year-end 2025 valuation work puts the net investment balance in Tamar at ILS 3.457 billion, almost three quarters of the company’s market value on March 31, 2026. But this is not a hidden-treasure story: the cushion above book value is thin, and sensitivity to pricing, FX and funding remains high.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:55:57 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>iArgento: Liquidity, Dilution, and the Ability to Defend the Portfolio</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3295</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3295</guid>
    <description>At the end of 2025, iArgento had only NIS 521 thousand of cash and NIS 1.974 million of current financial assets, while NIS 4.234 million went back into fair-value investments during the year. This follow-up isolates why the key balance-sheet question is not leverage, but whether the partnership can fund follow-ons without forcing dilution.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:54:55 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Barak’s Real Capital Base: Deferred Tax Assets Versus Equity</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3293</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3293</guid>
    <description>Barak’s reported equity is only ILS 1.42 million, and its quick liquidity almost only covers current liabilities. Its tax-loss carryforwards could eventually translate into roughly ILS 3.68 million of tax shelter, but as of year-end 2025 that is still a future earning-power story, not hard capital.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:52:01 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>GenCell Follow-Up: real commercialization or just two customers and an unproven new activity</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3288</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3288</guid>
    <description>The 2025 numbers still do not describe broad commercialization. 97% of revenue came from customers above the 10% threshold, 87.9% of revenue came from Israel, and operating working capital shrank by 82%. This follow-up tests whether GenCell is building a real commercial engine, or mainly converting a very narrow base into a bit more time.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:50:33 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Magorit: How Much Room Is Left Between NOI and the Debt Wall?</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3289</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3289</guid>
    <description>Magorit ended 2025 with NIS 227.7 million of cash against a NIS 1.186 billion working-capital deficit. After the January 2026 Harel repayment and the dividend announced in March, the gap between NOI and the 2026 debt wall is still being closed through debt-market access, not through the properties&#39; current economics.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:50:29 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Beit Hazahav Follow-Up: Tel Aviv Campus Value, Encumbrance, and What Equity Value Is Really Left</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3287</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3287</guid>
    <description>The Tel Aviv campus did improve in 2025, but a NIS 272.3 million appraisal is a clean asset value, not the value that is actually free for equity. After resident deposits, bank credit and Series D bonds, the layer left for shareholders is materially smaller than the headline suggests.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:50:20 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Hachshara After IFRS 17: Why Profit Rose While CSM Fell</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3283</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3283</guid>
    <description>In 2025 Hachshara&#39;s life segment swung to NIS 45.2 million of pre-tax profit, even as CSM fell to NIS 284.8 million. The tension matters: earnings improved, but more of the lift came from fees, capital markets and reinsurance, not from a larger reservoir of future insurance margin.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:48:31 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Universal Motors Follow-up: Used-Car Residual Risk and the Funding Ladder</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3282</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3282</guid>
    <description>The real risk at Universal Motors is not only weaker new-car demand. A modest drop in used-car prices hits earnings, tightens balance-sheet ratios, and runs into a funding ladder built on banks, bonds, commercial paper, and supplier credit.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:48:11 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>GFI Follow-Up: The Beekman Capital Stack and Whether It Really Buys Time</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3281</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3281</guid>
    <description>The Beekman remains the strongest asset in GFI&#39;s portfolio, but the apparent cushion sits behind several layers that rank ahead of common equity: a $195 million senior mortgage, a preferred-equity layer, a tax benefit already capitalized into value, and assumptions that support the cash flow. The refinancing bought time, but it did not yet create real capital-allocation freedom.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:47:39 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>BUFF Follow-Up: The Credit Line, the KPI Triggers, and Where Cash Really Tightens</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3278</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3278</guid>
    <description>BUFF’s credit line looks wider in the headline than it was in usable cash at year-end 2025. With $752 thousand of cash, a $771 thousand working-capital deficit, and drawdowns gated by MRR and fresh equity, 2026 began first as a funding test.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:47:04 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>AYA New York Follow-Up: How Strong Is Series A Collateral, Really?</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3276</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3276</guid>
    <description>AYA New York&#39;s Series A collateral rests on Renoir and Riverside and shows a real asset cushion, but the security runs through LLC layers, senior mortgages, and tax and distribution constraints. This makes it better than ordinary holdco debt, but weaker than a clean first-lien read on two assets.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:46:48 GMT</pubDate>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>The Finke Acquisition: Is Kafrit Buying Better Mix Or Just More Complexity?</title>
    <link>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3273</link>
    <guid>https://www.deeptase.co.il/en/analysis/3273</guid>
    <description>Finke entered Kafrit&#39;s numbers for only three months, yet it already changed both capital allocation and the 2026 story. The accounting allocation says Kafrit is betting on brand and customer relationships, while the real test is whether that turns into better profitability in Europe.</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:46:11 GMT</pubDate>
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