Liam Harish Asakim in the First Quarter: Psagot HaTrapez Advances Support Cash, Harish Maof Still Lags
The first quarter gave Liam a real operating signal at Psagot HaTrapez: 74 signed contracts, 51.4% marketing progress, and buyer advances rising to NIS 28.5 million. Harish Maof, however, still has only 6 contracts and no recognized revenue, while the new Lod and Petah Tikva projects expand the capital burden before cash surpluses are proven.
Liam Harish Asakim opened 2026 with a quarter that moved forward in exactly one place and stayed unproven where investors most needed evidence. Psagot HaTrapez is now selling, collecting buyer advances, and starting to recognize revenue. Harish Maof, by contrast, has still not moved into meaningful marketing and has not recognized revenue. This is still a bridge-year funding story, not a profitability story. Buyer advances from Psagot HaTrapez helped make consolidated operating cash flow positive, but after investments, debt movements, and interest payments, cash still declined slightly. Equity fell to about NIS 30.5 million and the net equity-to-balance-sheet ratio stood at 11.4%, above the current covenant floor but not a wide cushion for a developer adding projects. Psagot HaTrapez has passed the halfway mark in marketing progress and kept signing contracts after the balance date, while Harish Maof remains at only 6 contracts, 6.67% marketing progress, and no recognized revenue. Over the next few quarters, the question is less whether the company has a pipeline and more whether that pipeline becomes cash, financing, released surpluses, and an equity cushion that does not keep shrinking.
Psagot HaTrapez Is Moving From Inventory To Sales
The strongest business signal in the quarter came from Psagot HaTrapez. The company recorded NIS 3.6 million of first-quarter revenue, all from this project, and NIS 332 thousand of gross profit. The number is still small relative to the project's scale, but total revenue in all of 2025 was only NIS 4.7 million. Revenue recognition is beginning to enter the financial statements, not only the marketing tables.
The commercial pace matters more than the revenue line. By March 31, 2026, Psagot HaTrapez had signed 74 contracts out of 144 housing units, and marketing progress reached 51.4%. Another 4 contracts were signed after the balance date. Expected revenue from signed contracts rose to NIS 139.1 million, compared with NIS 107.2 million at the end of 2025 and NIS 27.8 million at the end of 2024. This is the transition small developers need to show: not only a project with expected profit, but signed contracts that start turning into buyer advances and recognized revenue.
Still, actual profitability remains narrow. The first-quarter gross margin was about 9.2%, before overhead and financing costs. General and administrative expenses rose to NIS 1.3 million, mainly because the company became a reporting corporation, changed controlling-shareholder employment terms, appointed a CFO, and increased adviser payments. So even a quarter in which the project started generating revenue ended with an operating loss of NIS 1.0 million and a net loss of NIS 2.4 million.
Harish Maof Is Still The Unproven Step
In the previous annual analysis, the key checkpoint was whether Harish Maof would begin turning expected surpluses into sales, financing progress, and released cash. The first quarter did not close that point. The project still includes 153 housing units, about 15 thousand sqm of office space, and about 9 thousand sqm of commercial space. As of the report publication date, excavation and rock-cutting works continued, alongside efforts to obtain the final permit. But the project appendix contains the important line: meaningful marketing has not yet started.
The number that sharpens this is only 6 signed contracts by the end of March, 6.67% of the project's apartments, with a financial scope of NIS 5.5 million and no recognized revenue. Against that, the carrying cost already stands at NIS 122.4 million, and remaining completion cost is estimated at NIS 333.8 million. Expected completion remains June 2029. The gap between accumulated spending and commercial proof is still wide.
The comparison with Psagot HaTrapez exposes the quality of progress. Psagot HaTrapez has 74 contracts, recognized revenue, and buyer advances. Harish Maof still has early works, 6 contracts, and no recognized revenue. The company is already receiving proof from Psagot HaTrapez, but the project expected to carry a large portion of future surpluses still has to pass the sales, permit, and financing stages in practice.
| Project | What Was Proven In The Quarter | What Is Still Missing | Economic Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psagot HaTrapez | 74 contracts, 51.4% marketing progress, NIS 8.4 million recognized revenue through March | Continued execution, broader revenue recognition, and released surpluses | The quarter's main commercial and cash-supporting engine |
| Harish Maof | 6 contracts totaling NIS 5.5 million | Meaningful marketing, recognized revenue, final permit, and wider financing progress | The main future value remains far from accessible cash |
Positive Cash Flow Is Still Limited By Debt And The New Pipeline
The most comfortable-looking number in the quarter is positive consolidated operating cash flow of NIS 2.7 million. But in residential development, the real question is who funded it. Here the answer is clear: buyer advances rose by NIS 9.8 million, mainly from Psagot HaTrapez, while inventory rose by NIS 7.5 million. In other words, sales at one project are already financing part of the investment period, but the company is still absorbing capital inside the projects.
On an all-in cash flexibility basis, meaning after operating cash flow, investments, debt repayments, new debt, and interest paid, the picture is less comfortable. Operating cash flow was NIS 2.7 million, investing activity consumed NIS 0.3 million, financing activity consumed NIS 4.3 million, and cash fell from NIS 50.1 million at the end of 2025 to NIS 48.3 million at the end of March. This is not a quarter in which sales are already releasing broad surplus cash.
The company still has a decent cash cushion: NIS 48.3 million in cash and cash equivalents, another NIS 5.0 million in restricted cash and project accounts, and about NIS 37.6 million of undrawn credit facilities. But the balance sheet is already carrying the cost of the interim period. Equity declined to NIS 30.5 million, from NIS 32.9 million at the end of 2025. The net equity-to-balance-sheet ratio stands at 11.4%, above the current 10% covenant, but closer to the 14% level that will apply from the 2027 annual statements. The debt-to-collateral ratio of about 32% looks comfortable, but it relies on expected surpluses from the two projects, not only on cash already received.
Finance expenses have become a line that pulls the income statement down. In the first quarter, finance expenses were NIS 1.8 million and finance income was NIS 461 thousand. Part of the increase came from ceasing to capitalize credit costs to Psagot HaTrapez inventory after the building permit was received, meaning some cost that previously sat in inventory now reaches profit and loss directly. That is an accounting point, but its economic implication is straightforward: while revenue recognition remains limited, financing and overhead are running ahead of profit.
The New Pipeline Adds Optionality, But Also Requires Capital
The quarter and the period after it added three moves that expand the story beyond the two Harish projects. The first is a joint activity in urban renewal and tenant representation, in which the company holds 67% and will provide an annual budget of NIS 1 million for three years as an 8% shareholder loan. The amount is small relative to the balance sheet, but it adds another cash use before it proves revenue.
The second is the acquisition of 50% of a project company in the Yeriho complex in Lod from the controlling shareholders for NIS 5.355 million. The project is based on an approved plan, with 370 planned housing units, of which 306 belong to the project company, and a 1,400 sqm gross commercial boulevard. The third is an urban-renewal agreement in Petah Tikva, where a 75%-held subsidiary signed with 15 of 16 rights holders, and the project is planned for 48 housing units, of which 32 belong to the project company.
These moves improve the future pipeline, but they also sharpen the same constraint. The company does not lack project ideas. The question is how much capital, financing, and time will be required before the new projects start contributing. In this quarter, adding Lod and Petah Tikva is an expansion of optionality, not proof of near-term profitability.
Conclusions
The first quarter supports a mixed but useful read: Psagot HaTrapez is giving Liam a tangible operating base, while Harish Maof and the new projects remain in the layer of promise, spending, and timelines. That is a positive change from the end of 2025, because the company no longer relies only on the bond issuance and estimated project surpluses. But 2026 is still a proof year: whether Psagot HaTrapez keeps selling, whether Harish Maof moves into meaningful marketing, and whether the balance sheet absorbs the expansion without further equity erosion.
The strongest counter-thesis is that the company has cash, credit facilities, a comfortable debt-to-collateral ratio, and one project that is starting to work. If Psagot HaTrapez keeps selling and Harish Maof receives its permit, accelerates sales, and advances in its financing package, this quarter may later look like the start of a shift from capital raised for projects to projects producing cash. On the other hand, if Harish Maof remains weakly marketed and the new projects begin requiring capital before Psagot HaTrapez releases surpluses, the market is likely to focus less on the pipeline and more on the equity cushion, interest costs, and cash burn after all uses of cash.
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