Liam Harish Asakim 2025: The Bond Bought Time, but Harish Maof Still Has To Turn Forecast Surplus Into Real Cash

Getting To Know The Company

Liam Harish Asakim is not just a small residential developer sitting on one land parcel and waiting to sell apartments. By the end of 2025 it is already a bond-listed platform with two active projects in Harish, a commercial and office layer, and an early-stage urban-renewal pipeline in other cities. But it has to be read correctly: this is not yet a story of a cleanly compounding income statement. It is a story of funding, execution pace, surplus release, and the distance between project-level value and company-level cash.

What is working now is real. In June 2025 the company completed its first bond issuance, with nominal proceeds of roughly NIS 115 million, and on the same day it also brought the Psagat Hatrpez group into the company through a structural change. That makes 2025 the first year in which the company actually looks like a broader vehicle, with two live engines rather than one. At year-end it held NIS 50.1 million of cash and cash equivalents, another NIS 5.0 million of restricted cash, equity rose to NIS 32.9 million, and Psagat Hatrpez was already contributing revenue recognition, gross profit and an investment-property line measured at fair value.

But the surface-level reading misses the bottleneck. The issue here is not a lack of projects. It is the gap between accounting value, signed sales and forecast surplus on the one hand, and cash that is genuinely accessible on the other. At the end of 2025 the company carried NIS 177.0 million of current real-estate inventory and another NIS 1.9 million of non-current inventory, against NIS 112.9 million of bonds, NIS 91.2 million of bank and other credit, and a Harish Maof project that had still not begun significant marketing by year-end. That is why 2026 and 2027 look less like breakout years and more like proof years.

Cash flow also needs to be read carefully. On a consolidated basis the company ended 2025 with positive operating cash flow of NIS 0.7 million, but that happened while inventory increased by NIS 9.5 million, balances with related parties moved negatively by NIS 11.9 million, and only the rise in buyer advances and accrued liabilities offset most of the pressure. On a solo basis the picture is sharper, with negative operating cash flow of NIS 13.6 million. In other words, the cash balance increased mainly because of financing moves, not because the underlying business is already generating clean self-funded cash.

That is also the right investor filter. The company is listed through bonds only, not through equity. So this is not a share-price story. It is a story of collateral quality, covenant headroom, and the pace at which the two Harish projects move from report-level numbers into actually released cash.

Four points that are easy to miss at first glance:

• The improvement in equity did not come mainly from operating profitability. It also came from reclassifying about NIS 31.7 million of subordinated shareholder loans into equity and from a NIS 38.8 million shareholder-benefit component recorded as a non-cash item.
• Reported revenue is still very small, only NIS 4.7 million, and reflects first-time recognition from Psagat Hatrpez. Without the NIS 2.4 million fair-value gain on the commercial part of that same project, the operating loss would have looked materially heavier.
• Psagat Hatrpez already provides a real marketing anchor, with 66 signed units by year-end and 44.2% of forecast project revenue already covered by signed contracts. Harish Maof ended the year at a much earlier stage.
• The urban-renewal layer and the new tenant-management activity may open a new sourcing engine, but for now they are still an option layer rather than a substitute for execution in Harish.

This chart explains why 2025 looks different. Until June 2025 the company was effectively a Harish Maof-only story. After the structural change, Psagat Hatrpez came in and became part of the collateral, the inventory base and the future revenue story. That clearly strengthens the platform, but it also makes the story less simple: more assets, more layers, and more dependence on two Harish projects that are advancing at different speeds.

Events And Triggers

The bond issue and the broader platform

The first trigger: in June 2025 the company issued bonds for the first time. Net proceeds after issuance expenses were about NIS 112.4 million. Strategically, that move served two goals at once. It bought time, and it bridged the period until Harish Maof secured its project financing. But it also opened a new cost layer, with a fixed 8% coupon and a repayment profile that starts as early as June 2026.

The second trigger: on the same date the structural reorganization was completed and the Psagat Hatrpez group was transferred into the company. That matters because it explains a large part of the balance-sheet jump. The company did not just add debt. It also received another residential-and-commercial project, so total assets rose to NIS 261.8 million from NIS 97.9 million. That is positive. But it is not clean organic expansion. It is an enlargement created by bringing a project into the listed vehicle.

The chart makes the nature of the change clear. Cash rose sharply, but so did public debt, while bank debt remained meaningful. Equity also increased sharply, but not because the business already generated wide operating returns. Part of the strengthening came from a legal and accounting reclassification of shareholder funding.

December 2025: Harish Maof moves to a fuller bank-financing framework

The third trigger: in December 2025 the company signed a financing agreement with Bank Leumi for Harish Maof, and as a result the bond proceeds that had been held in trust were released, other than the interest reserve. Financially this is a meaningful improvement. Harish Maof moved from a more interim funding picture into a bank-financing framework of up to roughly NIS 100 million, alongside buyer-guarantee lines of up to NIS 455 million and other guarantee lines of NIS 5 million.

But this is also exactly where the other side of the trigger sits. Phase A was fully made available, while Phase B had still not been made available and remained subject, among other things, to at least 11% equity, required approvals, required collateral, sales thresholds and a construction start date no later than November 1, 2026. So the financing is there, but it still does not mean that Harish Maof has become a self-running project.

After the balance-sheet date: a better economics frame, but not a fully clean thesis

The fourth trigger: in February 2026 Harish Maof received a deciding-appraiser ruling that reduced the betterment levy from NIS 28.7 million to NIS 16.8 million as of the relevant valuation date. That is a meaningful economic improvement, especially because the project's forecast profitability already relies on assumptions around selling prices, costs and funding.

The fifth trigger: in March 2026 the company signed an allotment and shareholders agreement with a third party and Rotem Tapiro & Co. Urban Renewal Complexes, under which Liam will hold 67% of a joint tenant-management activity. Already in February 2026 the company had reported a non-binding memorandum of understanding on the same subject, describing a partner that had reportedly operated in the field for more than a decade and had accompanied more than 4,500 tenants across more than 30 evacuation-and-rebuild complexes. That could strengthen the company's urban-renewal sourcing funnel, but at this stage it is still an option layer rather than a substitute for Harish execution.

Efficiency, Profitability And Competition

What actually drove the earnings line

2025 was not a year of clean profitability. It was a transition year in which the company started to look like a broader platform. Revenue totaled only NIS 4.7 million, all from apartment sales, and cost of revenue was NIS 4.4 million. That left gross profit of only NIS 0.4 million. At the same time the company booked a NIS 2.4 million fair-value gain on the commercial part of Psagat Hatrpez, selling and marketing expense rose to NIS 0.7 million, and general and administrative expense jumped to NIS 3.3 million from NIS 1.2 million.

The implication is straightforward: the company is still not at a stage where its sales engine is broad enough to carry the full overhead, public-company burden and interest expense. Loss from regular operations stood at NIS 1.2 million, and the pre-tax and net loss stood at NIS 6.2 million.

The quality of improvement matters too. Part of the operating result is supported by a revaluation of commercial space that is not yet producing NOI. That is not illegitimate, but it does mean the reader has to separate fair-value profit from profit that comes from delivery, marketing and actual gross margin.

Who is carrying the sales, and who is not

Psagat Hatrpez is currently the more mature side of the story. By the end of 2025, 66 contracts had been signed there, 56 of them during the year, and the sales ratio based on expected project revenue reached 44.2%. That is a good base for a project that is still only around 5% complete.

But even here, the terms matter, not just the pace. Out of 144 apartments, 115 are under the discounted-housing framework. That track supports demand visibility and reduces part of the commercial uncertainty, but it also limits price flexibility, imposes a more standardized contract framework, and is characterized by broader payment spread and a more uniform delivery timing. So sales under that framework are not necessarily equivalent to free-market sales in terms of cash conversion and surplus release.

Harish Maof is in a very different place. The project shows impressive forecast economics, but by the report date it had still not started significant marketing. Even based on the disclosure tied to the publication date, only 6 housing units had been sold, for a total consideration of NIS 5.456 million. That is exactly why the company cannot rely today on feasibility models and projected surplus alone. It still has to prove that this project is truly entering the market.

Competition and pressure in the urban-renewal layer

The company itself says that competition in urban renewal, especially in demand areas, becomes harsher already at the stage of locating projects and signing tenants. Tenants run competitive processes between developers, and the pressure on the developer shows up in richer terms for existing apartment owners. That matters because it explains why the urban-renewal pipeline, however promising, is not the same thing as a proven profitability engine. It needs time, signatures, permits and often economic concessions before inventory even appears in the balance sheet.

Cash Flow, Debt And Capital Structure

Analytical frame: all-in cash flexibility

This is the right frame for Liam. The company is not yet at a stage where a normalized cash-generation view of a mature operating business is enough. The right question is how much cash remains after the real cash uses of the period, and what actually drove the rise in cash.

On that basis, 2025 looks better than it did at the start of the year, but not clean. Operating cash flow was positive NIS 0.7 million, investing cash flow consumed NIS 3.5 million, and financing cash flow added NIS 52.2 million. That is why the cash balance rose to NIS 50.1 million from NIS 0.7 million. It is a sharp improvement, but it came mainly from the bond issue, borrowings and the new financing structure.

This chart gets to the core of the story. Operating cash flow did not turn positive because the business is already generating mature recurring cash. It turned positive because buyer advances and accrued liabilities grew enough to offset inventory, receivables and related-party movements. So the cash flow is showing some operational progress, but not yet genuine cash freedom.

The balance sheet is stronger, but not only because of the business

At the end of 2025 the company had NIS 235.9 million of current assets and another NIS 25.9 million of non-current assets. The big change came from the combination of NIS 177.0 million of real-estate inventory, NIS 50.1 million of cash, and NIS 24.0 million of investment property.

Against that stood NIS 121.6 million of current liabilities and NIS 107.3 million of non-current liabilities. The bonds are the new heavy layer, but bank credit also remains high at NIS 91.2 million.

This is where equity needs to be read carefully. Equity rose to NIS 32.9 million from just NIS 0.3 million a year earlier. That sounds like a sharp cleanup of the balance sheet, but it matters what built it. Subordinated shareholder loans of NIS 31.7 million were reclassified into equity after their terms were changed with the completion of the bond issuance, and the company also recorded NIS 9.8 million in capital reserve from transactions with shareholders. So the balance sheet did improve, but not because 2025 already generated a wide operating return.

Covenants: not distress, but not an infinite cushion either

The company reports three core bond tests: minimum equity of NIS 22 million, equity-to-balance-sheet ratio of at least 10%, and a maximum debt-to-collateral ratio of 77.5%. At the end of 2025 it was comfortably in compliance with all three, at NIS 32.9 million of equity, 17% equity-to-balance-sheet ratio, and a 31% debt-to-collateral ratio.

On one level, that is a calm picture. There is no genuine immediate-maturity stress here. But if one looks at the coupon step-up thresholds rather than just the acceleration thresholds, the distance is smaller: below NIS 28 million of equity or below 12% equity-to-balance-sheet, the coupon starts moving up. So the collateral cushion is wide, the equity cushion is decent, but this is not a balance sheet that can absorb every project deviation without consequences.

The debt sits on two projects, not on a diversified business

This is the heart of the credit story. The bond collateral includes a trust account, rights to surplus from Psagat Hatrpez, rights to surplus from Harish Maof, and pledged project accounts. In other words, even when the company looks comfortable on covenants, that comfort still rests on two Harish projects rather than a broad diversified portfolio.

Psagat Hatrpez has already crossed one important stage: project-specific debt fell to NIS 26.6 million from NIS 54.9 million a year earlier after the mezzanine facility was fully repaid in June 2025. Harish Maof, by contrast, still sits at NIS 57.8 million of short-term debt, and the next stage remains conditional.

Outlook

Four points need to stay in view for 2026 and 2027:

• 2026 looks like a proof year, not a harvest year. The company has already built a broader funding frame, but it has not yet proven that the large inventory base can turn into released surplus at a pace that cleans up the debt structure.
• Psagat Hatrpez has already moved from early-model logic into real sales and revenue recognition. Harish Maof still sits mostly in the forecast layer.
• Value is being created in the commercial portions of both projects, but accessible value will arrive only if leases are signed, sale processes mature, and lenders release surplus.
• The urban-renewal layer may improve the company's deal-sourcing funnel, but if it expands too quickly before the Harish projects mature, it may add management complexity rather than near-term cash generation.

Psagat Hatrpez: the project that supports the present

Psagat Hatrpez is currently the key project for understanding the company's operating layer. It includes 144 housing units, of which 115 are under the discounted-housing track and 29 are in the free market, plus roughly 2,500 square meters of retail. The company presents expected revenue of NIS 242.5 million, expected cost of NIS 206.2 million and expected gross profit of NIS 36.3 million.

But the more important insight is not just the gross-profit line. In the project's surplus table, the company shows expected economic profit of NIS 35.0 million, yet total expected project cash surplus of only NIS 16.1 million. That is a meaningful gap between value that is created and value that is actually expected to move upstream, and part of that gap comes from the fact that the commercial layer still needs to be monetized.

In that context, the identity of the tenant does matter. In April 2025 the company signed Super Sapir as a tenant for roughly 1,375 square meters for a supermarket, under a five-year lease with extension options. That helps commercialization and improves saleability. But it is still not cash in the company's bank account.

The chart shows the difference between the two projects clearly. Psagat Hatrpez already has a live sales path, but only a relatively small part of the forecast value is expected to become upstream surplus. Harish Maof is the opposite: the forecast numbers are much larger, but they still sit at an earlier proof stage.

That reading is positive, but not final. Nearly half of the forecast revenue is already backed by contracts, and that gives Psagat Hatrpez real weight in the story. But the rest of the path still depends on execution, costs and whether the commercial piece is actually monetized in a way that supports surplus release.

Harish Maof: the project that decides whether the story really gets cleaner

Harish Maof is the center of the 2026 and 2027 thesis. It is a much larger mixed-use project, with 153 housing units, roughly 15,000 square meters of offices and roughly 9,000 square meters of retail. It already sits in inventory at NIS 115.5 million, and the company estimates NIS 556.4 million of revenue, NIS 456.2 million of cost and NIS 100.2 million of gross profit. Total expected withdrawable surplus, at NIS 117.2 million, also looks large.

But this is exactly where one has to separate the model from the public-company reality. Significant marketing had still not started by the report date. Phase B financing had still not been placed. The memorandum of understanding to sell the full commercial area for roughly NIS 180 million plus VAT had still not matured into a detailed agreement by the report date. So all the attractive numbers in this project are still waiting for a real market test, a financing test and an execution test.

At the same time, there are genuine positive signals. In June 2024 the company signed Ramy Levy as a tenant for about 3,000 square meters, representing 30% of the commercial area, under a five-year base lease with extension options. In February 2026 the betterment levy was reduced, as noted above, by NIS 11.9 million. These steps do reduce uncertainty. But they do not solve the main test: can Harish Maof move in time from heavy inventory and bank financing into a project that actually sells, builds and releases surplus.

Urban renewal: an option being built, not the thesis base

The company already has several agreements and exclusivity memoranda in urban renewal in Netanya, Holon, Bat Yam, Petah Tikva and Rehovot. In some of them tenant signatures are still missing, in some there is no building permit, and in some there is only advanced negotiation or cooperation with another developer. So the right way to read this pipeline today is as a potential business reserve, not as a near-term cash source.

The tenant-management activity could fit well into that strategy because it connects the company to an earlier point in the urban-renewal value chain. But here too, without proof that it converts into signed deals and execution-ready pipeline, it remains more of a strategic layer than a cash-flow layer.

Risks

Harish Maof still has to move from model to contracts

This is the central risk. The project model, the financing agreement and the lower betterment levy all create a better frame. But until marketing accelerates, until the Phase B conditions are met, and until advances and released surplus actually appear, a meaningful part of the company's value will remain on paper.

The financial cushion also leans on the control group

The company employs only three workers directly. Management services are provided through the CEO and the chairman via management companies, and office and bookkeeping services are provided through Liam Engineering Urban Renewal. Beyond that, shareholders or related parties provide very large guarantees, about NIS 350 million to the company and another NIS 95 million to held entities, without consideration. That is both a safety net and a concentration point.

Even the main construction contractor is a related party

In May 2025, Psagat Hatrpez signed an agreement for all works other than excavation and shoring with Liam Engineering Ltd., the control holder of the parent company, at a turnkey price of NIS 155.753 million plus VAT. That may strengthen control and execution. But it also means a critical execution layer is concentrated with a related party, so pricing quality, oversight and project execution should remain a permanent checkpoint.

The external environment is still not calm

The company itself stresses that the continuation of war and broader geopolitical tension could hurt the availability of foreign workers, raise construction-input costs, delay permits and weigh on sales. That is not a theoretical sector risk. In Liam, where the entire story rests on execution timing, financing and marketing pace, any such delay feeds quickly into the credit layer.

Conclusions

Liam Harish Asakim ends 2025 in a stronger position than where it began the year. It now has two live projects, a fuller cash balance, better-supported public debt and an equity layer that looks reasonable. But this is still not the report of a developer that has already solved its liquidity question. It is the report of a company that bought time and now has to prove that the extra time really translates into sales, execution and released surplus.

Current thesis: the bonds, the structural change and Psagat Hatrpez gave Liam a firmer base, but the story will remain incomplete until Harish Maof turns from projected profit and surplus into a project that actually produces sales, financing progress and released cash.

What changed: at the end of 2024 the company was effectively a one-project story with a narrower funding base. The end of 2025 already shows a broader platform, public bonds, Psagat Hatrpez inside the reported numbers, and a cash balance that buys time. But it also makes clear that the move from a well-funded platform to a cash-generating platform is not finished.

Counter-thesis: one could argue that the company has already done most of the hard financing work, that Psagat Hatrpez is progressing in sales, that the debt-to-collateral ratio is very comfortable, and that the betterment-levy reduction further improves the economics of Harish Maof.

What could change the market reading: Harish Maof sales pace, execution progress and revenue recognition in Psagat Hatrpez, and whether the commercial memoranda and lease agreements turn into monetization or surplus release.

Why this matters: because in Liam the gap between projected profit and accessible value is still large. The real judge will not just be the income statement, but the speed at which the two Harish projects move from inventory, collateral and revaluation into actual cash.

Over the next two to four quarters, three things need to happen for the thesis to strengthen: Harish Maof has to move into a sales pace that is enough to unlock Phase B financing, Psagat Hatrpez has to deepen revenue recognition and send more value upstream, and the company has to keep equity and covenants stable even if costs or timing shift. If any of those fail, the gap between projected value and accessible cash will remain the central issue.