weSure Global Tech: Why Ayalon Is Strengthening While weSure Insurance Weakens

The main article argued that weSure Global Tech's earnings still rest mostly on Ayalon, while the newer activities in the US, credit, and provident funds still need proof. This follow-up isolates the more internal question: why Ayalon is getting stronger inside the insurance engines themselves, while weSure Insurance is getting weaker.

The short answer is that the gap does not start with size. It starts with the quality of earnings that remain after reinsurance. In 2025 Ayalon shows broader core-profit improvement that also survives on a retained basis. weSure Insurance, by contrast, shows places where gross underwriting improved, but a meaningful part of that economics was absorbed by weaker reinsurance treaties. By the fourth quarter the picture turned even sharper: in weSure Insurance's motor property book, the combined ratio rose to 101% gross and 103% retained.

That matters because it sits against a good group year. Group insurance-service revenue rose to NIS 4.889 billion from NIS 4.661 billion, and total premiums rose to NIS 5.049 billion from NIS 4.978 billion. Insurance service profit before held reinsurance also rose to NIS 935.6 million from NIS 815.6 million. But net expense from held reinsurance increased to NIS 572.1 million from NIS 526.0 million. The consolidated profit statement does not split that line by insurer, but the core-profit explanation shows where the pressure opened up: at weSure Insurance.

This chart makes clear how much the split widened in a single year. In 2024 Ayalon generated about 90% of the two insurers' combined core profit. In 2025 it was already about 94%. So the group is not only dependent on Ayalon in a broad sense. The weight inside the insurance activity itself moved even further in its direction.

Ayalon Improved Underwriting That Still Holds On A Retained Basis

At Ayalon the story is not a one-line improvement. It is a broad expansion in profitability. Core profit in general insurance rose 24.6% to NIS 340.4 million. In compulsory motor it rose to NIS 52.2 million from NIS 34.8 million. In motor property it rose to NIS 75.1 million from NIS 71.7 million. In the other lines it rose to NIS 213.1 million from NIS 166.6 million.

What matters more than the numbers is how they were built. In compulsory motor, the improvement came mainly from better claims development on prior accident years. In motor property, it came from both better current-year accident results, with higher-exposure premium than last year, and favorable development on prior years. In the other lines, Ayalon benefited from a better claims ratio, policy-mix improvements in professional liability, contractors, and guarantees, and higher sales. In other words, this is not profit carried by one pocket. It is spread across several underwriting pockets.

The fourth quarter did not break that pattern. It reinforced it. Ayalon's general-insurance core profit jumped to NIS 77.8 million from NIS 46.7 million. In compulsory motor it moved from a loss of NIS 3.1 million to a profit of NIS 10.9 million. In motor property profit rose to NIS 14.4 million from NIS 8.6 million. In the other lines profit rose to NIS 52.5 million from NIS 41.2 million.

The clearest way to see that Ayalon's improvement survived reinsurance is through the motor property book. Gross combined ratio stayed at 90% in both 2024 and 2025, and retained combined ratio stayed at 91% in both years. In the fourth quarter it even improved, from 95% gross and 96% retained to 91% and 92%. That does not mean reinsurance has no effect on Ayalon. It does mean the gross-to-retained gap remained small, just one point in both the full year and the quarter. That is an important signal about earnings quality. Ayalon's underwriting does not only look good before reinsurance. It still looks good after reinsurance.

weSure Insurance Gets Stuck Exactly Where Ayalon Is Succeeding

At weSure Insurance the numbers tell a different story. Core profit fell 28.6% to NIS 21.7 million from NIS 30.4 million, and in the fourth quarter it moved into a loss of NIS 1.16 million from a profit of NIS 2.95 million. That did not happen because all underwriting collapsed. The filing itself describes something more nuanced, and that is exactly why it matters.

In compulsory motor, the profit decline came from a deterioration in reinsurance treaty terms, while part of the hit was offset by a marked improvement in gross insurance-service profit due to better underwriting results. That distinction matters. It means the problem is not necessarily the ability to price risk on a gross basis. It is the ability to keep that economics after reinsurers take a larger share.

In motor property the story is heavier. The decline came both from weaker reinsurance treaty terms and from a higher expense ratio because gross premium fell versus 2024. Better underwriting results only softened the damage. They did not reverse it. And in the fourth quarter a third layer appeared: the filing no longer speaks only about weaker reinsurance terms, but also about weaker underwriting results versus the prior-year quarter.

This chart is the core of the continuation. At Ayalon the gap between gross and retained is small and stable. At weSure Insurance it is heavier, and in 2025 it reached a more problematic point: annual retained combined ratio rose to 99% from 96%, and in the fourth quarter it rose to 103%. So even if one assumes that part of the issue sits in a pricing cycle or in treaties that can be renegotiated, year-end already shows that the group's original digital engine was not able to keep enough profit on a retained basis.

One more point matters here. In 2025 weSure Insurance did not weaken because it necessarily lost all of its underwriting edge. The filing actually says that some underwriting results improved. What weakened was the translation of that underwriting into earnings that remain inside the company. That is already a question of reinsurance economics and structural efficiency, not only pure underwriting.

The Right Question Is Who Keeps The Profit, Not Only Who Writes The Policy

This is where the gap becomes both an earnings-quality question and a capital-allocation question. If Ayalon is generating underwriting profit that still remains after reinsurance, while weSure Insurance struggles to keep that profit on a retained basis, then not every unit of premium is worth the same. Put more simply, the group is no longer choosing only between two insurance brands. It is choosing between two engines with different economic quality.

Ayalon in 2025 looks like an engine that generates broader and more durable profit. Its improvement is spread across compulsory motor, motor property, and the other lines, and its motor-property combined ratio stayed comfortable. weSure Insurance, by contrast, still looks like an engine that can show flashes of gross underwriting improvement, but not like one that currently knows how to preserve that economics after a larger share is transferred to reinsurers.

That matters especially because the test is not premium volume by itself. The presentation shows that the group as a whole remained large and diversified, with 68% of premiums in general insurance, 19% in health, and 13% in life. So there is no collapse in the group's overall insurance activity. The split is more internal than that: who inside the group can still turn premium into insurance profit that remains.

That leads to the more practical conclusion about which engine really deserves capital. Without using recommendation language, the 2025 filing does give Ayalon a clear advantage when the insurance engine alone is examined. Not because it is merely larger, but because it currently shows cleaner economics on a retained basis. weSure Insurance will need to show better reinsurance terms, stabilization in gross premium, and a return to sub-100 combined ratios even in a weak quarter before it can carry similar insurance weight.

Bottom Line

The split between Ayalon and weSure Insurance in 2025 is not a footnote. It says something deeper about the quality of the group's earnings. Ayalon shows broader underwriting, stronger results, and a stable retained picture. weSure Insurance shows partial gross improvement, but fails to keep it after reinsurance, and by the fourth quarter it already loses the protection of a sub-100 gross combined ratio as well.

The counter-thesis is not weak. It is entirely possible that a large part of weSure Insurance's problem sits in reinsurance treaty terms, which means that if those contracts are repaired or renewed on better pricing, the gross underwriting improvement already visible in the filing could move back into reported profit relatively quickly. But as of year-end 2025 that is still hope, not result.

So the correct reading of this year is fairly sharp: inside the group's two insurers, Ayalon currently looks like the underwriting engine that really keeps profit, while weSure Insurance still needs to prove that it can hold on to retained profit rather than only show improved gross underwriting. That is the difference between an insurance engine that justifies capital and one that still needs proof.