Alma Yesodot: How Much Cash Really Stays at the Parent After 2025
Alma ended 2025 with NIS 82 million of solo cash, but 2025 receipts were flattered by a one-off Triple inflow and about NIS 81.2 million of the bond proceeds went to refinance bank debt. The key 2026 question is not how much portfolio value exists on paper, but how much cash really remains at the parent after the dividend, receipt normalization, and the possibility of another deal.
What This Follow-Up Is Isolating
The main article identified the right bottleneck: Alma does not lack portfolio value, it lacks easily usable cash at the parent. This follow-up is not asking whether the assets are good. It is asking how much money actually stays at the parent after 2025, and how much of that is a real cushion rather than a number that looks large only because 2025 was an unusual year.
The right lens here is parent-level all-in cash flexibility. This is not a question of on-paper distributable profits. It is a question of cash left after real cash uses, existing debt, a dividend that has already been approved, and expansion moves that may arrive immediately after that. On that test, the accounting headline is looser than the real room for maneuver.
As of December 31, 2025, Alma had NIS 82 million of solo cash and cash equivalents, and NIS 92.7 million of distributable profits. That looks comfortable. But after the balance sheet date the board already approved a NIS 5.5 million dividend, the forecast for receipts from investees fell to NIS 34.0 million in 2026 from NIS 46.2 million in 2025, and the company itself says that if it wants to expand its activity it may need additional financing sources. That is already a different picture.
| Item | Amount | What It Really Means |
|---|---|---|
| Solo cash and cash equivalents at 31.12.2025 | NIS 82.0m | The cash actually sitting at the parent at year-end |
| Distributable profits | NIS 92.7m | An accounting test, not a liquidity test |
| Dividend approved in March 2026 | NIS 5.5m | A cash outflow already set after year-end |
| Forecast 2026 receipts from investees | NIS 34.0m | The cash inflow base the parent is relying on this year, before new investments |
| Credit line available until December 2026 | NIS 40.0m | Secured borrowing capacity, not free cash |
| MOU for a new transaction | NIS 54.0m | A possible cash use, not certain but clearly relevant |
What Inflated 2025, and What Remains After Normalization
The key figure is not the NIS 46.2 million Alma received from investees in 2025. It is the mix inside that figure. Triple alone sent up NIS 31.6 million. But that was not a normal dividend base: NIS 26.3 million came from shareholder-loan and capital-note repayments, while only NIS 5.3 million came from dividends. The reason is straightforward. The IPM refinancing released reserve cash and enabled repayments to shareholders.
That is what makes 2025 a poor base year. The company itself expects 2026 receipts from Triple to fall to NIS 16.0 million, entirely dividends. In other words, almost half of Triple’s 2025 inflow disappears already in management’s own 2026 forecast. Green Coat, Hi Lift, and Dvir are expected to lift their combined receipts by roughly NIS 3.4 million, but that is not enough to close the gap. Total expected receipts therefore fall to NIS 34.0 million. The forecast also excludes receipts from any new investments made during the year, so a new acquisition starts here first as a cash use, not as a receipt engine.
The economic message is simple: 2025 boosted parent cash through a one-off event at Triple, not through a broad normalization across the whole portfolio. Anyone reading NIS 46.2 million as Alma’s steady-state upstream cash level is missing the story.
The Bond Improved Liability Structure, But It Did Not Create NIS 112 Million of Free Cash
This is another place where the headline and the economics diverge. Alma issued Series A bonds in April 2025 with NIS 112 million of par value. At first glance that looks like a dramatic expansion in flexibility. In practice, most of the cash did not remain on hand. NIS 81.183 million was released in June and used to fully repay the Mizrahi Tefahot bank loan, including accrued interest. Only NIS 29.775 million was transferred to the company in August and used to fund ongoing activity.
So the bond changed the parent’s liability structure, and that matters, but it did not create a fresh NIS 112 million cash pile. Roughly three quarters of the net proceeds went to refinance existing debt. That is a legitimate move, and probably the right one, but it has to be read correctly: the company replaced a bank loan with longer-dated public debt, it did not suddenly create a huge free-cash surplus.
The second layer is the collateral package. Series A is not unsecured. Among other things, it is backed by a pledge over the trust account, a first-ranking pledge over 18.14% of Triple’s shares, and a pledge over the pledged shareholder loans. The implication is straightforward: part of Triple’s value already supports parent creditors before it can become a free option for equity holders. That is why the rise in Triple’s fair value does not automatically translate into the same increase in parent-level flexibility.
The Credit Line Is Flexibility, But Levered Flexibility
In December 2025 Alma opened a NIS 40 million credit line that can be drawn until December 28, 2026. Here too, it is important not to confuse liquidity with the ability to raise more debt. Any draw becomes a loan priced at prime plus 1.85%, with an amortization schedule reflecting 48 quarterly payments and a residual principal payment at the end of March 2029.
That line is secured by a first-ranking pledge over Hi Lift shares and over the company’s rights in Green Coat. On top of that, the company undertook not to create a floating charge over its assets without lender consent. The covenants are also meaningful: equity plus subordinated shareholder loans of at least NIS 80 million and at least 30% of total assets, an LTV ratio of no more than 60%, and a combined LTV ratio of no more than 72.5%. If the company fails the equity test, the interest rate steps up by 0.25% per year. And if other debt above NIS 40 million is accelerated, this line can be affected through cross-default.
The right reading is therefore two-sided. On the one hand, Alma has real financing flexibility that it did not have before. On the other hand, this is not a cash buffer already sitting on the balance sheet. It is another layer of leverage, backed by additional collateral and dependent on covenant room. For anyone trying to understand how much cash really stays at the parent, this line is a backstop, not part of the cash balance.
How Much Cash Really Stays at the Parent After 2025
If you start from NIS 82 million of solo cash at year-end 2025 and deduct the NIS 5.5 million dividend approved after the balance sheet date, you get roughly NIS 76.5 million. That is still a respectable number. But it is no longer frictionless cash. Alma paid NIS 21.5 million when the Dvir acquisition closed, and it still owes NIS 9.2 million at the end of two years from closing, plus 5.5% annual interest. At the same time, it is negotiating a new NIS 54 million deal, even if there is still no certainty that the transaction will be signed or completed.
That is the core thesis. The problem is not that the parent is empty. The problem is that the cash balance that looks large at the end of 2025 partly rests on a one-off Triple inflow, while new uses were created almost in parallel: the dividend, deferred consideration for Dvir, and the possibility of another acquisition. That is also why the company explicitly says that expansion may require additional financing sources. When the company says that despite NIS 82 million of solo cash, it is effectively admitting that the current cash balance is not viewed internally as surplus capital.
The most important gap is the gap between the legal distribution test and the cash test. Legally, the company has NIS 92.7 million of distributable profits. Economically, once Triple is normalized, a meaningful part of 2026 flexibility depends on Green Coat, Hi Lift, and Dvir continuing to upstream cash, and on the company’s ability to add more borrowing against collateral. That is the difference between accounting value and accessible value.
Bottom Line
Alma is not exiting 2025 with an immediate liquidity problem. It is exiting 2025 with less room for maneuver than the raw numbers suggest. The parent benefited in 2025 from two unusual levers: the IPM refinancing, which pushed a large Triple inflow upstairs, and the bond issue, most of which went to refinance debt. That is why the right 2026 question is not how much portfolio value exists, but how much usable cash remains once the one-offs are stripped out.
If the 2026 receipts forecast is delivered and the company does not move into a full-size new transaction, the parent can remain comfortable. If Triple does not upstream the expected NIS 16 million, if Dvir and Green Coat do not maintain their distribution pace, or if the NIS 54 million MOU turns into a binding acquisition, Alma quickly comes back to the same conclusion: it has assets, but parent-level flexibility is being built through capital discipline and financing structure, not through a naturally excess cash pile.
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