Alma Yesodot: The Portfolio Works, but Parent Cash Is Still on Test

Getting to Know the Company

At first glance Alma Yesodot looks like a small holding company that bought a few solid assets and is starting to harvest the results. That is true, but only partly. By the end of 2025 the company already had a much more tangible portfolio than it did at the beginning of the story: Green Coat and Dvir sit inside the consolidated statements, Hailift adds profit and dividends through the equity-method layer, and Triple remains the largest asset through the IPM power plant and the adjacent land. At the same time, consolidated revenue nearly doubled to NIS 115.2 million and gross profit rose to NIS 41.1 million.

But the heart of the story is not the expansion itself. It is the quality of the bottom line and the cash that is truly accessible at the parent. Alma ended 2025 with NIS 55.8 million of net profit, yet operating profit was only NIS 3.6 million. Most of the gap came from NIS 76.3 million of other finance income, driven mainly by the revaluation of the Triple holding. The same caution is needed on the cash side: Alma received NIS 46.2 million from portfolio companies in 2025, but NIS 31.6 million of that came from Triple, and within that number sits a one-off repayment of shareholder loans and notes after the IPM refinancing.

That is exactly the point a superficial read can miss. Anyone who looks only at the NIS 89.6 million of cash and cash equivalents at year-end, or at Triple's fair value of NIS 226.8 million, may conclude that the parent-level cash issue is already solved. That would be a mistake. For 2026 Alma itself guides to portfolio-company receipts of only NIS 34.0 million. After the balance-sheet date the board already approved a NIS 5.5 million dividend, and at the same time the company signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding to acquire 60% of a metal-components producer for about NIS 54 million. The operating engines are working, but the parent still has to prove that it can turn portfolio value into comfortable cash rather than only into marked value.

The market layer matters too. Market cap stands at NIS 291.2 million, and on the last trading day before the market snapshot the stock traded just NIS 35.6 thousand of volume. Short interest is negligible. That means this is not a technical story. If the market read changes, it is likely to change because of value accessibility at the parent, not because of a crowded short or a trading squeeze.

Events and Triggers

The central insight is that 2025 was a year of platform building and financing, not yet a year that can be read as a fully normalized holding-company model.

Refinancing at the Parent and Below It

The first trigger: in April 2025 Alma issued Series A bonds with NIS 112 million of par value at a fixed 6.72% coupon. About NIS 81.2 million of the proceeds were used in June to fully repay a bank loan, and the remaining roughly NIS 29.8 million were released in August to support ongoing activity. Put differently, the bond deal was not only a growth move. It also replaced an existing financing layer and moved the parent toward a listed debt structure.

The second trigger: in May 2025 the IPM refinancing was completed. This is the event that changed the way 2025 should be read. IPM took about NIS 840 million of new financing, repaid part of its previous debt, and gained the ability to increase the share of electricity sold to private customers under bilateral agreements. At the same time, reserve-account cash was released and the conditions were created for an unusually large cash receipt at Triple and then at Alma. That is why Alma received NIS 31.6 million from Triple in 2025, versus only NIS 16.0 million expected in 2026.

The third trigger: the Dvir acquisition was signed in June 2025 and closed in November. Alma bought 70% of Dvir for NIS 30.7 million, of which NIS 21.49 million were paid at closing and NIS 9.21 million are due two years later plus 5.5% annual interest. The move broadens the industrial layer, but it also pulls cash out of the parent and adds a future obligation.

The fourth trigger: in December 2025 Alma obtained a NIS 40 million bank credit line for expansion. On the surface that looks like flexibility. In practice it is flexibility that comes with first-ranking pledges over the Hailift shares and the Green Coat rights, with financial covenants, and with restrictions on distributions and intra-group lending. The ability to do the next deal exists, but it is not free.

The fifth trigger: in February 2026 Alma signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding to buy 60% of a company providing metal-component manufacturing services for about NIS 54 million, alongside preferred shares that would give Alma priority on dividends and shareholder-loan repayments. There is still no certainty the deal will be signed or completed, but its existence already says something important: the company is not pausing to digest 2025. It is already trying to build another industrial layer.

Efficiency, Profitability, and Competition

Alma's operating numbers genuinely improved, but they do not sit in the same layer as the reported net profit. So 2025 needs to be separated into two stories: the industrial operating layer and the holding/revaluation layer.

Industrial Services Are Already a Real Business Layer

The industrial-services segment, which consolidates Green Coat and Dvir, generated all of the group's external revenue in 2025, NIS 115.2 million, versus NIS 58.4 million in 2024. Segment profit in that segment also rose to NIS 15.1 million. This is no longer a side note around Triple. It is a real operating layer.

Green Coat is currently the cleanest operating engine inside the consolidated numbers. Revenue rose to NIS 107.8 million and net profit to NIS 20.0 million. The presentation also says explicitly that the improvement came mainly from stronger demand from the Israeli defense sector and from an expansion of the service offering. That is positive, but it also needs to be normalized. Once defense demand becomes part of the core explanation, investors need to ask how much of the pace depends on an unusual environment and how much is repeatable without that same tailwind.

Hailift looks steadier. Revenue rose to NIS 74.2 million and net profit to NIS 13.7 million, mainly because more lifts were rented out and the mast-scaffold activity kept expanding. It is a business that can produce both profit and dividends, but it still depends on construction pace, site availability, and imported-equipment costs.

Dvir has not yet proven itself inside Alma's reported numbers. On a full-year basis Dvir ended 2025 with NIS 44.5 million of revenue and NIS 1.7 million of net profit. But in the consolidated statements, from 9 November through year-end, it contributed only NIS 7.3 million of revenue and a NIS 288 thousand loss to net profit. More importantly, the acquisition agreement includes a purchase-price adjustment if 2025 revenue falls below NIS 47.5 million. Actual 2025 revenue was NIS 44.5 million. That is an important yellow flag. Dvir is not yet sitting comfortably inside the thesis.

Net Profit Came Mainly from Revaluation, Not from Consolidated Margins

This is the gap that is easiest to miss. Alma's operating profit was only NIS 3.6 million. Net profit reached NIS 55.8 million because above that line sits a completely different layer: NIS 67.5 million of net finance income and expense, including NIS 76.3 million of other finance income. The company itself explains that the change came mainly from roughly NIS 82.3 million more profit from the fair-value change in Triple.

That does not mean the profit is "fake". It does mean that Alma's 2025 net profit is not the same thing as proof that the listed parent can reproduce the year on the back of consolidated operating performance alone. Anyone building a clean thesis only from the headline net-profit number will miss that the parent-level operating layer still does not stand by itself.

What That Means for Competition

Alma's advantage today is not a single brand or a single product. The advantage is the parent's ability to hold a portfolio of relatively mature cash-generating businesses with different economic drivers and to move capital between layers. But that same advantage creates the analytical limitation: Alma is not competing only inside the markets of Green Coat, Hailift, or Dvir. It is also competing on its ability to allocate capital without leaning too much on one asset, one revaluation, or one financing layer.

Cash Flow, Debt, and Capital Structure

To read Alma correctly, the relevant frame is all-in cash flexibility, not a narrow operating-cash measure. The reason is simple: the thesis sits at the parent, not only in the quality of the portfolio companies.

How the 2025 Cash Position Was Built

Cash and cash equivalents rose from NIS 20.9 million at the end of 2024 to NIS 89.6 million at the end of 2025. That increase was not accidental, but it also was not generated only from ongoing operations. Cash flow from operations contributed NIS 7.1 million, investing activity contributed NIS 35.0 million, and financing activity contributed NIS 26.7 million.

Behind those numbers sit several clear drivers: NIS 46.2 million of receipts from portfolio companies, about NIS 25.5 million of proceeds from selling marketable securities, and the net release of NIS 29.8 million from the bond issue. Offsetting those were the NIS 21.5 million cash payment for the Dvir acquisition and about NIS 5.3 million paid to settle an adviser-related separation obligation.

Here too it is important to distinguish consolidated cash from what actually sits at the parent. The presentation shows total liquidity of NIS 96.0 million at year-end, and within that the company's solo cash balance stood at about NIS 82.0 million. That is the number that should matter when the question is dividends, another acquisition, or the use of the new credit line.

Flexibility Exists, but It Is Already Partly Encumbered

At the end of 2025 Alma's financial debt was about NIS 125.7 million, against NIS 244.1 million of equity attributable to shareholders and NIS 281.4 million of total equity. The bonds alone stood at NIS 110.4 million, and short- and long-term bank loans together were about NIS 15.3 million. At the covenant level there is no immediate pressure. The equity-to-assets ratio stands at 52.3%, and total equity is far above the minimum threshold set both in the bond package and in the bank credit agreement.

But room is not the same thing as unencumbered room. Series A bonds are secured, among other things, by the Triple shares held by Alma and by the shareholder loans extended to Triple. The bank credit line signed in December 2025 is secured by first-ranking pledges over the Hailift shares and the Green Coat rights, and also includes a negative-pledge commitment. In other words, every layer that is supposed to create value is simultaneously becoming collateral for the financing layer.

Value Has Been Created, but Not All of It Is Accessible

Triple is the clearest example of that gap. The fair value of the holding rose to NIS 226.8 million after Alma recorded NIS 81.0 million of revaluation gain in 2025. The valuation is based on an IPM value of about NIS 1.22 billion and a land value of NIS 305 million at Triple. That is an impressive economic picture, but it is not the same thing as cash already sitting at Alma.

That value is still sensitive. The valuation work shows that a 1% change in the discount rate used for IPM's cash flows can change Alma's share of the holding value by as much as NIS 18.6 million in either direction. And inside Triple there is also optionality around data centers: the company is advancing a first project of up to 20 MW IT, with excavation and shoring work expected to start during 2026 and commercial operation estimated during 2028. That could become a meaningful upgrade, but it is still not parent-level cash in 2026.

Green Coat has its own layer of value that is not fully free either. The put-option liability toward the non-controlling seller rose from NIS 13.0 million to NIS 18.0 million. That option can be exercised between four and five years from completion based on a preset multiple of the average net profit over the preceding eight quarters. So success at Green Coat creates value, but it also increases a future claim on the parent's cash.

Outlook

Finding one: Alma itself expects receipts from portfolio companies to fall 26.4%, from NIS 46.2 million in 2025 to NIS 34.0 million in 2026.

Finding two: almost the entire decline sits in Triple. Cash from Triple is expected to fall from NIS 31.6 million to NIS 16.0 million, a 49.3% drop, because 2025 included shareholder-loan and note repayments that are not a normal base.

Finding three: Dvir is still not a clean proof asset. Its 2025 revenue came in below the NIS 47.5 million threshold that activates the purchase-price adjustment, and its post-acquisition contribution to Alma's consolidated profit was negative.

Finding four: Alma's industrial business is more real than before, but two important assets also benefited in 2025 from supportive outside conditions. Green Coat benefited from stronger defense demand, and Hailift benefited from longer construction cycles alongside its mast-scaffold expansion.

Finding five: Triple carries both most of the accounting upside and most of the risk of over-reading the story. The IPM valuation already assumes a higher bilateral-sales mix, up to about 75% in the second half of 2026, while Alma's direct cash receipts from Triple are already normalizing lower.

2026 Looks Like a Bridge Year, Not a Harvest Year

This is not a survival year. That matters. Alma is not entering 2026 under covenant pressure, without cash, or without access to debt markets. Quite the opposite. But it is entering 2026 with a large part of the strong 2025 narrative not automatically repeating.

The 2026 receipt forecast is built as follows: NIS 16.0 million from Triple, NIS 11.8 million from Green Coat, NIS 2.1 million from Hailift, and NIS 4.1 million from Dvir. That is a more balanced mix than in 2025, but it still depends almost half on Triple, and it still does not prove that Green Coat and Dvir can fully replace the exceptional cash event that came out of IPM in 2025.

That is also what defines the kind of year ahead. This looks like a bridge year with a proof test at the parent. If Alma were already sitting on a portfolio whose receipts were expanding organically, without adding another deal and without leaning on revaluations, 2026 could be read as a stabilization year. If Dvir were already proving distributable strength, and if Green Coat were growing without unusual tailwinds, one might even call it a breakout year. Right now that would be too early.

What Must Happen for the Thesis to Improve

The first step is proof from the assets already inside the group. Green Coat has to show that its 2026 profitability and dividends rest not only on unusually strong defense demand but also on service expansion and automation. Hailift has to keep delivering stability while continuing to invest in mast scaffolds. Dvir has to prove that 2025 was a transition year rather than the beginning of a weaker pattern, and that it can become a business that produces both cash and dividends rather than getting stuck in the integration stage.

The second step is capital discipline. If the NIS 54 million memorandum of understanding turns into a binding deal, Alma will need to show that it can finance it without consuming most of the solo cash cushion and without further encumbering the core assets to the point that the parent is left with a strong portfolio but weak freedom of action. The preferred shares that Alma is supposed to receive in the target would improve priority, but they do not solve the financing question.

The third step is separating created value from accessible value. Triple can continue to look better in 2026, especially if IPM keeps increasing bilateral sales and if the data-center project advances. But a higher Triple value is not a substitute for convenient cash at Alma. That is the economic center of the whole story.

What May Change the Market Read in the Near Term

The market is likely to focus first on whether the MOU stays a headline or becomes a signed deal, and on what funding architecture accompanies it. The second question will be the quality of the 2026 receipts. After a year in which 68.3% of receipts came from Triple, investors will want to see the mix genuinely diversify. The third point is the interaction between dividends, a new acquisition, and the bank line. If all three can coexist without materially eroding flexibility, the read on Alma can improve quickly. If they arrive together with more encumbrance and more dependence on one-off receipts, the market will move back to the parent-level cash question.

Risks

The main risk at Alma is not a covenant sitting next to the wall. The main risk is a situation in which the portfolio keeps looking good while the parent remains too dependent on non-recurring value realization and financing layered on top of those very same assets.

Parent-Level Risks

The first flag is earnings quality. In 2025 the bottom line leaned mainly on the Triple revaluation, not on consolidated operating profit. That is not an accounting problem, but it is an important analytical limitation.

The second flag is how the next step gets funded. The bonds are secured by Triple and by shareholder loans to Triple, and the new credit line sits on Hailift and Green Coat. This is not a debt distress story, but it is certainly a financing layer that is beginning to color the group's core assets.

The third flag is obligations that grow out of success. The Green Coat put-option liability already stands near NIS 18 million. The better Green Coat performs, the larger the future claim on cash can become.

Risks at the Portfolio-Company Level

At Triple and IPM there is an embedded mix of regulatory, tariff, and financing risk. The weighted electricity-generation tariff fell to 28.90 agorot per kWh with the December 2025 regulatory decision that took effect at the start of 2026, and the plant carries about NIS 1.55 billion of bank debt. For now the historical debt-service coverage ratio at IPM stood around 1.9, so this is not an immediate stress story, but both the valuation and the cash flow remain sensitive to macro, interest-rate, and regulatory assumptions.

At Green Coat the central risk is normalization. 2025 benefited from stronger defense-sector demand. If that tailwind moderates, the company will need to show that automation and service expansion truly support the profitability.

At Hailift the risk is the combination of construction exposure and FX. The company depends on the pace of building activity in Israel, and at the same time its equipment costs are sensitive to the dollar and the euro.

At Dvir the risk is simply proof. The deal was signed on the basis of a mature profitable business, but 2025 revenue still came in below the threshold used for the purchase-price adjustment, and the consolidated contribution in the year of acquisition was weak. That does not make the deal broken, but it does mean 2026 will carry more interpretive weight than usual.

Conclusion

Alma ends 2025 stronger than it entered it. The portfolio is broader, the industrial-services layer is now tangible, and the parent is not pinned against the wall on liquidity or covenants. But the clean read is still not here. 2025 leaned on two drivers that should not be confused with one another: a large revaluation at Triple and an exceptional cash receipt from IPM after refinancing. So the 2026 question is not whether Alma owns good assets. It is whether parent-level cash can stay comfortable once the year becomes more normal again.

Current thesis: Alma already owns a real portfolio of cash-generating assets, but in 2025 the listed-company layer still depended too heavily on the Triple revaluation and on a one-off IPM-driven cash receipt, so the parent cash story remains the core test.

What changed: Compared with 2024, Alma is no longer just Triple plus a few side holdings. Green Coat is now a full-year consolidated asset, Dvir has been added to the portfolio, and the parent has shifted part of its bank financing into listed bonds. But precisely because of that, 2026 opens a new test: can the industrial layer really replace the non-recurring positives that shaped 2025.

Counter-thesis: The cautious read may prove too conservative because Alma has about NIS 82 million of solo cash, a NIS 40 million credit line, wide covenant headroom, and expected receipts of NIS 34 million even in 2026. On that view, another acquisition does not have to turn the parent into a bottleneck.

What may change the market interpretation in the short to medium term: progress or retreat around the NIS 54 million acquisition, the actual quality of 2026 receipts, and whether the company can keep expanding the platform without further materially encumbering the assets that have already proven themselves.

Why this matters: In a holding company, the real question is not only whether the assets are good, but whether their value can move up to the parent and stay available to common shareholders without being absorbed by another financing layer.

What must happen over the next 2 to 4 quarters: Green Coat, Hailift, and Dvir need to prove a steadier cash contribution to Alma; if a new deal is signed it needs to come without materially hurting parent flexibility; and Triple needs to keep creating value without the market confusing that value with already-available cash. What would weaken the thesis is a combination of another acquisition, more encumbrance, and more dependence on one-off receipts instead of normalized parent-level inflows.