GoTo and Trinity: How Much of 2026 Is Consolidation and How Much Is Real Economics
GoTo’s 2026 numbers should look bigger not only because the business is growing, but also because Trinity is finally moving from an internal management lens into full financial consolidation. Roughly 42% of the jump versus reported 2025 revenue already comes from the wider consolidation perimeter, so the real baseline to measure is the roughly ILS 105 million pro forma base.
The main article already argued that GoTo’s Israeli activity is starting to look like a real business, while the balance sheet still keeps the story from looking clean. This follow-up isolates the part that is easiest to misread: Trinity is not a brand new engine suddenly dropping into GoTo in 2026. Inside management’s operating view it was already sitting deep inside the technology segment. It only moves into full line-by-line consolidation on 23 March 2026, after the control amendments gave GoTo a casting vote on Trinity’s board.
That distinction changes the way 2026 should be read. If the 2026 revenue forecast of ILS 132 million is compared with the ILS 85.914 million of external revenue reported in the 2025 financial statements, the result looks like a jump of ILS 46.1 million. But ILS 19.453 million of that gap is simply Trinity revenue that was already included in the 2025 segment view and then removed from consolidated revenue. In other words, roughly 42% of the jump against the reported base year is a wider consolidation perimeter, not newly created activity.
That still does not make the story accounting-only. In the investor presentation, management describes Trinity as a business that grew 21% in 2025 to ILS 19.5 million of revenue, with ILS 12.5 million of gross profit and ILS 5 million of Non-GAAP profit. So there is real economics here. The issue is that in 2026 those economics move from a place where they were already measured internally into a place where they will also enter the consolidated top line. Anyone who does not separate those two layers can easily over-credit the same jump for both reporting optics and business improvement.
- About 42% of the jump against reported 2025 revenue is perimeter change. That is the ILS 19.453 million Trinity layer already living inside the technology segment.
- The 2025 technology segment was already almost entirely Trinity. The implied revenue left in GoTo’s standalone technology activity had shrunk to only about ILS 212 thousand.
- Even after stripping out the consolidation effect, real growth remains. On the presentation’s pro forma base, 2026 still points to roughly 25% revenue growth versus 2025.
Where The Comparison Base Actually Changes
The right starting point is not only whether 2026 will be better, but what the correct benchmark is. Note 25 shows that 2025 consolidated external revenue was ILS 85.914 million, while the technology segment alone stood at ILS 19.665 million and the adjustment line was ILS 19.453 million. In practical terms, Trinity was already inside management’s operating lens, but almost all of it was still outside consolidated revenue.
The presentation solves the comparability problem the same way. On slide 20, management already presents 2024 and 2025 as if Trinity had been consolidated from the start, and explicitly says Trinity revenue will only be consolidated in 2026 while being shown there on a pro forma basis as if it had already been consolidated in 2024. That means the cleaner comparison for ILS 132 million of 2026 forecast revenue is not ILS 85.9 million, but roughly ILS 105.4 million.
| Comparison layer | Revenue | What it actually means |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 consolidated external revenue | ILS 85.914 million | The formal accounting base before Trinity consolidation |
| 2025 Trinity revenue removed from consolidated revenue | ILS 19.453 million | The scope layer that enters the statements in 2026 |
| 2025 pro forma base including Trinity | ILS 105.367 million | The cleaner economic base for judging 2026 |
| 2026 presentation forecast | ILS 132.0 million | A number that combines Trinity consolidation and underlying growth |
That is the core read. Comparing ILS 132 million with ILS 85.9 million produces a 53.6% jump. Comparing ILS 132 million with ILS 105.4 million produces roughly 25.3% growth. Both numbers are correct, but they answer different questions. The first asks how much bigger the filing will look. The second asks what really changed in the economics of the business.
And even inside the cleaner base, the story is not only Trinity. The 2026 presentation forecast is built on ILS 86 million in Israel, ILS 21.5 million in Germany, and ILS 24.5 million in Trinity. So out of the roughly ILS 26.6 million of growth beyond the consolidation effect, about ILS 19 million comes from Israel, about ILS 5 million from Trinity itself, and about ILS 2.9 million from Germany. That is real economics, not just reporting engineering.
The Technology Segment Was Already Almost Entirely Trinity
The most important part of Note 25 is not only the adjustment line, but the definition. The company says the technology segment includes 100% of Trinity’s operating results from the date it began to be accounted for under the equity method. So anyone reading the technology segment as “GoTo’s software engine” can miss that this segment has become more and more Trinity, and less and less GoTo’s standalone platform.
The implied calculation inside the segment table is unusually sharp. If the adjustment line is subtracted from technology-segment revenue, what remains is the revenue still sitting inside GoTo’s own standalone technology activity. The path is almost a straight line downward.
| Year | Technology segment revenue | Trinity layer removed from consolidated revenue | Implied standalone technology revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | ILS 26.621 million | ILS 9.477 million | ILS 17.144 million |
| 2024 | ILS 23.231 million | ILS 16.038 million | ILS 7.193 million |
| 2025 | ILS 19.665 million | ILS 19.453 million | ILS 0.212 million |
By 2025 the shift was almost complete. The technology segment reported ILS 19.665 million of revenue, while the Trinity component removed from consolidated revenue was ILS 19.453 million. The gap, only about ILS 212 thousand, is what was left inside GoTo’s own standalone technology activity under that same headline.
The implication cuts both ways. On one side, anyone trying to understand 2026 through the “technology segment” is in practice analyzing Trinity. On the other side, there is also a warning sign here: if GoTo’s standalone platform has almost disappeared at the revenue level, then a growing part of the technology story rests on an engine that strengthens the group but also makes the historical comparison much less clean.
There Is Real Economics Here, Just Not At The Same Pace As The Headline
The segment note and the presentation do not contradict each other. They are speaking in two different languages. Slide 10 presents Trinity as a business that grew 21% to a record ILS 19.5 million of revenue, with ILS 12.5 million of gross profit and ILS 5 million of Non-GAAP profit. That does not read like a technical wrapper. It reads like a real operating engine.
But in that same year, the technology segment as a whole still ended 2025 with a segment loss of ILS 5.177 million, versus a segment loss of ILS 4.285 million in 2024. So even if management’s read of Trinity as a profitable growing activity is accepted, the distance between good economics inside Trinity and what reaches GoTo’s segment line has still not closed.
That matters because it blocks a lazy interpretation in either direction. It is not wrong to say Trinity is a real business. The presentation points to that clearly. But it is also wrong to read 2026 as if every shekel entering through Trinity consolidation will immediately show up with the same quality of profit at the public-company layer. In 2025 the activity was already visible from the inside, and the technology layer at GoTo still did not look like a clean profit engine.
Slide 20 sharpens the same distinction through EBITDA. The presentation shows EBITDA of negative ILS 1.3 million in 2024, positive ILS 9.6 million in 2025, and a forecast of ILS 16 million in 2026. That is a very sharp improvement, but here too the chart is built on a pro forma base that already pulls Trinity backward into the comparison. So the ILS 16 million expected for 2026 reads as real growth against ILS 9.6 million, not as a magic trick created only by the wider consolidation perimeter.
The Consolidated Number Is Not The Same As Shareholder Economics
Slide 18 is not a Trinity slide, but it is probably the best reminder of why discipline is still needed when consolidated numbers get bigger. In the Malta post-transaction pro forma balance sheet, total equity rises from ILS 918 thousand to ILS 15.812 million. On first look that appears dramatic.
But one layer above that, equity attributable to shareholders stays at ILS 15.826 million in both columns. Almost the entire movement runs through non-controlling interests, which move from negative ILS 14.908 million to almost zero. In other words, even when the group looks stronger on a consolidated basis, not every improvement rolls into the line that actually belongs to GoTo’s shareholders.
That is exactly the discipline readers should bring to Trinity as well. Full consolidation in 2026 will enlarge the statements, pull in revenue that was already present in management’s operating view, and probably create the feeling that the technology activity is finally “showing up” in the accounts. But the more important question stays the same: not how large the consolidated number will look, but how much of that enlargement turns into profit, equity, and flexibility that genuinely serve the shareholders of the listed company.
The conclusion here is sharper than the headline. GoTo’s 2026 should be a better year both operationally and in reporting optics. The problem is that those two layers will arrive together, which makes it easy to give the coming “jump” too much credit.
The right read is not “all consolidation” and not “all real growth.” The right read is that Trinity was already a material engine inside GoTo’s economics in 2025, but had not yet entered the consolidated revenue line. In 2026 that gap closes, so part of the jump will mainly be the accounting statements catching up to management’s operating view.
Anyone trying to judge the true quality of 2026 should start from a pro forma base of roughly ILS 105 million of revenue and ILS 9.6 million of EBITDA, not from the reported base of ILS 85.9 million. From there the real question becomes clear: are Trinity, Israel, and Germany continuing to improve the business, or is the reporting perimeter simply growing faster than the economics that actually reach shareholders?
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