GoTo in 2025: Israel Works, but the Balance Sheet Still Runs the Story

Getting to Know the Company

By the end of 2025, GoTo no longer looks like a mobility concept stock living only on promise. In Israel, the core business is finally starting to look like an operating business: segment revenue rose to NIS 67.1 million, segment profit reached NIS 8.9 million, and newer services such as flexible leasing and business leasing are now part of the platform. Germany, which used to be a deep loss center, also ended the year much closer to break even. That is the part that is working.

The problem is that the balance sheet has not caught up. Consolidated equity fell to just NIS 918 thousand, working capital was negative NIS 42.6 million, and the company breached a financial covenant as of December 31, 2025 and needed a waiver from the bank on March 23, 2026. A reader who focuses only on the EBITDA slides could easily conclude that the turnaround is complete. That is an incomplete read.

The real question now is not whether operations improved. They did. The question is whether that improvement can fund itself. In 2025 GoTo moved to a more focused structure: Israel at the center, Germany in a leaner format, Malta on the way out, Trinity on the way into consolidation, and more owned vehicles instead of a broader reliance on leasing. That raises the earnings potential, but it also pushes more weight onto the balance sheet and the funding side.

There is also a practical screen issue here. In the April 6, 2026 market snapshot, the company had a market cap of roughly NIS 29 million, daily turnover of roughly NIS 19 thousand, and effectively no short interest. So even if the business story is improving, this is still a very illiquid stock where financing mistakes get punished faster than operating progress is rewarded.

GoTo's Economic Map

What First-Read Readers May Miss

• The technology segment looks stable, but it is mostly Trinity. Standalone platform revenue nearly disappeared to NIS 212 thousand in 2025, from NIS 7.2 million in 2024.
• The Israeli improvement did not come for free. The company increased vehicle ownership and fixed assets to capture resale economics, so part of the improvement moved from the P&L to the balance sheet.
• Cash went up, but not because the business turned cash generative. The year-end cash balance of NIS 8.27 million came after NIS 30.8 million of positive financing cash flow.
• Part of the 2026 step-up depends on accounting effects. Malta is supposed to lift equity, and Trinity enters consolidation only in 2026, so next year's numbers will not be a clean like-for-like comparison.

Events and Triggers

Colmobil opened a real growth lane, but also a new layer of value sharing

The most important operating event of 2025 was the March 25, 2025 agreement with Colmobil to create a partnership for monthly car subscription and leasing activity. On paper this is a strong move: Colmobil brings sourcing and distribution power, an owner-loan framework of up to NIS 20 million to fund vehicle purchases, and a right of first refusal on vehicles the partnership wants to buy. GoTo brings the technology, the operating layer, the app, and the website, and receives an annual wrapper fee of NIS 1 million or 5% of revenue, whichever is higher.

This is exactly the kind of move the company needed in order to scale faster without building everything alone. But there is a second side to it. The partnership is owned equally, and after 36 months Colmobil gets an option to buy GoTo's entire stake in the activity. In other words, GoTo created a faster path to growth, but part of the future value now sits inside a shared structure in which a stronger counterparty controls the supply channel and may ultimately acquire the business.

For shareholders, that means the partnership improves the growth path, but does not guarantee that all of the created value stays at the listed-company level. It is good for operations, less clean for public equity holders.

AutoTel remains an anchor, and that anchor is still partly city-funded

The contract with the Tel Aviv municipal development authority is far more than just a large customer agreement. It is a core economic anchor. In 2025, the Tel Aviv project received about NIS 4 million of subsidy support under its settlement mechanism. In December 2025, the seventh addendum extended the agreement through November 30, 2030, with an option to extend again through November 30, 2033. On top of that, the city committed to fund the 2026 replacement of the owned fleet at an estimated NIS 25 million, and on February 8, 2026 the company actually received about NIS 17.2 million for that purpose.

This matters because it both confirms that the municipal relationship remains intact and removes part of the fleet investment burden. But it also reinforces the fact that a meaningful piece of GoTo's Israeli economics still depends on one institutional customer and one municipal support structure. The Israeli improvement is real, but it is not a pure market-driven improvement.

Malta is no longer an operating story, but a balance sheet cleanup story

In February 2026, the conditions required to complete the Malta share sale were not met, and the parties agreed to cancel the transaction. Instead of a disposal, the company and the minority shareholders moved to a different track: converting all shareholder loans into equity and winding the business down voluntarily. The company expects the completed conversion to increase consolidated equity by roughly NIS 13 million, while the immediate report frames the range at roughly NIS 12 million to NIS 14 million, depending in part on FX.

This is an important 2026 trigger, but it needs to be framed correctly. This is not fresh cash. It is mainly the removal of a liability line that currently weighs on the balance sheet. So if it is completed, it should improve the equity picture and make the balance sheet read better, but it will not by itself fund the next stage of growth.

Trinity is both a real trigger and a comparison trap

On March 12, 2026, Trinity approved governance changes that give GoTo a decisive board vote, and on March 23, 2026 GoTo's board approved that arrangement. From that point forward Trinity is consolidated. This is material because in 2025 Trinity was already the main growth engine inside the technology segment, with NIS 19.453 million of revenue and a new partnership with Penske Media.

But this is also where investors need to stay sharp. Management's presentation frames 2026 as a scale year with NIS 132 million of revenue and NIS 16 million of EBITDA, while explicitly noting that Trinity is consolidated only from 2026 and is shown on a pro forma basis as if it had already been consolidated in 2024. That means part of the 2026 step-up will be a perimeter effect, not purely organic acceleration.

Efficiency, Profitability, and Competition

Israel: finally an engine carrying the group

Israel is where the real improvement showed up. Segment revenue rose 32% to NIS 67.077 million, from NIS 50.890 million in 2024. Within that, ride revenue rose to NIS 60.850 million from NIS 45.116 million, while other revenue increased to NIS 6.227 million. So the growth did not come mainly from subscription fees or side revenues. It came first and foremost from actual transport activity.

Segment profit in Israel rose to NIS 8.933 million, and segment gross profit was roughly NIS 20.7 million. In the presentation, management highlighted positive Israel EBITDA of NIS 17.5 million, gross profit of NIS 21 million, and operating profit of about NIS 8 million. Even after stripping away the presentation language, the important point holds: Israel is no longer just a top-line growth story. It is now an improving economic engine.

The second layer is what matters. The company did not grow only through the legacy AutoTel product. By 2025 it already had a wider product stack, from minute-based use to multi-month subscriptions. That raises lifetime value, but it also raises operating and capital complexity. The company itself says it changed strategy, launched short-term rentals, flexible leasing and business leasing, and in parallel moved toward buying vehicles rather than relying more broadly on third-party leasing.

That is the heart of the story. A reader looking only at segment profit could miss that the growth rests on two very different foundations. The first is genuine demand for a broader mobility offering. The second is a different funding structure that moves more assets and liabilities onto the balance sheet. The key question, then, is not just whether Israel is profitable, but whether Israel is profitable enough to carry vehicle ownership and the financing costs that come with it.

Germany: less exciting, but far less dangerous than before

Germany moved in the opposite direction. It gave up revenue in order to improve quality. Segment revenue fell to NIS 18.625 million from NIS 23.994 million in 2024, but the segment loss narrowed sharply to NIS 2.947 million from NIS 13.324 million. According to the presentation, the company moved to a profitable-rides-only model, shut down loss-making city activity, raised prices in the summer, cut OPEX and headcount, and shifted German technology to a third-party solution.

That point matters because it shows the improvement was not driven by a Berlin sale. The company did conduct early, non-binding negotiations in 2025 to sell its Berlin business, but those talks did not turn into a transaction. In other words, the German turnaround came from fixing the operating model, not from a one-off asset exit.

Still, this is not yet a clean business. Germany operates more than 3,940 e-mopeds across three cities, the demand profile is highly seasonal, and winter usage is materially weaker than summer. On top of that, the business remains exposed to local parking, enforcement, and allocation rules. So 2025 was much better than 2024, but it still does not prove that Germany has become a durable profit anchor. It only proves that the loss hole has become much shallower.

Technology: when investors read "technology", they are mostly reading "Trinity"

This may be the most important analytical gap in the report. Technology segment revenue stood at NIS 19.665 million in 2025. On a shallow read that looks like reasonable stability versus NIS 23.231 million in 2024. But once the number is broken apart, the picture changes: standalone platform revenue collapsed to just NIS 212 thousand, versus NIS 7.193 million in 2024 and NIS 17.144 million in 2023. Nearly the entire segment in 2025 came from Trinity revenue, which rose to NIS 19.453 million.

The reason is straightforward. The Astra agreement, which had been the company's only platform customer through the end of the first half of 2024, is now behind it. So 2025 removes the noise that came from that external platform sale and leaves the segment exposed for what it really is: a very small standalone platform business and a growing Trinity operation.

The implication cuts both ways. On one hand, that is relatively good news because Trinity appears to be a better-quality engine than the legacy platform sales activity. On the other hand, anyone telling themselves that GoTo is simultaneously building a mobility operator and a broad external software sales engine is simply not reading the numbers correctly. As of the end of 2025, GoTo's standalone platform is not a meaningful commercial growth engine. Trinity is.

There is also an accounting bridge that matters. In segment reporting, the technology segment includes 100% of Trinity's results from the point at which it began to be treated under the equity method, while Trinity was still not fully consolidated in the 2025 statutory accounts and flowed mainly through the equity line. So the segment already signals more breadth than the consolidated 2025 revenue line actually carries. That changes in 2026, but in 2025 investors need to bridge between the segment story and the real economics reaching public shareholders.

Where the operating improvement really came from

At the group level, revenue rose only 4.7% to NIS 85.914 million, but operating loss narrowed sharply from NIS 19.125 million to NIS 5.402 million. That is a major improvement, but it did not come equally from everywhere. The biggest driver was Germany, which stopped burning cash at 2024 levels, alongside a cut in G&A to NIS 18.469 million from NIS 22.762 million, and a reduction in R&D expense to NIS 4.968 million from NIS 7.149 million.

In other words, 2025 was both a growth year and a cost-cutting year. That is a good combination, but it also means the profitability is still sensitive. If Israel slows, if Germany slips, or if the central cost base starts rising again, the company could lose part of this improvement fairly quickly.

Cash Flow, Debt, and Capital Structure

Cash flow: on an all-in basis, the business still does not fund itself

This is where framing discipline matters. On an all-in cash flexibility basis, meaning after real cash uses rather than at the earnings level, 2025 still did not build a cushion. Operating cash flow was negative NIS 956 thousand. Investing cash flow consumed NIS 25.414 million, mainly because of fixed asset purchases and mostly vehicles. Financing cash flow was positive NIS 30.804 million, which is why year-end cash rose to NIS 8.27 million from NIS 3.96 million.

What does that mean in plain language? The cash balance looks better only because 2025 was financed. Before new debt and equity funding, the business consumed NIS 26.4 million across operating and investing activity. So any claim that GoTo has already turned cash generative does not survive a balance-of-cash review.

The second point is just as important. The company's shift toward owning vehicles instead of leasing them more broadly can improve long-term economics, but it also delays the real test. The company now buys more of the fleet and hopes to capture resale value later. That may work well over time, but for now it weighs on cash, on debt, and on the need to keep accessing funding.

Capital structure: the operating improvement runs into a very tight balance sheet

The balance sheet is the active bottleneck. Total assets rose to NIS 102.2 million, but that increase came together with a sharp rise in liabilities. Current liabilities climbed to NIS 63.0 million, versus current assets of only NIS 20.5 million. Non-current liabilities rose to NIS 38.3 million. Equity shrank to NIS 918 thousand.

Put differently, almost the entire balance sheet now sits on debt and obligations. Loans from banks and others reached NIS 52.094 million, versus NIS 22.668 million a year earlier. Lease liabilities reached NIS 17.627 million. Against that, the company had NIS 8.27 million of cash and only NIS 107 thousand of short-term deposits.

The auditor's emphasis of matter on the company's financial condition did not appear by accident. It is there because the end-2025 picture still depends on management assumptions, a 24-month cash forecast, and continued access to debt and equity funding.

The covenant has already been broken once

This is probably the most important external warning signal in the report. Under an August 2025 irrevocable undertaking, the company committed to a tangible equity to tangible balance sheet ratio of at least 20% starting December 31, 2025. In practice it did not meet that covenant. It informed the bank that it expected to meet the threshold only by December 31, 2026, and on March 23, 2026 it received a waiver for the December 31, 2025 breach together with a revised covenant package for 2026.

That needs to be stated directly. This is not a theoretical risk. It is an event that already happened. Yes, the company got relief. But once the bank has already granted a waiver, 2026 is no longer a year in which EBITDA charts are enough. It is a year in which financial credibility has to be rebuilt.

Interest rates are still a real drag

The company remains highly sensitive to prime-linked debt. According to the rate sensitivity note, a 2% increase in rates on the NIS loan exposure would have worsened pre-tax loss by about NIS 1.265 million in 2025. That is material for a company with a NIS 9.811 million loss from continuing operations and almost no equity buffer.

The meaning is simple. Even if the operating model is improving, the rate burden can still eat a meaningful part of that improvement as long as the funding structure remains heavy.

Outlook

Four points that need to be on the table before reading 2026

• The 2026 forecast is not a clean comparison with 2025. Trinity enters consolidation only from 2026, so part of the revenue and EBITDA step-up will come from a change in reporting perimeter.
• Malta can improve equity, not cash. If the shareholder-loan conversion is completed, the balance sheet should look better, but it does not bring in new money.
• AutoTel eases 2026 fleet pressure, but sharpens concentration. The city support and cash already received improve flexibility, while also reinforcing dependence on one institutional customer.
• The real question is cash flow, not only EBITDA. Israel already looks like a functioning business, and now it has to prove it can carry the debt and fleet CAPEX structure as well.

Management presents 2026 as a scaling year. In the presentation it points to NIS 132 million of revenue and NIS 16 million of EBITDA, versus roughly NIS 105 million of revenue and NIS 9.6 million of EBITDA on a 2025 pro forma basis. Those numbers are not meaningless, but they need to be read with high caution.

The first problem is the comparison base. Showing Trinity on a pro forma basis as if it had already been consolidated in prior periods helps investors understand management's direction, but it also blurs the fact that reported 2025 still does not include that same revenue scope in the consolidated line. So 2026 may look much bigger from day one even if the underlying organic improvement is more modest.

The second problem is growth quality. Israel can absolutely keep growing, and the Colmobil partnership opens a clear channel. But growth funded through vehicle ownership, owner financing, and a heavy debt structure is not the same as growth built on a comfortable cash profile. If the company does not show parallel improvement in operating cash flow, the market may start reading 2026 as a year of better optical profitability more than a year of stronger free economic value for shareholders.

The third problem is that Germany only needs to do one thing now: not slip back. The model worked in 2025 because the company cut costs, repriced activity, and moved away from unprofitable volume. If the segment stays near break even through the weaker seasons, that should be enough. If it turns back into a support-needing business, a large piece of the 2025 improvement story disappears.

That leads to the right definition of 2026. This is not a breakout year. It is a financial proof year. The company has already shown it can build a viable Israeli operating engine, stop Germany from being a black hole, and rely on Trinity as a real growth asset. What it still has not shown is that the combination creates real breathing room for common shareholders rather than simply requiring another round of financing support.

What has to happen over the next 2 to 4 quarters for the thesis to strengthen?

• Israel has to show that better operations are beginning to translate into cash flow, not only segment profit and EBITDA.
• The Malta cleanup needs to close in practice and turn the planned NIS 12 million to NIS 14 million equity uplift into an actual balance sheet improvement.
• Trinity needs to enter consolidation without the market confusing accounting perimeter change with newly created value.
• The 2026 covenant package has to be met without another waiver.

And what would weaken the thesis?

• A return to deep cash burn even after the AutoTel fleet funding and even after Trinity consolidation.
• A need for fresh equity before the company proves it can live within its cash plan.
• A renewed deterioration in Germany, especially through the weaker quarters.
• Delay or failure in the Malta cleanup, leaving the balance sheet tight exactly when the bank has already started watching more closely.

Risks

Funding, covenants, and rates

This is the top risk. Equity is almost gone, working capital is deeply negative, and the bank has already had to grant a waiver. On top of that, the prime sensitivity analysis shows that even a moderate rate move is meaningful for the bottom line. A company with this structure does not need a full-blown crisis to get into trouble. It only needs the operational improvement to arrive more slowly than planned.

Dependence on a major customer and municipal support

AutoTel is an asset, but it is also a concentration point. The company itself defines the Tel Aviv relationship as material, with loss of that customer expected to hurt Israeli activity materially. Added to that are the subsidy mechanisms, the fleet replacement funding, and the fact that the updated agreement also caps annual municipal subsidy amounts. So the company benefits from a strong anchor, but does not fully control the economics of that anchor.

Growth quality risk in Israel

The Israeli market looks good, but the new growth model requires capital. Fixed assets rose to NIS 55.1 million, owned Israeli vehicles rose to 809 from 468 a year earlier, and new borrowing came with that expansion. If used vehicle values weaken, insurance costs keep rising, or growth slows, the company may discover that part of the 2025 improvement arrived too quickly relative to the balance sheet's ability to carry it.

Germany is still exposed to seasonality, regulation, and FX

Germany improved, but it remains highly seasonal. In addition, the business operates within local parking and enforcement regimes and carries euro obligations in that activity. So while 2025 was a very strong repair year, it is still not a closed case.

Trinity is impressive, but it is not a frictionless asset

Trinity is growing well, but it was still not fully consolidated through 2025. The company also notes that in 2024 Trinity had three customers representing more than 10% of its revenue. Beyond that, the digital audio market sits inside a platform ecosystem where much larger players can change the rules quickly. So Trinity is both an engine and a concentration risk.

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Conclusions

GoTo took a real step forward in 2025. Israel now looks like a business that can generate operating profit, Germany is much less dangerous, and 2026 opens with several triggers that can improve the numbers further. But the company still has not bought itself financial comfort. The balance sheet is tight, cash generation has not yet crossed to the right side of the story, and the bank waiver makes clear that the proof phase is not over.

Current thesis in one line: GoTo's operating model progressed faster in 2025 than its funding model did, which makes the story much more interesting but still not clean.

What changed versus the earlier read? It used to be easy to see GoTo as a noisy collection of activities with very limited proof. In 2025 it becomes possible to see a real Israeli engine. What has not improved enough is the question of who funds the path until that engine turns into real financial cushion.

Strongest counter-thesis: if Malta is cleaned up, Trinity is consolidated, AutoTel funds a large part of the fleet, and Israel keeps growing, then the cautious read here may prove too conservative and the balance sheet could start looking much healthier during 2026.

What could change the market's reading over the near to medium term? First, completion of the Malta cleanup. Then Trinity consolidation. Then evidence that 2026 is not only an accounting jump in revenue, but also a real improvement in debt service capacity and covenant compliance.

Why this matters: because GoTo is no longer being tested on whether it has a product and a market. It is now being tested on whether it can turn operating progress into a company that can stand on its own feet without repeatedly leaning on banks, partners, and new equity.

Over the next 2 to 4 quarters the thesis strengthens if the company closes Malta, keeps Germany near break even, and shows that Israeli growth is starting to show up in cash flow. It weakens if another waiver is needed, if external capital is again required earlier than expected, or if too much of the 2026 story turns out to be only a change in consolidation scope.