Liam Harish Asakim: Is Harish Maof Really Close To Phase B, or Are The Surpluses Still Far Away
Harish Maof carries NIS 117.2 million of forecast surplus at the end of 2025, but Leumi's Phase B financing is still conditional on approvals, equity, sales thresholds and timing. The betterment-levy reduction, the Rami Levy lease and the commercial-sale MOU improve the economics, but they still do not turn projected surplus into near cash.
What This Follow-Up Is Isolating
The main article made a clear point: the key question for Liam in 2026 is not whether it has projects, but whether Harish Maof can move from feasibility-model logic into cash that is actually financeable and eventually releasable. This is the project with the largest forecast surplus, which is exactly why it is also the easiest place to get carried away by one big number.
That number is NIS 117.2 million of forecast surplus available for release. It sounds close to an answer. That is the mistake. In the company’s own table, this is project-level forecast surplus, not cash already released, not financing already opened, and not money the company can simply access today.
To judge whether Phase B is really close, the report has to be split into three different layers that can easily look like one story: the project economics on paper, the bank’s conditions for further financing and surplus release, and the actual commercial progress on the ground. Once those three layers are separated, the picture becomes materially less comfortable.
NIS 117 Million Of Forecast Surplus Is Not NIS 117 Million In The Till
The company shows Harish Maof with forecast gross profit of NIS 100.2 million on forecast revenue of NIS 556.4 million and forecast cost of NIS 456.2 million, implying a forecast gross margin of 18%. That is already a respectable number, but even that is not the figure that really drives the optimism. The next table takes another step: it deducts NIS 31.8 million of measurement differences between accounting gross profit and forecast economic profit, mainly layers that do not sit in cost of sales such as financing, marketing and selling costs, and gets to forecast economic profit of NIS 68.4 million.
Then comes the big jump. The company adds back NIS 26.5 million of equity already invested and another NIS 22.3 million of equity yet to be invested, and that is how it reaches NIS 117.2 million of forecast surplus available for release. This is a project number, not a treasury number. It describes what is expected to remain inside the project if the assumptions hold, not what is currently free.
This chart gets to the core issue. Forecast surplus of NIS 117.2 million is not a pure profit layer generated by market-tested sales. Part of it is simply the developer’s own equity, whether already injected or still expected to be injected. So even if the company is right on the headline projection, the path from that number to free cash still runs through execution, financing, signed deals and lender discretion.
The company says that explicitly: surplus release is generally subject to construction pace and sales pace, and in any case remains subject to the sole discretion of the financing party. In other words, forecast surplus is not a distribution commitment. It is a conditional figure that stays trapped inside the project account until the bank is satisfied with progress and sales.
The sensitivity of the forecast is also sharper than it first appears. A 5% decline in selling prices for still-unsold areas wipes out NIS 27.8 million of the unrecognized gross profit. A 10% decline wipes out NIS 55.6 million. A 5% rise in construction cost removes another NIS 23.7 million, and a 10% rise removes NIS 47.3 million.
The implication is straightforward: the company does show a high projected surplus, but that surplus still sits on a forecast that remains highly sensitive both to selling prices and to construction costs. So the right question is not whether the table contains an attractive number. The right question is how much of that number has already passed the market-and-financing test. By the end of 2025, very little had.
Phase B Is Still Not “Almost There”
This is where the analysis has to move from forecast economics to the financing sheet. On November 26, 2025, the company signed the project financing agreement with Leumi. The total framework is up to roughly NIS 100 million: up to about NIS 75 million in Phase A, and another roughly NIS 25 million in Phase B. In addition, the bank provided sales-guarantee lines of up to NIS 455 million and other guarantee lines of up to NIS 5 million.
But the report does not present Phase B as opened money. The opposite. It says clearly that making the Phase B facilities available is subject to customary conditions precedent by no later than November 1, 2026, including minimum equity of 11%, receipt of the required approvals, provision of the required collateral, achievement of contractual sales thresholds, and start of construction by that date.
This chart explains why it is hard to argue that Phase B is close simply because the total framework is about NIS 100 million. The balance sheet already carries NIS 57.8 million of short-term project financing, and the company adds that only about NIS 17 million of Phase A cash credit remained unused. In other words, the initial framework is already largely spoken for, while Phase B has still not been made available.
The key bottleneck here is not just the bank document. It is also the project’s actual status. On one hand, there has been progress: excavation and shoring permit came in December 2024, a conditional building permit came in April 2025, and the company says excavation and shoring works began during September 2025. On the other hand, as of December 31, 2025 and still as of the financial-statement approval date, a full building permit had not yet been received.
That matters because Phase B depends not only on Liam’s balance sheet but on whether the project can already be read as a complete bankable story: approvals, collateral, sales thresholds and enough execution progress. It is hard to call this “almost there” when the same report says significant marketing had still not started. The company’s own footnote does not show a sales pace that already breaks the doubt: by the report publication date only 6 apartment-sale contracts had been signed, for total consideration of NIS 5.456 million, while the company was simultaneously working on signing leases in the commercial area to help support an eventual sale of those spaces.
| Key checkpoint on the way to Phase B and surplus release | What the report says | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum 11% equity | Listed as a Phase B condition precedent | A necessary base condition, but the report does not say this alone opens the stage |
| Required approvals | Listed as a condition precedent, while the report separately says full building permit had not yet been received | A real bottleneck that was still open |
| Sales thresholds | Listed as a condition precedent | Hard to read comfortably when the company itself says significant marketing had not yet started |
| Construction start by November 1, 2026 | Listed as a condition precedent | There is a hard deadline, not an open-ended timetable |
| Surplus release | Subject to construction pace, sales pace and bank discretion | Even after Phase B, there is still no automatic path to cash |
This is exactly the point the main article only flagged. Phase B is not a small technical step still waiting to be ticked. It is the stage at which the bank is supposed to be convinced that the project has moved far enough on approvals, collateral, sales and execution to justify another NIS 25 million. Based on the evidence in the report, the end-2025 disclosure still does not support the optimistic reading.
What Has Improved, And Why It Still Does Not Close The Gap
This is not a negative reading for the sake of negativity. There are several real datapoints pushing Harish Maof in the right direction.
First: in June 2024 Rami Levy signed a lease for 30% of the project’s commercial area, about 3,000 square meters, for a five-year term with extension options. That is an important commercial anchor. It does not just improve lease visibility. It also supports the company’s own strategy of selling the commercial part once signed lease agreements exist on it.
Second: in April 2025 the company signed an MOU with an unrelated buyer for the sale of the entire commercial area of Harish Maof, about 9,200 square meters, for base consideration of NIS 180 million plus VAT, subject to an adjustment mechanism linked to annual rental income. That is a potentially material monetization path.
Third: in February 2026 the company received a deciding-appraiser ruling that reduced the betterment levy on the project from NIS 28.7 million to NIS 16.8 million as of the relevant date. That is a real economic improvement, especially in a project whose forecast profitability is already sensitive to both prices and costs.
But these three datapoints still do not close the gap between forecast economics and financeable, monetizable economics.
The Rami Levy agreement covers 30% of the commercial space, not the whole project envelope. The commercial-sale MOU was still only an MOU as of the report date, with no detailed signed agreement yet. And the betterment-levy reduction clearly helps the project equation, but it does not replace the need to satisfy Phase B conditions, nor does it by itself solve the sales question.
In other words, the base has improved, but the proof has not arrived. It is fair to say the project looks cleaner and more financeable than it did a few months earlier. It is not yet fair to say it is close to the point at which the projected surplus is about to become released cash.
Bottom Line
Harish Maof is not standing still. It has signed financing, a commercial lease anchor with Rami Levy, an MOU for sale of the commercial area, and a material reduction in betterment levy. Those are exactly the reasons the project remains central to the Liam thesis.
But anyone reading the surplus table as if it were nearly ready cash is getting ahead of the facts. Leumi’s Phase B is still conditional on approvals, equity, sales and execution. Surplus release is separately subject to construction pace, sales pace and bank discretion. And as of the end of 2025, significant marketing had still not really started while a full building permit was still missing.
Current thesis: Harish Maof now looks like a project whose economics have improved, but its financing and monetization test is still ahead of it, not behind it.
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