Canada Global: 2025 Created Value Fast, but Most of It Is Still Not Accessible to Shareholders

Getting To Know The Company

Canada Global can look simple at first glance: another Israeli real-estate company that bought three Miami assets, booked a sharp uplift in value, and ended the year with positive net profit. That is only a partial reading. By the end of 2025 this is no longer a company built around a single asset, but it is also not yet a mature income-property owner that can be read mainly through NOI and cash flow. It is a public platform for development, repositioning, and capital-structure engineering, with three highly material U.S. assets, gross 100%-basis fair value of $843.6 million, and accounting profit that reaches the listed-company layer mainly through the equity method.

What is working right now is the portfolio build. In roughly 14 months the company completed three strategic transactions with aggregate asset value of about $711 million, including roughly 3,700 residential units and more than 100 thousand square meters of commercial real estate. Attributable equity rose to $69.6 million from $26.5 million, and the company managed to bring in both partners and public-market funding in order to expand its asset base very quickly.

But the active bottleneck is not about finding the next deal. It is much more practical: permits at Aventura, financing extension and planning progress at Biscayne 85, and converting River District from a partly leased asset with an aggressive valuation into an asset that starts producing real NOI. The financing backdrop in the U.S. is no longer as frozen as it was, and the company itself describes moderate Federal Reserve cuts alongside longer yields still running around 4.0% to 4.3%. That means the market is no longer distressed, but it is also not offering cheap money for execution mistakes.

What is easy to miss is that Canada Global operates more like a very lean public sponsor than like a heavy operating platform. As of the report date the company had only three employees, while most officers provide services under management-fee arrangements. The income statement makes the same point. Rental income in 2025 was only $24 thousand, while the company's share in profit from equity-accounted investees reached $49.62 million. In plain terms, anyone looking at net profit without asking on which layer it was created is missing the core of the story.

There is also an actionability constraint that deserves to be on the table early. Based on market data from early April 2026, market capitalization stands at about NIS 574.3 million, but turnover on the last trading day was only NIS 14.3 thousand. That matters. Even if value is there, this is not a stock where the market will always translate a thesis into liquidity quickly.

Four points to understand up front:

• Canada Global is currently closer to a public development and value-creation platform than to a classic income-producing real-estate company. Most of the economics sit inside associates, partners, and project-level debt.
• 2025 created a great deal of paper value, but most of the increase has not yet turned into cash that is accessible at the listed-company layer.
• River District is the largest driver of the uplift in value, but at year-end it was still not the largest driver of NOI.
• 2026 looks like a proof year: permits, refinancing, and lease-up, not a clean harvesting year for cash flow.

Events And Triggers

The main point is that 2025 was a year of portfolio and capital-structure building far more than it was a harvesting year. The company did not just buy assets. It also built the ownership model it wants to use: with Flow, with additional partners, and with layers of project debt and public-market debt that allow faster growth, but also shift the center of gravity from valuation to execution.

The first trigger: the three transactions changed the company's scale. Aventura was acquired in November 2024, Biscayne 85 in March 2025, and The River District in August 2025. In a short period the company moved from a relatively limited position to one concentrated in three very material assets in the same geographic area, combining an existing office asset, a development land bank, and a residential tower with additional development parcels. That creates depth. It also creates geographic and financial concentration.

The second trigger: adding partners improved capital efficiency, but it also sold part of the upside. In February 2025 the company added partners at Aventura and Biscayne. At Aventura, the equity the company needed to fund fell to about $14 million from about $26 million. At Biscayne, the equity need fell to about $11.8 million from about $19.6 million. From a capital-efficiency standpoint this was a smart move. From a common-shareholder standpoint it is also a reminder that part of the future upside no longer belongs only to them.

The third trigger: Aventura already received approval to increase rights to 675 residential units, but the application for 735 units has still not been approved. This matters because the no-change letter on the Aventura valuation states explicitly that the potential for 60 additional units above the current 675 was not reflected in fair value as of December 31, 2025 because it was not yet legally approved. In other words, there is real option value here, but it is still outside the booked number.

The fourth trigger: River District has already started moving operationally, but it has not yet crossed the proof point. Close to the report date about 57% of the residential units were leased at an average monthly rent of about $4,544 per unit. That is progress. Still, during the year itself average occupancy was only 38.3%, NOI was negative, and the valuation had already moved sharply higher.

The fifth trigger: the company decided not to pursue a strategic partnership in the U.S. real-estate-backed finance field. This is not the main headline, but it does suggest a measure of discipline. The company is not trying to expand into another arena before the current assets move to the next stage.

Efficiency, Profitability And Competition

The central point is that 2025 profit was generated mainly at the valuation and equity-method layer, not at the direct-rent layer. That is the heart of the story. The company ended the year with $47.2 million of operating profit and $23.4 million of net profit, but rental income was only $24 thousand. The fair-value change on investment property inside the consolidated accounts was only $101 thousand. What really carried the year was the company's share in profit from associates, $49.62 million.

Profit came from the layer below the listed company

This is not just an accounting footnote. It is the key analytical question. If most of profit comes from associates, the reader needs to ask two things immediately: how much of it is cash and how much of it is built on valuation uplift. The answer to the second question is very clear. During 2025 the associates recorded about $183 million of real-estate revaluation gains, of which the company's share was about $56 million. Roughly $37 million came from Aventura, about $1 million from Biscayne, and about $145 million from River District.

In plain terms, Canada Global's 2025 profit is first of all a reading on what the appraisers think and what the associates booked, and only after that a reading on money that has already moved up. That is not necessarily negative. It simply means this was a year of accounting and strategic value creation, not yet a year of cash-flow proof.

Aventura: value moved up before office economics recovered

At Aventura the interesting part is that the ongoing operating picture did not, on its own, justify the jump in value. Fair value at the end of 2025 was $156.8 million after a $37.0 million revaluation gain. But the full-year operating data shows a much less clean picture: revenue fell to $12.773 million from $13.666 million, NOI fell to $7.304 million from $7.757 million, and average occupancy declined to 89.1% from 91%.

So what is holding up value? Mainly the land layer and the rights. The appraisal separates the office property from the residential land component, and the company notes that it is targeting lease-up of vacant office areas at rent levels closer to market, about $58 per square foot versus a current average of about $54 per square foot. In addition, there are already approved rights for 675 residential units. That means Aventura is not just an office building. It is also a planning and redevelopment option.

But precision matters. The no-change letter says that between July 1, 2025 and December 31, 2025 there was no material change in market conditions requiring a new appraisal, and it also says the possible extra 60 residential units above the current 675 were not included in fair value because they were not legally permitted at the measurement date. In other words, current value has already risen, but it still does not tell the 735-unit story.

River District: the appraisal ran ahead, NOI is still behind

If there is one asset carrying most of the 2025 story, it is River District. Its year-end fair value was $612 million and its revaluation gain was $144.7 million. That alone explains almost 79% of the total revaluation gains across the three assets. This is exactly where the analysis has to slow down.

In 2025 operating terms, River still did not look like a $612 million asset. Revenue was only $884 thousand, costs were $2.71 million, NOI was negative $1.826 million, and FFO was negative $9.839 million. Average occupancy was 38.3%, and 242 units were leased at year-end. That is not a bad number for an asset that was only recently delivered after the investment, but it is also not yet a number that fully supports a valuation like this through operating performance.

This is where the appraisal matters. In the River District valuation table, the company presents $415 million for the rental tower and $197 million for excess land. The tower value relies, among other inputs, on a representative 38% occupancy rate, a 5.25% capitalization rate, an eight-month stabilization period, and representative NOI of $23.1 million. In plain terms, a large part of value rests on what the asset is expected to become soon, not on what it had already become by the end of 2025.

That does not mean the valuation is wrong. It means the next year will measure the lease-up much more than it measures the appraiser. If River moves quickly from about 57% leased close to the report date toward operating levels that start resembling positive, sustainable NOI, the revaluation will look more grounded. If pace stalls, much more of the 2025 story will look like value pulled forward.

Biscayne 85: for now this is an expensively financed land option

Biscayne 85 is the asset where it is easiest to confuse potential with current economics. The land was acquired for about $70.5 million and was valued at $74.8 million at the end of 2025. So the uplift here was modest, only about $1.156 million. The company itself writes that no construction is expected to begin in the next two years and that it cannot estimate the scale of future investment or development outcomes.

That turns Biscayne from a future development site into a financing and planning test. On the one hand there are significant existing development rights. On the other hand the land carries a $51 million loan, with an outstanding balance of $48.447 million at year-end, an effective rate floor of 11.25%, and a first maturity already in April 2026, even if extension options are available subject to conditions. As long as there is no final development plan and no construction financing, Biscayne remains an option-bearing asset that also carries real cost.

Cash Flow, Debt And Capital Structure

The main point is that the right frame here is all-in cash flexibility, not a narrow read of operating cash generation. Canada Global is not at a stage where it is enough to ask whether the business is "producing." The real question is how much cash remains after building the portfolio, after funding associates, and after financing activity, because that is what determines how much real room common shareholders still have.

The full cash picture

In 2025 cash flow from operating activities was negative $4.691 million. Investing cash flow was negative $68.873 million, mainly because of investments in equity-accounted entities, meaning real cash uses below the listed-company layer. The company funded all of this through positive financing cash flow of $88.45 million. Cash and cash equivalents ended the year at $17.224 million.

The board stresses that there are no warning signs because working capital is positive, because the company has enough cash to fund ongoing expenses and interest for the next two years, and because it expects to continue adding partners. That matters. This is not a distress picture. But it is also not the picture of a company already financing itself out of internal cash flow. It is a growth picture that still depends on access to financing and on bringing in partners.

The real debt map

Canada Global's debt does not sit in one place, so the risk does not sit in one place either. At the public-company layer there is Series A bond debt with NIS 216.396 million par outstanding, fixed 6.5% interest, and equal principal repayments in December 2028 and December 2029. On covenant terms this layer is very comfortable: equity-to-assets of 50% versus a minimum requirement of 20%, and solo equity of $69.592 million versus a minimum of $13 million to $15 million. The company also says it is in full compliance and there is no acceleration trigger.

But the bonds are not secured by a specific collateral package, and the company is still allowed to create specific liens over assets without asking bondholders for approval. That means the calm at the public bond layer does not cancel the fact that the material value sits lower down, inside assets already financed through their own collateral structures.

At the asset level the map is tighter. Biscayne carries a $51 million loan, with a $48.447 million balance at year-end, an effective rate no lower than 11.25%, and a first maturity in April 2026, with extension options subject to conditions. Aventura carries an $80 million balloon loan, with a year-end balance of $79.545 million, fixed 8% interest, and maturity in November 2026. There is also cross-default between the Aventura and Biscayne loans. River District carries a $319.5 million senior loan and a $30.5 million mezzanine loan, together $350 million, priced off SOFR with an 8.25% floor, and maturing in 2027 to 2028.

The key point is simple: comfortable covenant headroom does not automatically equal full financing flexibility. It only means the company is far from pressure at the public-company layer. The harder questions will be asked at the asset level, around refinancing dates and project progress.

Forecasts And What Comes Next

Five points to pin down before talking about 2026:

• River District already carries a $612 million valuation, but by the end of 2025 it had still not produced NOI that justifies that number.
• Aventura has real upside optionality, but the application for 735 residential units is still unapproved and current fair value does not include the extra 60 units.
• Biscayne 85 is expensively financed and reaches a financing test before it reaches an operating test.
• The fact that the public bonds sit far from covenant pressure does not solve the project debt that matures earlier.
• Bringing in partners solved the 2025 equity check, but if the same pattern continues, part of the future upside will keep being sold along the way.

What has to happen at River District

River is the first proof point. During 2025 it was still more of a value engine than an NOI engine. The near-term goal is not necessarily to jump immediately to the representative $23.1 million NOI used in the appraisal. It is to show a credible path toward it. That means more leased units, a move from negative NOI to positive NOI, and the ability to hold achieved rent levels without effectively buying occupancy through unusual concessions.

The key number here is not only the roughly 57% leased level close to the report date. The more important question is whether lease-up pace and rent roll begin to build a base that can support the valuation without relying on a theoretical stabilization year. This is the main checkpoint for the next two to four quarters.

What has to happen at Aventura

Aventura needs two moves at the same time. The first is operational: leasing vacant space and improving achieved office economics toward the market levels the company itself points to. The second is financial and planning-related: refinancing the $80 million loan before November 2026 and making real progress on the 735-unit question.

The positive side is that planning upside beyond 675 units has still not been booked into value. The negative side is that it has also not yet been converted into realizable economics. So Aventura is an asset that can improve the thesis, but only if the gap between approved rights, a pending application, and actual financing starts to close.

What has to happen at Biscayne 85

There is no room for romance at Biscayne. As long as there is no final development plan, no investment estimate, and no expected construction start in the next two years, this land first has to pass the financing test. An extension or refinancing of the loan in spring 2026 is the first checkpoint. After that, the company needs to show a serious Master Plan and credible planning progress with El Portal. Without that, value remains an option financed at a high carry cost.

So what kind of year is next

2026 looks less like a breakout year and more like a proof year. Not because the company weakened, but because valuation moved ahead faster than cash economics did. If River moves to the next stage, if Aventura advances on financing and permits, and if Biscayne does not get stuck with expensive debt and no plan, the read on 2025 will look like a well-built foundation year. If not, 2025 may look in hindsight like a year that pulled value forward in the accounts before pulling it forward in cash.

Risks

• Valuation running ahead of execution: in 2025 the associates booked about $183 million of revaluation gains, including about $145 million at River District. Any delay in lease-up, any gap between actual NOI and representative NOI, or any change in cap-rate conditions could hit accounting profit first.
• Refinancing tests are tighter than the public bond covenant suggests: Biscayne reaches a financing test in April 2026, Aventura in November 2026, and River in 2027 to 2028. So calm at the public bond layer does not cancel the real financing test.
• Value created below does not automatically become value available above: even after the revaluations, a large share of value sits below partners, non-controlling interests, project debt, and the listed-company layer. In a company like this, it is essential to separate value created from value accessible.
• Legal and governance noise: the company says it became aware of a demand letter sent to controlling shareholders at Israel Canada alleging exploitation of a corporate opportunity in connection with the U.S. transactions being done through Canada Global. The company itself did not receive such a letter and reported no legal proceeding against it, but it is still an external warning signal that should not be dismissed as pure noise.
• Rates, currency, and liquidity: some of the asset-level debt bears floating interest based on SOFR, while the public bonds are shekel-denominated and the assets are in the U.S. On top of that, day-to-day trading liquidity is very weak, which can leave the story in a "paper value" state even if the operating thesis improves.

Short Interest

Short-interest data does not currently point to an aggressive bearish read. As of March 27, 2026 short interest as a percentage of float stood at only 0.05%, while SIR stood at 0.9. That is well below sector averages of 2.45% and 3.220, respectively. On the other hand, with only NIS 14.3 thousand of turnover on the last trading day, it is hard to read this as a strong confirmation of the thesis. Sometimes it simply means there is not enough liquidity here for a meaningful short position.

Conclusions

Canada Global ends 2025 as a bigger and richer company on paper, but still an unproven one in terms of realization. There is a real portfolio here, strong partners, and a capital structure that lets the company operate on a much larger field than it did two years ago. On the other hand, most of the value still sits underneath debt layers, permits, and lease-up, so the market is now testing execution rather than the appraiser.

Current thesis: Canada Global created a great deal of accounting and strategic value in 2025, but shareholders only get real proof if River moves to positive NOI, Aventura is refinanced and advances on planning, and Biscayne stops being expensively financed land without a clear path.

What changed: a year ago the company could largely be read through acquisitions and strategic repositioning. After the 2025 report, the discussion moves to how much of that value is actually durable, how much depends on stabilization assumptions, and how much can ultimately rise to the listed-company layer.

Counter-thesis: it is fair to argue that this read is too conservative, because the company has already built an impressive portfolio in a short period, added strong partners, sits comfortably inside public-bond covenants, and still has unbooked planning upside at Aventura.

What could change market interpretation in the short to medium term: financing extension or refinancing at Biscayne, real lease-up progress at River over the next few quarters, and any sign that the 735-unit application at Aventura starts moving together with refinancing there.

Why this matters: in Canada Global the key question is not whether value was created at the asset level, but whether that value can cross layers of partners, debt, permits, and time and become value that common shareholders can actually access.

Over the next two to four quarters, something straightforward but not easy has to happen: River needs to start looking like an asset that supports its appraisal, Aventura needs to move from a rights map to an execution and financing map, and Biscayne needs to move from a loan-extension test to a planning test. If all three lines move together, 2025 will look like a smart build year. If one of them stalls, the market will keep seeing value that moves faster in the accounts than in cash.