Sheret and Bazel: How Much of the Project Profit Will Really Reach Listed Shareholders?
Intergama's Sheret and Bazel tables look much larger than the economics that truly belong to the listed company. This follow-up separates the equity-layer share, shareholder-loan priority, timing, and the cash layer that can actually move up to public shareholders.
What This Follow-up Is Isolating
The main article argued that Sheret and Bazel already changed how Intergama should be read. This follow-up isolates the next question: out of NIS 196.641 million of expected gross profit on a 100% project basis, how much really belongs to the listed company, in what order, and when might it become something public shareholders can actually reach outside the project tables.
That question matters now because the report holds two different layers at once. The project tables describe Sheret and Bazel as full projects. The consolidated and separate-company statements describe Intergama's economics inside the ownership structure, the financing stack, and the shareholder-loan layer. Once those two layers are separated, the big headline becomes easier to read correctly. The big number in the report is the project number, not the shareholder number.
The key numbers to keep in mind are:
| Layer | Sheret | Bazel | Total | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Expected gross profit, 100% basis | 96.734 | 99.907 | 196.641 | This is full-project economics, not economics attributable to Intergama alone |
| Approximate Intergama share at the equity layer | 16.1 | 16.7 | 32.8 | Intergama owns about 16.66% indirectly in each project, roughly one sixth |
| Gross profit not yet recognized, 100% basis | 49.487 | 91.015 | 140.502 | This is the future profit pool still sitting on paper at year-end 2025 |
| Approximate Intergama share of unrecognized profit | 8.2 | 15.2 | 23.4 | Even this number has to pass through the holding structure first |
| Shareholder loans including accrued interest | 21.040 | 26.897 | 47.937 | This is a separate claim that can rank ahead of ordinary surplus distribution |
| Cash interest that moved up to the group in 2025 | 1.607 | 1.995 | 3.602 | Proof that part of the value can already move up before an ordinary equity distribution |
How Much Survives the 100% Project Tables
The first haircut is the ownership haircut. Intergama owns 50% of the Q4 project vehicle and 50% of the Q5 project vehicle, and each of those vehicles owns 33.33% of the relevant project joint venture. That takes Intergama's indirect share in each project to about 16.66%, roughly one sixth.
The immediate implication is that the NIS 196.641 million of expected gross profit does not sit at the shareholder layer. At Intergama's equity layer, that number falls to roughly NIS 32.8 million, about NIS 16.1 million from Sheret and NIS 16.7 million from Bazel. The same is true for unrecognized gross profit. NIS 140.5 million on a 100% basis falls to roughly NIS 23.4 million at Intergama's indirect share.
But this is where the story should not be flattened too quickly. In the footnote to the project table, the company says its share of surpluses is expected to be slightly higher than its project share because of the priority attached to shareholder loans. That is a critical distinction. Intergama does not suddenly own more than one sixth of the projects. What changes is the order in which money may come back. Part of the recovery may come first through the loan layer, and only later through the ordinary equity-surplus split.
That is why one sixth of the gross profit is a useful starting point, but not the final realized-cash number. At the same time, even that reduced number is still far from free cash for public shareholders. It still has to pass through financing, time, group-level cash uses, and the gap between project gross profit and cash that actually moves up to the listed company.
Shareholder Loans Change the Waterfall, but Only After the Bank
This is the real difference between "development profit" and "value that reaches shareholders." In Sheret, Intergama committed to provide up to NIS 24 million of shareholder funding to the Q4 project vehicle, and by year-end 2025 about NIS 14.9 million of principal had already been advanced. In Bazel, Intergama committed to provide up to NIS 28 million to the Q5 project vehicle, and by year-end 2025 NIS 21.4 million of principal had already been advanced. In the consolidated investment note, those exposures already appear with accrued interest at NIS 21.040 million for Sheret and NIS 26.897 million for Bazel.
That is a large number, and it explains why the company says its share of surpluses may end up slightly above its pure equity share. At year-end 2025 Intergama was not sitting only on one sixth of future profit. It was also sitting on a loan claim of almost NIS 47.9 million including accrued interest. In practical terms, its current exposure to the two projects looks more like a rolling creditor position first, and only then like equity that is already ripe for distribution. That also shows up in the investment-account balance, which stood at NIS 18.19 million in Sheret and NIS 21.038 million in Bazel, a combined NIS 39.228 million, after accumulated losses were also taken into account.
But shareholder-loan priority is not absolute priority. In both projects the filings state explicitly that the shareholder loans are repaid only after the bank lender has been repaid. That matters because it is too easy to read the footnote as if Intergama is first in line. It is not. The bank comes first. Only after that does the owner layer, including shareholder loans, start to matter.
That is exactly why one cash-flow datapoint stands out. In 2025, on a cash basis, Intergama received NIS 1.607 million of interest from the Q4 project vehicle and NIS 1.995 million from the Q5 project vehicle, a combined NIS 3.602 million. So the mechanism is already visible. Part of the value can move upward as interest before ordinary equity surplus is distributed. But it still needs to be framed correctly. This is cash received at the group level, not proof that development profit has already turned into clean free cash for public shareholders.
Sheret Is Closer to Cash, Bazel Is Not
The two projects are not sitting at the same point on the timeline. Sheret is much closer to the test of turning a project table into actual cash. By year-end 2025 it had sold 56 units out of 86 units for sale, only 30 units remained unsold, engineering progress stood at 69% at year-end and 77% near the report date, and expected completion was set for the fourth quarter of 2026. At the Q4 project-vehicle level, the picture has already shifted as well. The held company ended 2025 with comprehensive profit of NIS 2.19 million, and Intergama's share of comprehensive income was NIS 1.095 million.
Bazel is earlier by a wide margin. By year-end 2025 it had sold 38 units out of 81, 43 units remained unsold, engineering progress stood at only 11% at year-end and 12% near the report date, and expected completion was deferred to the fourth quarter of 2028. The Q5 project vehicle tells the same story. Despite a near-NIS 100 million expected gross-profit table on a 100% basis, the held company still reported a NIS 3.885 million loss in 2025.
That is why Sheret and Bazel do not say the same thing to shareholders. In Sheret it already makes sense to talk about delivery, collections, and shareholder-loan recovery. In Bazel, even though the company already received NIS 1.995 million of cash interest from it in 2025, most of the story still sits in the future financing, sales pace, and execution layers. That is not a minor distinction. It determines how quickly the 100% project numbers can even begin to approach the listed-company layer.
Bottom Line
The NIS 196.641 million number is not wrong. It just sits two floors above the public shareholder. First it is cut to roughly one sixth. Then it still has to pass through bank debt, shareholder-loan priority, timing, and group-level cash uses. Only what remains after all of those filters begins to look like accessible value.
This is also not a one-sided story. On the positive side, the shareholder-loan layer does improve Intergama's position relative to the simplistic reading that it owns only 16.66%. That is exactly why the company already received NIS 3.602 million of cash interest from the two projects in 2025 even without an ordinary equity-surplus distribution. On the negative side, that same mechanism still does not make Sheret and Bazel an open cash box. First comes the bank. Then comes project completion. Only after that comes the real test of cash moving upward.
If the whole analysis has to be reduced to one line, it looks like this: Sheret is the 2026 test of whether development profit can move closer to accessible cash, while Bazel is still mostly a 2028 test of patience, financing, and execution. Anyone reading the project tables without that transition is reading the potential correctly, but not the route the money still has to take before it reaches public shareholders.
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