After Augmedics and FlexDex: Which Part of Almada's Book Still Holds Up

What Is Actually Left in This Pocket of the Book

The main article argued that the real test at Almada is not how much value is written in the books, but how much of that value can actually turn into cash that becomes accessible to the partnership. This follow-up isolates the five holdings that most blurred the 2025 picture: Augmedics, Belongtail, FlexDex, MetaFlow, and Sensi. This is where the gap opens up between a respectable headline profit and a much less clean layer of book quality.

Almada ended 2025 with profit of about $1.749 million, but these five holdings were not the clean engine behind that result. Quite the opposite. Augmedics, Belongtail, and FlexDex together produced about $4.48 million of fair-value losses in 2025. Against that, Sensi delivered about $2.466 million of fair-value gains and another roughly $1.034 million of partial-realization gain, while MetaFlow added about $196 thousand of fair-value uplift. In other words, this pocket did not fully break, but it did not hold together as a coherent book either.

The right split at year-end 2025 is between value that already received some external validation, value that received partial financing validation, and value that still rests mostly on a model and on the hope of a funding or licensing event. That is a very different split from the accounting headline of “fair-value investments.”

The chart captures the point immediately. These five holdings still carried aggregate fair value of about $5.447 million at year-end 2025. But about $4.559 million of that, roughly 83.7%, sits only in Sensi and MetaFlow. Augmedics, Belongtail, and FlexDex together were left with only about $888 thousand against an audited invested amount of about $8.002 million. That means the part that truly survives the stress of 2025 is much narrower than the broad Level 3 label suggests.

Which Names Already Have an External Anchor

Sensi is the only holding in this group that clearly crossed the line in 2025 from accounting value toward actual cash. Almada signed the sale of 45,000 A1 shares on December 16, 2025, and the deal was completed on December 31 with full consideration received, about $1.86 million. At the same time, Almada recorded fair-value gains of about $2.438 million at year-end and about $28 thousand at mid-year, plus about $1.034 million of gain from the partial realization.

That matters because Sensi is not “holding up” only because a model says so. Part of the value has already been validated by a real transaction. That makes it the strongest line inside this stressed pocket. Still, it is worth stopping one step short of calling it near-cash. Even after the partial sale, the remaining investment was still valued through a probability-weighted expected return framework, with a 19% discount rate and a projected liquidity event in 3 to 3.5 years. So this is a much stronger line than the others, but it has not fully completed the path from book value to cash.

MetaFlow is the middle case. In November 2025 Almada invested about $24 thousand through a SAFE meant to bridge the company until a new round of up to $10 million. In January 2026 the company signed a financing agreement, and after the balance-sheet date Almada added another about $56 thousand in order to take up its full pro rata share. The round closed in January 2026 at about $5.8 million, including SAFE conversion.

This is not an exit, but it is already more than another detached mark. There is a real external financing anchor here, alongside about $196 thousand of fair-value gain in 2025. Even so, perspective still matters. The fair-value line remains small at about $1.088 million, and it still rests on a model using a 19.5% discount rate and a 2.5 to 4 year expected liquidity horizon. MetaFlow therefore holds up better than Augmedics or Belongtail, but it has not yet moved from financing-backed book value into accessible value.

Which Names Still Depend Mainly on the Model or on Funding

Augmedics is the hardest line to defend as book value that still holds up. The issue is not only that fair value fell to just $417 thousand. The deeper issue is what broke underneath that number. After Almada participated in the November 2024 round and funded another $600 thousand in three tranches, including in February and May 2025, Augmedics reported on January 29, 2026 that due to its financial position it was stopping commercial spine activity, including sales, manufacturing, quality, and regulatory functions, and shrinking itself into an R&D-focused platform centered largely in Israel.

On February 16, 2026 Augmedics signed a binding agreement with VB Spine for exclusive rights to the X Vision platform in spine surgery. But the wording matters more than the headline. The stated purpose is continuity of service for existing customers and transfer of certain commercial infrastructure, and the filing explicitly says this does not change Almada’s valuation of the holding. In other words, the $417 thousand left in the books no longer rests on an active commercial engine in its original field. It rests on a new scenario built around licensing, partnerships, and R&D.

Belongtail looks less dramatic, but not necessarily stronger. Unlike the equity holdings, the portfolio table does not even present a fully diluted ownership percentage here because the investment was made through a SAFE instrument. After the balance-sheet date, on March 9, 2026, Belongtail’s management updated Almada on cost-cutting, strategic refocus, and the exploration of fresh capital or strategic alternatives. In the same breath it also said there is no certainty that any of those paths will be completed and on what terms. That is the definition of a funding-dependent value line.

FlexDex, by contrast, has already given the final answer. The company stopped operations, approved an asset sale of about $300 thousand, entered voluntary liquidation, and Almada concluded that no material remainder is expected to be left for shareholders, if any. Accordingly, the investment was written down and fair value at December 31, 2025 is zero. From an analytical perspective, there is no remaining debate here about the quality of the mark. This line has already exited the book in substance.

What the Level 3 Sensitivity Table Does Show, and What It Does Not

This is exactly where Note 9 matters, because it can lull the reader into a false sense of comfort. The sensitivity table shows that a 1% change in the discount rate would reduce profit and equity by about $252 thousand, and a 2% change would reduce them by about $498 thousand. At face value, that looks like a manageable sensitivity for a Level 3 book of about $17.467 million.

But that was not the stress that actually hit this pocket in 2025. The real stress was business and financing stress: Augmedics reset its business model, Belongtail openly moved into cost-cutting and capital-search mode, and FlexDex went into liquidation. Those three holdings alone produced about $4.48 million of fair-value losses in 2025, almost 9 times larger than the hit implied by the 2% discount-rate sensitivity in the note.

That is the core point. Discount-rate sensitivity measures how much the model moves when a parameter moves. It does not measure what happens when a portfolio company shuts down its commercial activity, enters liquidation, or has to look for rescue financing. Anyone reading Almada’s book through Note 9 alone gets only a partial picture. The large risk in this pocket is not fine-tuning of the valuation model. It is whether the underlying companies can still produce the external event that gives those marks a real foundation.

That also explains why 2025 profit can look cleaner than the underlying content of this pocket. Even after Sensi and MetaFlow, these five holdings still produced a net fair-value loss of about $1.818 million in 2025. So the portfolio-wide fair-value gain of about $2.467 million was achieved despite this stressed cluster, not because of it.

Conclusion

After Augmedics and FlexDex, the part of Almada’s book that truly holds up is narrow and tiered. Sensi holds up clearly, because part of the value already became cash. MetaFlow holds up cautiously, because it now has a fresh financing anchor but not yet a monetization path. Augmedics and Belongtail hold only conditionally, because both still need external proof before their marks can look stable. FlexDex does not hold up at all anymore.

Put back into the main article’s framework, the test is not whether Almada still has value on paper. The test is which part of that value has already moved through a real transaction, financing, or realization event, and which part is still waiting for outside rescue. At year-end 2025 the answer is sharper than the headline profit suggests: most of what still holds in this pocket sits in Sensi, a smaller piece in MetaFlow, and much less than it seems in everything else.