Almada Ventures 2025: Book Value Rose, Now It Has to Turn Into Cash

Getting to Know the Company

Almada Ventures no longer reads like a venture vehicle looking for its next deal. In practice, 2025 marked a shift into harvest mode. The partnership says so explicitly: it does not intend to make new investments and instead aims to support the existing portfolio and maximize value through upgrades, sales, or eventual listings. That means Almada should now be read less as a growth story and more as a listed wrapper trying to turn private portfolio marks into cash at the partnership level.

That also explains the gap between what looks good on paper and what still looks unresolved in practice. On the one hand, the partnership moved from losses to net profit of $1.749 million in 2025, and partners' equity rose to $25.826 million. On the other hand, that profit was not built on a recurring operating engine. It came almost entirely from fair-value gains and a partial realization on one holding. A superficial read of the bottom line can miss that the partnership itself ended the year with just $78 thousand of cash, even though it also held $4.323 million in short-term investments.

What is actually working today? Three larger holdings made tangible progress in 2025. BioProtect already had its FDA clearance, kept pushing US commercialization, and in January 2026 entered into a non-binding memorandum of understanding for the sale of the whole company. Nurami completed a financing round in February 2025, kept drawing grant support, and started a first-in-human study for ARTIFIX in December 2025. Sensi already produced something even more important for Almada: real cash proceeds, with a partial sale completed in December 2025.

What still blocks a cleaner thesis? The bottleneck is not value creation. It is value conversion. The key question is how much of the book value can turn into cash that actually remains at the partnership level instead of being recycled into portfolio support. That is the whole story here. BioProtect alone is carried at $6.58 million, but based on data provided to Almada it burned cash at a monthly rate of about $1.57 million in 2025, ended the year with $9.164 million of cash, and was seeking a credit line to maintain operating continuity. In other words, even the strongest asset in the book is still operating against a funding clock.

There is also a practical screen issue. Almada's market cap was about NIS 39.1 million in early April 2026. That likely reflects deep skepticism toward the quality and monetizability of the reported asset base, not just general disinterest in a micro-cap security. Investors are not buying a recurring earnings stream. They are buying a basket of Level 3 marks, a few credible monetization paths, and several reminder cases showing how fast private valuations can also move the other way.

The Value Map Today

The portfolio is more concentrated than it may look at first glance. BioProtect, Nurami, and TailorMed account for 56.1% of the partnership's assets. The distinction between "material holdings" and "almost material holdings" does not change the economics: if one of those three moves, the whole thesis moves with it.

Events and Triggers

The first trigger: BioProtect is no longer just a line in a valuation memo. In January 2026, a non-binding MOU was signed for the sale of 100% of the company to a strategic investor. If a binding agreement is reached, Almada estimates immediate cash proceeds of $10 million to $12 million and a tax profit of about $8 million. For a partnership of this size, that is a game-changing event. But it remains a conditional event: diligence, regulatory approvals, third-party consents, and Israel Innovation Authority approval still stand between the headline and the cash.

The second trigger: Sensi already delivered a partial proof of concept on monetization. Almada sold part of its holding on December 31, 2025 and received the full consideration of about $1.86 million. Beyond the cash proceeds, it also booked a realized gain of about $1.034 million and a revaluation gain of about $2.438 million. This is the most constructive datapoint in the report because it connects private carrying values to actual cash at the partnership level.

The third trigger: Augmedics moved in the opposite direction. After year-end, Almada learned that the company had decided to stop commercial activity and refocus on research and development. In February 2026, Augmedics signed a binding agreement with VB Spine to sell exclusive rights in its X Vision platform for use in spine surgery. That should preserve service continuity for existing customers and reduce operating costs, but it also confirms that the prior commercial path did not hold. It is therefore not surprising that Almada cut Augmedics' carrying value to just $417 thousand after a $1.357 million negative revaluation in 2025.

The fourth trigger: On the same day the annual report was approved, the board approved a capital reduction distribution of up to $2 million, subject to court approval. That may signal a willingness to start sending value back to holders. But it is a two-sided move. It can be read positively as capital return, yet it can also reduce liquidity at precisely the point when parts of the portfolio still need bridge time and possibly more support.

Efficiency, Profitability and Competition

The central point is that Almada's profit improved, but earnings quality is still only moderate. In 2025, the partnership recorded $2.467 million of gains from revaluation and realization of financial assets, against $692 thousand of G&A, $104 thousand of management fees, and net finance income of $78 thousand. Without the movement inside the portfolio and the Sensi realization, the listed wrapper still does not support itself.

Profit on Paper Versus Profit in Cash

That does not mean the profit is fake. That would be the wrong conclusion. When BioProtect, TailorMed, Nurami, and MetaFlow make progress, the partnership's economic value does change. But the key distinction is between value created and value accessible to public unitholders. In 2025, Almada generated two different kinds of value:

• accounting value through positive revaluations, mainly in BioProtect, TailorMed, and Nurami
• more liquid value through the partial Sensi sale and the exercise of Almada's own warrants

That gap is why the market still looks skeptical. The partnership has already shown that its book value can move up. It still needs to show that this turns into a repeatable stream of cash proceeds.

The Upside and the Warning Sat in the Same Year

What matters here is that 2025 was not a one-direction win year. The same report that shows net profit also contains a sharp warning on the quality of part of the book. On the positive side, Almada recorded positive revaluations of $1.951 million in BioProtect, $992 thousand in TailorMed, $361 thousand in Nurami, and $196 thousand in MetaFlow. On the negative side, it booked write-downs of $1.357 million in Augmedics, $1.294 million in Belongtail, $1.829 million in FlexDex, and $25 thousand in Virility.

That is exactly what separates a portfolio vehicle with realizable value from one still living mostly on models. Part of the book is moving toward commercialization, grant-backed development, or potential exits. Another part is aging into funding stress, strategic resets, or liquidation. So the right conclusion is not that book value is meaningless. The right conclusion is that each line item needs to be tested on its own path to monetization.

Almada Competes for Time More Than for Price

As a small listed life-sciences portfolio vehicle, Almada is not competing for customers. It is competing for three other things: whether portfolio companies can reach the next milestone, whether they can raise money on reasonable terms, and whether Almada can turn valuation events into liquidity events. BioProtect and Nurami suggest that some holdings still have real regulatory and commercial momentum. Augmedics, Belongtail, and FlexDex show how quickly funding windows can close.

Cash Flow, Debt and Capital Structure

The right cash frame here is all-in cash flexibility. The key question is not what Almada earned on paper, but how much liquid capital remained after operating costs, follow-on investments, lease payments, and the rest of its actual cash uses.

On that basis, 2025 looks acceptable but not roomy. Operating cash flow was negative $984 thousand. Investing cash flow was negative $440 thousand after $1.124 million of follow-on investments and $2.668 million of realizations, alongside a larger allocation to short-term funds. Financing cash flow was positive $1.42 million, almost entirely from the exercise of Series 5 warrants. The result is that cash and cash equivalents fell by only $23 thousand, but that happened because unitholders funded the bridge through warrant exercises, not because the listed wrapper generated cash on its own.

In absolute terms, Almada's immediate liquidity rose from $2.355 million at the end of 2024 to $4.401 million at the end of 2025. That is real improvement, but the build matters: it came from the Sensi monetization, warrant exercises, and redeployment into money-market funds. It did not come from recurring operating cash generation.

No Parent-Level Financial Debt Does Not Mean No Funding Pressure

At the partnership level there is no meaningful financial debt, and current liabilities are low. That is a clear positive. The fee base also became leaner in 2025. Management fees shifted to a fixed monthly structure of NIS 25 thousand plus VAT, and the partnership gave up its office lease in April 2025. The cost base did fall: G&A declined to $692 thousand from $1.105 million in 2024, while management fees fell to $104 thousand from $222 thousand.

But the real funding pressure sits inside the portfolio. MetaFlow took a bank facility of up to $15 million in 2025, had drawn $14.2 million by year-end, and received an additional $2 million bridge line in October. BioProtect, despite its year-end $9.164 million cash balance, was seeking a credit line for continuity. Belongtail disclosed after the balance sheet date that it was evaluating strategic alternatives and additional financing. That means any capital return at the partnership level still has to be read against the list of potential support needs inside the portfolio.

The Capital Structure Also Says Something About the Cushion

The number of participation units increased from 16.0 million at the end of 2024 to 19.4 million at the end of 2025. Most of that came from the exercise of 3.364 million Series 5 warrants, which brought in $1.435 million. That matters for two reasons. First, it explains how Almada funded part of the year without fully depleting liquidity. Second, it means the current cushion was itself financed by the market. If the partnership now distributes up to $2 million before another large exit closes, it is effectively returning part of the bridge that was just built.

Outlook

Four Findings That Matter Most Up Front

• 2025 profit was portfolio profit, not wrapper profit. Almada turned positive only because the marks and the Sensi realization moved in its favor.
• The most important move now is not another mark-up. It is the conversion of BioProtect from a non-binding sale path into binding cash proceeds.
• 2025 proved there is real value in the book, but it also proved that parts of the book can deteriorate quickly. Augmedics, Belongtail, and FlexDex together erased more than $4.4 million.
• 2026 looks like a bridge year with a monetization test, not a breakout year. The question is not whether the portfolio has upside. It is how much of that upside becomes cash before the rest of the portfolio asks for more time and more capital.

BioProtect is the first and most important test. If the MOU becomes a binding deal, the partnership expects to receive $10 million to $12 million in cash. Relative to Almada's size, that can reshape liquidity and force a much cleaner market read of the asset base. But two details matter. First, the MOU was still non-binding as of the report date. Second, BioProtect itself was still burning cash at a high rate and looking for a credit line. So the sale process is both a value event and a funding solution.

Nurami is the second option, but it is not at the same stage. The company combines grant support, a financing round, an option structure around a future acquisition subject to FDA approval for ARTIFIX, and an active first-in-human study. That is real operational progress. But it is still a development and regulatory timeline. It can support book value, yet it does not currently look like an immediate liquidity source for Almada.

MetaFlow sits somewhere in between. There are cumulative sales in the tens of millions of dollars, a financing round that closed in January 2026, and Almada's participation to preserve its pro rata stake. But beneath that sit meaningful bank debt, a bridge facility, and broad security interests including intellectual property. This is a survival improvement, not necessarily a clean improvement in the quality of value available to Almada holders.

That leads to a simple conclusion: in Almada's first phase, investors had to believe in portfolio selection. In 2026, they need to believe in execution on exits. If BioProtect closes and the capital reduction does not impair flexibility, the market reading can change quickly. If BioProtect drags or fails, and holdings like Belongtail or MetaFlow keep consuming time and capital, the market is likely to keep treating reported NAV as largely theoretical.

Risks

High Concentration Inside a Level 3 Book

Most of the investment asset base, $17.467 million out of $21.462 million carried at fair value, sits in Level 3. That means value depends on models and assumptions around discount rates and exit timing. The disclosed sensitivity is not extreme, but it is meaningful: a 1% change in the discount rate would move profit by roughly negative $252 thousand to positive $266 thousand, while a 2% change would move it by roughly negative $498 thousand to positive $547 thousand.

Monetization Does Not Equal Freely Accessible Cash

Even when a monetization event occurs, not every dollar reaches unitholders cleanly. On BioProtect alone, the report already points to an estimated tax profit of about $8 million if a binding agreement is signed. Almada's partnership agreement also includes initiation fees on realization events. So the headline value of a sale is not the same as the amount that will remain freely available for distribution or redeployment.

A Portfolio That Still Requires Patience, and Possibly Capital

Augmedics has exited commercial operations and moved back toward R&D. Belongtail is already evaluating strategic alternatives and additional financing. FlexDex entered liquidation. MetaFlow did close a financing round, but it did so alongside meaningful bank debt and collateralization. The risk here is not just lower marks. It is extended timelines and renewed capital needs.

High Portfolio Dependence With a Very Lean Wrapper

The partnership has become leaner, which is positive, but it is also very thinly staffed. As of the report date, Almada had no employees other than its CEO and relied on services from the general partner. That keeps overhead down, yet it also means execution is highly dependent on management's ability to run several monetization tracks at once without falling back into another cycle of bridge funding and waiting.

Conclusions

The right way to read Almada at the end of 2025 is as a partnership that has made real progress, but has not yet completed the move from value to cash. What supports the thesis today is the combination of positive accounting profit, one realized sale already completed, and BioProtect now looking like a credible exit candidate. The central blocker is that the story is still dominated by private NAV and by dependence on a small number of holdings. In the near and medium term, the market's reaction will likely be driven mainly by whether BioProtect becomes binding and how much capital remains after the layers between headline value and usable cash.

Current thesis: Almada has already shown that there is real value in the portfolio, but it has not yet shown that this value can flow out at a pace that deserves a much cleaner market read.

What changed versus the prior understanding? 2025 gave Almada both real monetization in Sensi and a potential exit path in BioProtect, but it also confirmed that weaker holdings can deteriorate fast. This is no longer a partnership living only on future promise. It is also not yet a partnership that has solved the monetization question.

Counter-thesis: the market discount may be justified because most of the value is still private and illiquid, BioProtect has not been sold, capital reduction could weaken liquidity, and weaker holdings may continue to erode value or demand support before meaningful cash reaches public unitholders.

What could change the market read in the near to medium term? A binding BioProtect agreement, actual cash proceeds received, a court-approved capital reduction that does not damage flexibility, and evidence that MetaFlow and Belongtail do not immediately return as the next funding priorities.

Why does this matter? Because in Almada the gap between "there is value" and "there is cash" is the whole story.

Over the next 2 to 4 quarters, the thesis strengthens if BioProtect moves from memorandum to binding sale, if Sensi remains the first monetization example rather than the last, and if liquidity stays adequate even after capital return. It weakens if the BioProtect process drags or fades, and if the rest of the portfolio keeps writing down value faster than Almada can turn it into cash.