Aluma in the First Quarter: Exelera Became Cash, Supergas Will Decide What Remains for Shareholders

Aluma enters the first quarter of 2026 with a meaningful change: the liquidity problem that defined the fund at the end of 2025 has eased, but it has been replaced by a heavier capital-allocation question. Exelera was sold after the balance sheet date for roughly $127.8 million gross to the fund, Asco already generated about NIS 53 million of cash, and a new convertible bond issue lifted cash and deposits to about NIS 243 million at the end of March. That does not make the story simple, because in the same window the fund agreed to acquire Supergas Natural for total consideration of NIS 395 million, completed a NIS 45 million investment in Greenmix, increased its Super Pipe loans to NIS 12.5 million, and plans to redeem Series B bonds. The portfolio itself continues to improve attributable EBITDA, but the fund posted a NIS 10.4 million loss because of the shekel value decline in Exelera and public-holding-company costs. The stock is therefore not only trading at a discount to NAV of about NIS 462 million. It still needs proof that the new liquidity will reduce friction and create cash-generating assets, rather than being replaced by another round of financing, a dividend and a large acquisition. The next proof points are completion of Supergas on the announced terms, the Series B redemption, the decision on a dividend of up to NIS 62 million, and the ability of Greenmix and Asco to show cash flow and profitability that justify the capital tied up in them.

Company Overview

The fund is an infrastructure holding company that measures its investments at fair value. That starting point matters. Its profit does not come from consolidated operating revenue of the portfolio companies, but from fair-value changes, dividends, interest, loan repayments and management fees. A company like this can therefore show improving activity at the portfolio companies while reporting a loss at the fund level, or the other way around.

Its economic model creates value in two layers. In the first layer, infrastructure and environmental companies need to grow EBITDA, service debt and build value. In the second layer, that value must move up to the fund through exits, dividends, loan repayments or transactions that create liquidity. In the current quarter the second layer became more important than the first, because the Exelera exit is no longer a future option. It was completed after the balance sheet date.

This is why continuity with the previous annual analysis matters. Back then, the question was whether the Exelera and Asco exits would actually turn NAV into accessible cash. Now part of the answer is yes, but it is not enough: the cash arrived exactly as the fund opened a new and larger investment front.

At the end of March, the investment portfolio still looked heavily concentrated in Exelera: NIS 371.5 million out of NIS 570.8 million of fair-value investments. After the sale was completed on May 20, 2026, that concentration turns into liquidity and a new question: what replaces Exelera as the asset that supports value. Asco remains an operating exposure with a NIS 55.4 million investment value after the partial exit, Oganim and Hen Hamakom provide a steadier asset layer of about NIS 96.1 million, and Greenmix plus Super Pipe turn the environmental platform into a cash use that still needs to prove returns. Above all of these sits Supergas Natural, a NIS 395 million acquisition that converts part of the new liquidity into a larger energy asset.

Market pricing adds pressure to the reading. The last share price was 93.7 agorot, compared with NAV of about 151 agorot per share at the end of March. That implies a discount of roughly 38% to NAV per share, without unusual short pressure: the latest short position was only 0.12% of the float. The debate is not technical. It is about whether the value created in the portfolio is truly accessible to shareholders.

The Quarter Moved the Question From Liquidity to Capital Allocation

At the end of 2025, the fund's liquidity was narrow: about NIS 17.1 million of cash and deposits. Three months later, cash and deposits jumped to about NIS 243.2 million. That increase did not come from operating cash flow. It came from two clear sources: about NIS 187.4 million net from the convertible bond issue, and the partial Asco sale, which generated about NIS 53 million in cash.

The relevant cash bridge here is all-in cash flexibility after actual fund-level cash uses: operating cash flow, investments, debt repayment, a possible dividend and acquisitions, not normalized cash generation at the portfolio companies. On that basis, the quarter shows a sharp liquidity improvement, but also a list of uses that lengthened quickly.

The Supergas Natural deal is the event that prevents the quarter from becoming a simple "cash has arrived" story. At closing, the fund is expected to pay NIS 281 million, plus the net financial asset or debt balance of Supergas Natural, which the sellers calculated at about NIS 11 million at the end of March. Another NIS 114 million is due within 24 months of closing, indexed to CPI, and 29% of Supergas Natural shares will be pledged to secure that deferred consideration.

The positive side is clear: the fund is trying to turn a telecom exit into an energy asset that can generate recurring infrastructure cash flow. The less comfortable side is that the acquisition arrives before the market has seen the final use of Exelera proceeds, while the fund is also redeeming Series B and considering a dividend. The market will likely judge the move by the actual order of cash uses: balance-sheet friction first, or portfolio expansion first.

The Portfolio Works, but Not Every EBITDA Shekel Reaches the Fund

The positive operating number in the quarter sits at the portfolio-company level. Aggregate portfolio EBITDA on a 100% basis rose to NIS 32.5 million in the quarter, up 25% year over year. On the fund's attributable share, EBITDA rose to NIS 18.9 million, up 11.8%. On an LTM basis, meaning the last 12 months, attributable EBITDA reached NIS 77.1 million, up 18.7%.

Still, that EBITDA is not cash in the fund's account. The fund measures investments at fair value, and recurring cash income from dividends, loan repayments and interest was only NIS 314 thousand in the quarter, down from NIS 989 thousand in the parallel quarter. Management-fee income was NIS 667 thousand, while management fees paid to the management company were NIS 2.3 million. This fixed holding-company friction explains why exits and dividends matter more here than operating profitability at the portfolio-company level.

The portfolio quality is also uneven. Exelera posted quarterly revenue of $11.7 million and EBITDA of $5.5 million, but operating cash flow was only $503 thousand. Asco grew revenue to NIS 41.2 million, but operating profit fell to NIS 5.1 million because of an estimate change in specific projects and higher operating costs. Hen Hamakom grew revenue to NIS 74.2 million, but operating cash flow was almost zero, NIS 31 thousand, against net financial debt of NIS 62.8 million.

Greenmix is the most interesting point in the new portfolio. Quarterly revenue reached NIS 16.8 million, EBITDA reached NIS 3.9 million, and it moved to operating profit of NIS 1.4 million. But the bottom line was still a NIS 691 thousand loss, mainly because of finance expenses. Its equity deficit was NIS 12.8 million, and liabilities reached NIS 132.7 million. The loan conversion and additional NIS 20 million investment after the balance sheet date were intended in part to repay loans and refinance bank debt, so this is not only a growth investment. It is also an investment that repairs a portfolio company's capital structure.

The gap between portfolio activity and cash at the fund level is not a new weakness. It is part of the model. But after the Exelera sale, that gap becomes practical: can the next asset in the portfolio generate recurring cash upward, or will the fund continue to prove value mainly through fair-value marks and selective exits.

Debt, Dividend and the NAV Discount Set the Next Read

The balance sheet at the end of March looks more comfortable than it did at the end of 2025, but it is also less simple. Equity was NIS 462.3 million, and the fund had comfortable covenant room: equity above the NIS 255 million threshold, NAV above the NIS 225 million threshold and a net financial debt to assets ratio of about 10% versus a 55% ceiling. These are not immediate pressure zones.

Debt still matters because it defines the order of priorities. Series B was still carried at about NIS 119.7 million at the end of March, but after the Exelera closing the condition for full early redemption was met and redemption is planned for June 21, 2026. The new Series 1 convertible bonds, with NIS 190 million par value, are unsecured and convertible into shares. The first conversion price, NIS 1.12 until December 21, 2028, sits above the last share price of 93.7 agorot. If the share price moves closer to that level, dilution will become part of the financing read, not just a technical trust-deed detail.

The possible dividend sharpens the same point. The fund is considering using part of the Exelera proceeds for a dividend of up to NIS 62 million, subject to board approval, distribution tests, the June 30, 2026 financial statements and financial covenants. Based on the end-March equity level, such a dividend would still leave numerical room above the NIS 290 million equity and NAV distribution threshold. Economically, however, it would be a message decision: is the fund telling shareholders that part of the exit is coming back to them, or does it need most of the cash to absorb Supergas, complete environmental-platform investments and close debt.

That is why the discount to NAV does not disappear automatically after the Exelera exit. The assets have proved that value can be monetized, but the company still needs to show that shareholders can access it. If the Exelera proceeds are mostly absorbed by debt redemption, the Supergas acquisition and follow-on investments, the discount can remain even while NAV looks high relative to market value.

Conclusion

The first quarter of 2026 strengthens the fund's liquidity, but makes the investment story less clean. Exelera and Asco provided monetization proof, the convertible bonds provided time and flexibility, and the portfolio continues to grow EBITDA. Against that stand a very large Supergas Natural decision, follow-on investments in Greenmix and Super Pipe, Series B redemption and a possible dividend. The current read is that Aluma has moved from "will cash arrive" to "how much of that cash remains accessible to shareholders after the near-term capital uses."

The strongest counter-thesis is that the Supergas Natural acquisition may be exactly what the fund needs after selling Exelera: an operating energy asset that can restore a meaningful cash-flow source to the portfolio and reduce dependence on fair-value marks. That is a reasonable argument, but it needs proof through the financing structure, closing terms and cash contribution after the acquisition. In the coming quarters, the market is likely to focus less on whether NAV exists and more on whether the new portfolio order improves cash accessibility: Series B redemption, Supergas closing, the dividend decision, and continued improvement at Greenmix and Asco will be the four signals that shape the read.