Hadera Is No Longer Just a Revaluation: Veridis Needs Land Cash to Fund OPC
The Hadera land has a higher value and a nearer timeline, but the same evidence also sharpens OPC's funding burden. A roughly NIS 450 million rights sale could turn accounting value into funding, provided the agreement, levy and timing do not consume too much cash on the way.
Veridis did not just get another positive Hadera revaluation in the first quarter. It got a much more binding timeline for when that land is supposed to become cash, and what happens if that cash arrives late. The developments around Hadera 2 reduced the uncertainty component in the lease realization, brought the expected realization date forward to July 2026, and lifted the combined fair value of the two Hadera assets to roughly NIS 403 million. But the same evidence has another side: OPC Israel needs equity funding for advanced development projects, Veridis' potential share of the shareholder loan reaches up to roughly NIS 310 million, and Hadera already carries an initial betterment levy assessment of about NIS 194 million at the project level. Hadera is therefore no longer only an accounting-profit or NAV question. It has become a funding question: whether a roughly NIS 450 million rights sale closes on time and on terms that let the company fund its OPC share without reversing the balance-sheet improvement delivered in the quarter. The next proof point is not another revaluation, but a binding agreement, a manageable levy outcome, and project financing that does not require more cash than the filings currently imply.
Hadera has moved from accounting value to a cash timetable
The earlier coverage of Hadera and OPC separated revaluation gains from accessible cash. The first quarter moves the discussion one step forward: the revaluation is still there, but it now sits next to dates, payments and conditions that can turn it into a funding source or leave it as paper value.
In Hadera 2, the uncertainty around realization of the lease agreement between Infinia and OPC Israel fell from 20% to 10%, and the expected realization date moved forward from June 2027 to July 2026. As a result, the Hadera 2 investment property was valued at about NIS 325 million, with a revaluation gain of about NIS 48 million before tax and about NIS 37 million after tax. Another Hadera asset, Hadera 1, was valued at about NIS 78 million, with a revaluation gain of about NIS 8 million before tax and about NIS 6 million after tax.
Those figures matter less as a revaluation and more as a map toward cash. Infinia is negotiating with OPC Israel to sell the rights in Hadera 1 and Hadera 2, replacing the lease agreement and lease option, for expected consideration of about NIS 450 million. There is still no certainty on completion, terms or final consideration. But the contemplated switch from lease to sale changes the logic: Veridis is no longer only waiting for future lease income, but is examining a large one-off cash inflow into the group layer.
| Item | What changed | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Hadera 2 | Fair value of about NIS 325 million and a pre-tax revaluation gain of about NIS 48 million | The value is based on lease-income capitalization and land value, so it still depends on realization |
| Hadera 1 | Fair value of about NIS 78 million and a pre-tax revaluation gain of about NIS 8 million | The operating-site land was also revalued, not only the new-project land |
| Potential rights sale | Expected consideration of about NIS 450 million | This could turn revaluation into cash, but the deal is not yet binding |
| Shareholder loan to OPC Israel | Potential Veridis share of up to about NIS 310 million | Hadera cash may fund the OPC requirement instead of relying on the balance sheet |
| Hadera betterment levy | Initial assessment of about NIS 194 million at Hadera 2 | The project is advancing, but some cash may be caught in levy payment, bank guarantee and appeal proceedings |
The rights sale has shifted from useful monetization to a funding need
The reason the Hadera transaction matters now is not just the price tag. After the balance-sheet date, OPC Energy's board approved a shareholder-loan framework of up to about NIS 1.55 billion for OPC Israel, to fund the equity required for advanced development projects in Israel, mainly Ramat Beka and Hadera 2. Veridis, which owns 20% of OPC Israel, may need to provide up to about NIS 310 million.
The timing makes the link between Hadera and funding explicit. The loan must be provided no later than September 15, 2026, or five business days after the full consideration for the Hadera land sale is paid, if such a sale occurs. In other words, the funding mechanism already assumes that the Hadera sale may become the source that allows Veridis to meet its share without adding pressure back to debt.
Ramat Beka and Hadera 2 are no longer distant ideas. At Ramat Beka, EPC agreements were signed for a substation and switching station totaling about NIS 310 million, and after the balance-sheet date another agreement was signed for a photovoltaic power plant totaling about NIS 500 million. At Hadera 2, a February 2026 agreement with GE Vernova covers the main power-station equipment and maintenance, with total consideration estimated at about 20% of a project cost currently estimated at NIS 4.8 to 5.2 billion. Some payments have already been made, estimated at tens of millions of euros.
Still, the boundary of what has already been proven is clear. Construction at Ramat Beka depends on financing completion, permits and regulatory approvals. Hadera 2 has advanced to an equipment agreement, but still needs the approval and financing chain that turns commitments into a built project. The Hadera rights sale is therefore not a bonus on top of the thesis. It has become the cleanest funding source the company can show against its potential OPC equity requirement.
The Hadera levy shows the cash is not fully free
The datapoint that keeps the story from becoming simple is the betterment levy demand. After the reporting date, Hadera municipality sent a payment demand and initial assessment of about NIS 194 million in connection with exercising rights under the plan through issuance of a building permit for Hadera 2. Receipt of the building permit, which is needed for Electricity Authority approval of financing completion, is conditional, among other things, on settling the levy payment.
OPC Israel intends to settle the demand by paying 50% of the assessment in cash and securing the rest with a bank guarantee, while disputing the assessment amount and preparing an appeal. At this stage, the final levy amount cannot be reliably estimated. For Veridis' shareholders, that means the NIS 450 million figure does not automatically equal free cash. It has to pass through sale terms, taxes and transaction costs if any, OPC funding needs, and the levy settlement at the project.
That is why Hadera deserves a separate continuation. In an infrastructure and holding-company structure, a land revaluation around an energy project is not abnormal by itself. What is unusual here is that the revaluation, rights sale, equity funding need and betterment levy converge in the same time window. If the sale is signed near NIS 450 million and the levy is settled at a level and structure that do not absorb a large share of the proceeds, Veridis can turn a revalued asset into funding for OPC. If the sale is delayed, reduced or blocked by a higher levy burden, the first-quarter balance-sheet improvement may prove to be an interim stop before another cash call.
What will decide the next read
Hadera now looks much closer to execution than it did at the end of 2025, but that is exactly why it should be measured in cash, not in another fair-value gain. A binding rights-sale agreement, the final betterment levy amount, the timing of Veridis' share in the shareholder loan to OPC Israel, and project financing completion are the four signals that will decide whether Hadera improves the company's financial flexibility or merely swaps an attractive revaluation for a new capital requirement. The current read is cautiously positive: the asset is advancing, but for that progress to matter more to shareholders, the land has to become cash before OPC again becomes a significant consumer of capital.
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