Electricity Starts With Gas: The TASE Companies Holding Israel’s Reservoirs
Data centers and electrification lift electricity demand, but renewables and storage cannot carry the full load alone. This analysis maps Leviathan, Tamar and Karish, and separates companies with direct reservoir exposure from those that remain in the background.
Electricity Demand Puts Gas Back At The Center
Data centers, electrification, desalination and heavy industry do not only need more megawatts on paper. They need continuous, available power at large scale. Renewables and storage are important parts of the solution, but they do not replace the baseload layer that holds the system when solar output is not enough and demand rises.
In a separate analysis we mapped which TASE-listed companies are exposed to data centers. Here the focus moves one step back in the chain: who supplies the gas that enables that electricity to be produced.
The answer starts with three reservoirs: Leviathan, Tamar and Karish. NewMed and Ratio are the direct Leviathan exposures, Isramco and Tamar Petroleum are the Tamar exposures, and Energean is exposed to Karish, Tanin and Katlan. Delek Group gets exposure through NewMed. Dalia, Meshek Energy, OPC and Supergas are already the electricity and customer layer. Renewables, storage and infrastructure matter, but they sit further away from the reservoir itself.
Leviathan is the central asset in this map because it combines a producing reservoir, export contracts, a final investment decision for expansion and two direct TASE-listed exposures. Tamar is a more mature and more domestic reservoir, with an export layer and transmission upgrades. Karish is a domestic reservoir with long-term contracts, but in 2026 it also shows why operational availability is a real risk.
Short Glossary For New Readers
| Term | Short Explanation |
|---|---|
| BCM and BCF | Gas-volume units. BCM means billion cubic meters, while BCF means billion cubic feet |
| 1P and 2P | Reserve classifications by confidence level. 1P means proved reserves, while 2P includes proved plus probable reserves |
| Production capacity | The quantity that the reservoir and platform can produce over a given period. When capacity is constrained, sales are constrained too |
| Transmission capacity | The ability to move gas through pipelines from the reservoir to Israel, Egypt, Jordan or other export routes |
| GSPA | A long-term gas sale agreement that sets quantity, price, indexation and commitments between the reservoir and the customer |
| Take or Pay | A mechanism in which the customer pays for a minimum quantity even if it does not physically take all of it |
| FID | Final investment decision. This is the point where planning becomes an executable project with budget and timetable |
| FPSO | Floating production, storage and offloading facility. In Karish, the Energean Power FPSO is the core production facility |
| MW, MWh and MW IT | MW measures power capacity, MWh measures energy over time, and MW IT refers to computing-equipment load in data centers |
Who Sells To Whom
The split between Israel and exports defines the exposure. Leviathan sold about 10.9 BCM in 2025, of which only 1.8 BCM went to the domestic market and about 9.1 BCM went to exports, mainly Egypt and Jordan. Tamar sold about 10.05 BCM, of which 6.78 BCM went to Israel and 3.27 BCM to exports. Karish sold about 5.6 BCM, all to the domestic market.
The three reservoirs are therefore not the same story. Leviathan is primarily a regional export asset, Tamar is a domestic anchor with an export layer, and Karish is a domestic base with growth optionality through Katlan and Nitzana. That distinction matters because Israeli data centers support local electricity demand first, while reservoir expansions and pipelines can also move the export layer.
Expansions And Pipelines: Where The Bottleneck Opens
The important number is not only how much gas sits underground, but how much can be produced, transported and sold on time. That is where expansions and pipelines become central to the thesis.
| Reservoir | What Already Exists | Expansion Or Pipeline | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leviathan | Capacity of about 12 BCM per year historically, with an interim phase around 14 BCM per year | Final investment decision for the first expansion stage, with a budget of about $2.36 billion. The stage includes 3 additional production wells, subsea systems and platform-treatment upgrades, and targets production capacity of up to about 21 BCM per year in the second half of 2029. A later step toward about 23 BCM per year requires, among other things, a fourth pipeline between the field and the platform | This is what turns Leviathan from a stable asset into a growth asset. Without pipelines, transmission capacity and export customers, part of the cash flow remains on paper |
| Tamar | Mature reservoir with current supply capacity of about 1.15 BCF per day | The first expansion stage was completed in February 2026, including a third pipeline from the wells to the platform and upgrades in Ashdod. Together with compressor upgrades, the target is up to about 1.6 BCF per day. FAJR is targeted for the second half of 2026 and Nitzana for the second half of 2028 | Tamar is less dependent on one big headline and more on gradual improvement in sales capacity. If transmission opens, the reservoir can protect its local role and sell more regionally |
| Karish, Tanin and Katlan | Karish and Karish North produce through the Energean Power FPSO, and all operating revenue of Energean Israel depends on that system | Katlan reached FID in July 2024 and is planned to connect to the FPSO through a subsea line of about 30 km, with first gas in the first half of 2027. The Nitzana agreement also provides capacity of up to 1 BCM per year and up to 6 BCM in total | This can add a growth layer above the domestic base, but dependence on the FPSO makes operational availability the first checkpoint |
The implication is simple: the sector is not tested only by electricity demand, but by the physical ability to open bottlenecks. A reservoir with large reserves but no pipeline, transmission route or production availability is weaker than a reservoir that can turn gas into a contract, revenue and cash flow.
The Companies: Who Is Close To The Reservoir
NewMed and Ratio are the most direct Leviathan exposures. NewMed holds 45.34% of the reservoir, Ratio holds 15%, and Delek Group gets exposure through NewMed. The advantage is a large, producing and expanding reservoir. The drawback is that the market still has to price security, transmission, Egypt, expansion funding and timelines.
Isramco and Tamar Petroleum are the direct Tamar exposures. This is not the same step-change story as Leviathan. It is a mature asset, contracts, meaningful 2P reserves and transmission upgrades. Isramco looks like the broader Tamar exposure, while Tamar Petroleum is more sensitive to debt structure and refinancing.
Energean is a separate case. It is not a derivative of Leviathan or Tamar, but Israeli activity around Karish, Tanin and Katlan inside an international group. In 2025 Karish sold about 5.6 BCM to the domestic market, but in February 2026 Israel’s Ministry of Energy ordered a temporary suspension of activity at the Energean Power FPSO. That does not change the existence of the asset, but it does show that the risk is not only gas price. It is also facility availability.
Dalia, Meshek Energy, OPC and Supergas are the second layer. They benefit from electricity demand, large customers, power plants and customer migration to the private electricity market, but they do not own the gas reservoirs. Dalia is the clearest example: the existing Dalia plant generated about NIS 749 million of operating profit before depreciation and financing in 2025, while Eshkol Generation generated revenue of about NIS 1.51 billion and operating profit before depreciation and financing of about NIS 580 million. That matters, but it is a power-generation analysis, not a reservoir analysis.
Enlight, Energix, Doral, Nofar, Ormat, Elmor, Paz, Bazan and Energy Infrastructures stay in the background. Some can benefit from electricity demand, storage, infrastructure or system services, but their exposure to gas reservoirs is more indirect. Anyone looking for the gas thesis should start with Leviathan, Tamar and Karish, and only then move to the derivatives.
What The Market Pays For Reservoir Cash Flow
For reservoirs, valuation starts with the reserves report. How much gas and condensate are expected to be sold, at what pace, at what prices and costs, and what the future cash flow after royalties, levies and taxes is worth when discounted to today.
NPV is the reservoir’s discounted cash flow at a given rate. NAV is the next step: take the NPV, add cash and financial assets, and subtract debt and liabilities at the company or partnership level. The move between 10%, 7.5% and 5% is therefore not technical noise. It reflects how the market prices risk.
| Discount Rate | What It Means In Practice | When It Makes More Sense |
|---|---|---|
| 10% | A relatively high risk premium, giving less value to distant cash flows | Concern around production interruptions, security, transmission, debt, CAPEX or dependence on a regional customer |
| 7.5% | A more infrastructure-like read of a producing asset with contracts and cash flow | Producing reservoir, long-term contracts, distributions and a clear expansion plan |
| 5% | A very calm view of the risk | Relevant only if operating, security, regulatory and financing risk are materially lower |
This is exactly the Ratio argument. If Leviathan is a large producing asset with export contracts and an approved expansion, it is understandable why an investor may view 10% as too harsh and 7.5% as more appropriate. If war, production stops, transmission, Egypt and debt get a high weight, 10% can still be justified. A 5% read already requires more certainty than seems reasonable as a central Israeli base case.
NewMed’s share of Leviathan’s 2P discounted cash flow is about $7.53 billion at 7.5%, versus about $5.99 billion at 10%. Ratio’s share of the same reservoir is about $2.55 billion at 7.5%, versus about $2.03 billion at 10%. Isramco’s share of Tamar is about $2.34 billion at 7.5%, versus about $1.95 billion at 10%.
| Company | Reservoir | Reported 2P Discounted Cash Flow | Latest Market Cap | Valuation Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NewMed | Leviathan, 45.34% | About $7.53bn at 7.5%, about $5.99bn at 10% | About NIS 22.2bn | The largest Leviathan exposure, but with Aphrodite, debt, distributions and royalties |
| Ratio | Leviathan, 15% | About $2.55bn at 7.5%, about $2.03bn at 10% | About NIS 5.1bn | The most direct case: almost the entire story is Leviathan |
| Isramco | Tamar, about 28.75% | About $2.34bn at 7.5%, about $1.95bn at 10% | About NIS 6.0bn | A more mature, more domestic asset with transmission upgrades |
| Tamar Petroleum | Tamar, 16.75% | About $1.32bn at 10%, without a 7.5% base in the same summary table | About NIS 2.6bn | Direct Tamar exposure, but debt makes NAV more sensitive |
| Energean | Karish, Tanin and Katlan | 818 Mmboe of 2P reserves in Energean Israel, not in the same Israeli NAV-table format | About NIS 6.3bn | Requires group-level analysis of debt, FPSO availability and production stability |
| Delek Group | NewMed and other assets | Not comparable to one reservoir directly | About NIS 17.7bn | Holding-company analysis: NewMed beside Ithaca, Isracard, Mehadrin, Delek Israel and parent debt |
The table does not create a price target. It organizes the question: does the market view the reservoir as long-duration infrastructure cash flow, or as an asset that still requires a high risk premium. Ratio and Isramco are the simpler reserve-report-versus-market-cap comparisons. NewMed is more central, but more complex. Energean and Delek already require group-level analysis.
What To Track
For Leviathan, the test is actual progress on the expansion, drilling, platform upgrades, export transmission capacity and the fourth pipeline in the later stage. Any delay in funding, construction or Egypt can push part of the cash flow further out.
For Tamar, the question is whether the completed expansion and compressor upgrades actually lift sales capacity, and whether FAJR and Nitzana stay on schedule. This is less dramatic than Leviathan, but just as important for preserving cash flow.
For Karish, the first checkpoint is a safe and stable restart of the Energean Power FPSO. After that come Katlan, Nitzana and the ability to turn Karish from a domestic-only base into an asset with an additional growth layer.
For Dalia, Meshek Energy, OPC and Supergas, the test is whether electricity demand becomes binding agreements, identified gas supply, grid connection and economics that reach shareholders. In renewables, the question is similar: how much backlog reaches operation and how much cash remains after financing.
Reservoir First, Derivative Second
The mistake is to assign a premium to every company near the word energy. The gas thesis starts with the reservoirs themselves: who owns them, how much they produce, who they sell to, which pipelines open and what discount rate the market is willing to pay for the cash flow.
Leviathan is the largest growth and export story. Tamar is a mature-asset, capacity-upgrade and steadier cash-flow story. Karish is a local-contracts, Katlan and Nitzana story, but also a story of FPSO dependence. Power plants, data centers, renewables and infrastructure are important layers, but they come after the basic question: who gets paid from the gas itself.
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