Tamar Petroleum: From New Capacity to Cash, the Compressor-FAJR-Nitzana Chain

What This Follow-Up Is Isolating

The main article argued that Tamar’s new capacity still was not the same thing as accessible cash. This follow-up breaks that gap into its actual links. The question here is not whether the reservoir can produce more gas. It is the order in which that ability has to pass through the Ashdod compressors, the BOE contract, FAJR and Jordan North, Nitzana, and only then become export sales that show up in revenue.

The non-obvious point is that there are three separate clocks running here. One is the field clock: the third pipeline was completed on February 9, 2026, and the Ashdod compressors are meant to finish the move from 1.15 BCF per day to 1.6 BCF per day. The second is the transport clock: in 2026 Tamar still relies on Jordan North and FAJR, both on an interruptible basis, while Nitzana is only targeted for the second half of 2028. The third is the reservoir clock itself: Tamar 12 and Tamar 3ST are only scheduled to start in the second half of 2027 and run through the fourth quarter of 2028.

That is why the forward sales curve looks like stairs rather than a single jump. Tamar field sales are forecast to rise from 10.1 BCM in 2025 to 12.1 BCM in 2026, 13.7 BCM in 2027, 14.1 BCM in 2028, and only then to 15.1 BCM in 2029 and 2030. That is the clearest inference from the chain: the new capacity begins to work in 2026, but fuller monetization is a staged process that runs well into 2028 through 2030.

The Monetization Chain: Where Each Link Opens And Where It Still Blocks

Link 1: The Field Is Almost Ready, But Not Fully

The first link is the most engineering-heavy, and also the easiest to read too quickly. Stage one of the expansion project, the third pipeline from the wells to the platform together with the related offshore facilities, platform work, and the Ashdod onshore terminal, was completed on February 9, 2026. Total completion cost for stage one is estimated at about $640 million at the project level, and cumulative investment already reached about $630 million by December 31, 2025.

But even after stage one was completed, maximum production capacity still stood at about 1.15 BCF per day at the reporting date. The reason is simple: the compressor upgrade at the Ashdod terminal, budgeted at another roughly $24 million, was still not complete, and only the combination of stage one plus the compressors is expected to bring Tamar up to about 1.6 BCF per day. In the March 2026 investor presentation, the operator said compressor installation was expected to finish within weeks. That is a fast trigger. It does not close the whole story.

Link 2: The Contract Exists, But The Commercial Path Is Separate From The Physical Path

The second link is commercial. Under the BOE export agreement, the Tamar partners are committed to an annual layer of roughly 2 BCM, with an additional layer of about 4 BCM per year meant to open through the additional-quantities mechanism. But the disclosure itself separates contractual entitlement from actual transportability.

The start date for the additional quantities was initially set for July 1, 2025, but it could be deferred if the expansion works at the sellers’ facilities were not completed. Tamar therefore notified BOE that the start date was pushed into the first quarter of 2026. More important, the agreement explicitly says that inability to transfer all or part of those additional quantities because of transport-capacity shortages or lack of transport-system availability does not count as breach.

That is the core of the gap between capacity and cash. Even if the field can produce more, not every additional molecule turns immediately into contractual export revenue because the transport system remains a separate condition. Put differently, the larger BOE export layer exists on the contract side, but its timing still depends on the infrastructure chain.

This is also where Kassem matters. On February 22, 2026 the Kassem gas agreement became effective for a combined-cycle power plant, with a maximum annual contracted level of about 0.8 BCM from commercial start, on a Take or Pay basis. That is an important reminder: when extra capacity begins to become sales, part of it may go to local demand rather than directly to exports to Egypt. So more capacity is not automatically the same as more export cash.

Link 3: 2026 Relies On A Bridge, Not On The Permanent Route

The third link is the interim transport route. For 2026, the Gas Authority said Jordan North offers annual available transport capacity of 4.2 BCM, similar to 2025, and the company estimates that Tamar partners may receive up to 50% of that capacity. In addition, Chevron notified NGT in December 2025 that it was redirecting the full base capacity to Jordan North, and NGT approved the diversion from April 1, 2026.

At the same time, the FAJR project, the upgrade of the transport system outside Israel, is the second bridge route. Total budget is about $353 million, with Tamar partners carrying about $176.5 million and Tamar Petroleum itself about $30 million. By December 31, 2025 Tamar partners had invested about $131 million and the work was 86.8% complete. Estimated completion is in the second half of 2026.

But here too there is an asterisk. The FAJR arrangement relies on interruptible transport and is paid based on actual throughput. Jordan North itself is available in 2026 only on an interruptible basis as well. That means 2026 can absolutely be a step-up year for exports, but it is still a year built on system availability, transport constraints, and realized flow, not on a fully stable route already sitting in place for Tamar.

That chart reflects the company’s own route table for Tamar and is contingent on each relevant link within each route actually being completed. It is not the same thing as capacity already fully available today.

Link 4: Nitzana Is The Route That Makes Export Capacity More Stable, But That Is A 2028 Story

The fourth link is Nitzana, and it changes the quality of exportability more than just the volume. The agreement package became effective on October 23, 2025. Estimated project budget is about $609 million, with Tamar partners’ share determined by a 41.8% allocation in the line, and Tamar Petroleum’s share at about $43 million. On top of that, Tamar partners took on 50% of the excess cost above the EPC price for the Nitzana compressor station. Those excess costs were estimated at about $64 million at the project level, with Tamar Petroleum’s share at about $5.4 million.

The Nitzana transport agreement gives Tamar firm base daily capacity of about 175,560 MMBTU, plus additional interruptible quantities of at least 1.8 BCM per year for all exporters on the route. But the transport start date is no later than 36 months from effectiveness, meaning by the end of October 2028, and the presentation points to the second half of 2028 as the estimated completion window.

Here again, the chain is not Israeli only. On February 1, 2026 the Tamar partners informed BOE that the Ramat Hovav-Nitzana agreement package had been signed and asked BOE to confirm that it intends to develop the Egyptian-side transport system toward Nitzana. So Nitzana is not only an Israeli line-and-compressor project. It is also a question of whether the Egyptian side keeps pace and turns the new delivery point into a real commercial route.

Link 5: The Development Wells Are Part Of The Curve, Not A Footnote

The fifth link sits a few steps further out, but it cannot be stripped out of the thesis. On December 29, 2025 the Tamar partners took FID on two new development wells, Tamar 12 and Tamar 3ST, in order to preserve long-term production capacity, ensure redundancy, and support Tamar’s sales obligations. Total approved budget is about $466.5 million at the partner level, including about $313.6 million for Tamar 12 and $152.9 million for Tamar 3ST. Tamar Petroleum’s share is about $78.1 million.

Actual execution is only expected to start in the second half of 2027 and continue through the fourth quarter of 2028, including completion and hook-up. By year-end 2025 only about $18.1 million had been invested, mostly in long-lead equipment.

That is exactly why it is hard to read the 2028 through 2030 sales curve as a pipeline-only story. To reach 14.1 BCM in 2028 and 15.1 BCM in 2029 and 2030, Tamar needs not only Nitzana but also the development wells. In other words, the market is not buying only a pipe. It is also buying redundancy.

What All Of This Means For Cash

The key conclusion is that monetization is not stuck, but it is also not arriving in one shot. The 2026 sales forecast of 12.1 BCM shows that the new capacity is expected to begin turning into cash this year. But that first step still relies on a partial chain: compressors that were expected to finish within weeks, BOE additional quantities already delayed into Q1 2026, Jordan North and FAJR on an interruptible basis, and Nitzana still about two and a half years away.

So the right 2026 read is a transition year into monetization, not a full harvest year. What is working now is that the field is almost ready for 1.6 BCF per day, the BOE agreement already includes an additional quantity layer, and Jordan North plus FAJR provide a commercial bridge ahead of Nitzana. What is still missing is a firmer and more stable export route, full Egyptian-side coordination, and completion of the development wells that support the 2028 through 2030 curve.

This also explains why the company itself publishes a gradually rising sales curve. It is not presenting a case where compressor completion alone immediately launches Tamar into its end-state sales level. The implicit message is that the field, the pipes, the delivery points, and the new wells all have to line up before the new capacity becomes fully monetized cash.

Conclusion

Current thesis: at Tamar Petroleum, new capacity begins to turn into cash in 2026, but the full monetization chain opens in stages, from the Ashdod compressors through FAJR and Jordan North, and then into Nitzana and the Tamar 12 and 3ST wells.

What changed relative to the earlier read is that the gap between more capacity and more export cash no longer looks like a generic delay. It now looks like a sequence of separate milestones with separate dates. The field is almost ready now. The interim export route is built during 2026. The firmer route arrives only in 2028. And the 2029 through 2030 curve also rests on new wells.

The strongest counter-thesis is that this read is too cautious. BOE already has an extra layer of about 4 BCM per year, Jordan North is open for 2026, FAJR was already 86.8% complete at year-end 2025, and the sales curve itself already rises to 12.1 BCM in 2026. That is a serious argument. But it still does not remove the fact that 2026 exports sit on a bridge solution, not on the permanent one.

What will change the market read in the near term is less another reserve slide and more four checkpoints: compressor completion, evidence of higher actual BOE flow through Jordan North and FAJR, progress on the Egyptian-side leg toward Nitzana, and the timetable for Tamar 12 and Tamar 3ST. Only if those links connect does the new capacity really close the gap to cash.