Capital Point: Nasus as the Portfolio's New Anchor
In 2025 Nasus became a listed holding, a fee-paying services relationship and the only name singled out in a standalone material-valuation disclosure. That gives Capital Point a new anchor for reading the portfolio, but it still does not prove that the value is already accessible to shareholders.
Nasus Is The New Anchor, But Not The Whole Story
The main article argued that Capital Point should not really be judged through NAV alone, but through its ability to turn value into accessible cash. This follow-up isolates Nasus because it is the clearest place in 2025 where three lines meet at once: a holding that is already listed, a relationship that generates a fee-paying services contract for Capital Point and a name that appears on its own in the material-valuation disclosure.
That matters because at a small holdco the discount does not start to narrow just because another fair-value line went up. It starts to narrow when the market gets at least one asset it can track without relying only on internal models. Nasus gave Capital Point exactly that. At the end of 2025 it was carried at NIS 10.699 million against a cumulative cost of NIS 5.395 million, with a 6.05% stake and 5.53% on a fully diluted basis.
But this is also where the first limit appears. Nasus is an anchor, not a substitute for the entire portfolio. At year-end it was one of the two largest holdings, almost level with Aura at NIS 10.893 million, but still only about 17.2% of the NIS 62.309 million portfolio of project-company and marketable investments. The top two positions together, Aura and Nasus, accounted for about 34.7% of the book. That is enough to shape how the company is read, but not enough to answer the quality question for the whole portfolio by itself.
That chart sharpens the point. Nasus is already large enough to become the first name the market looks at, but not large enough to turn Capital Point into a near-direct listed proxy for Nasus. So the interesting question is not whether Nasus became an anchor. It did. The real question is whether one anchor can reshape the read of the whole company.
Why Nasus Received A Different Status
The first move was the Nasdaq listing. On 12 August 2025 Nasus completed an IPO and Nasdaq listing of 1.25 million ordinary shares at $8 per share, implying a post-money valuation of about $72 million. Capital Point did not just sit with a legacy position. It bought 150,000 shares in the offering itself for a total of $1.2 million, and after the IPO it held about 6.3% of Nasus.
The second move was the creation of a services-income layer. On 7 August 2025, five days before the IPO, Capital Point signed a business-development services agreement with Nasus. The contract runs through the end of June 2026 and carries total consideration of $600,000 over the service period. That is a meaningful shift because it moves Nasus from being only an equity holding to being a relationship that also pays Capital Point contract income.
The third move, and the most analytically important one, is the disclosure layer. In the holdings table, Nasus is marked off a quoted price with an illiquidity discount applied to the restricted shares. In other words, this is already a much more market-grounded position than a purely model-driven private holding, but it is still not a fully frictionless screen price. At the same time, the material-valuation table includes only one name, Nasus, with an external expected-value appraisal. That turns Nasus into more than just a large holding. It becomes the only position for which Capital Point is forced to provide a standalone valuation explanation.
| Layer | What Nasus adds | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Trading | A Nasdaq-listed company since August 2025 | The market gets an external anchor instead of relying only on internal models |
| Services | A business-development agreement through end-June 2026 for total consideration of $600,000 | The relationship is no longer purely equity-based and includes contractual income |
| Valuation disclosure | The only name that appears in the material-valuation table | Nasus becomes the focal point through which the company explains how value is being built |
The gap between cost and fair value, NIS 5.304 million, is exactly why Nasus became the new anchor. This is no longer a small line near the bottom of the table. It is a holding that almost doubled against cost, has an external market price and reflects active participation by Capital Point in the IPO itself.
What This Anchor Does Change
Before Nasus, much of the debate around Capital Point was still fairly abstract: how much of the portfolio was really worth what the books said, and how much still depended on rounds, comparables or assumptions. Nasus changes that debate because it introduces an asset the market can test from the outside. Investors no longer have to guess whether the company exists, whether it had a financing event or whether there is a price. There is a screen, there was an IPO, there is a stake percentage and there is also a services contract.
That matters even more because in the same annual package the company says that none of its portfolio companies meets its threshold for a material portfolio company, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively. That is the subtle but important point. Nasus is big enough to shape the conversation, but not big enough to turn Capital Point into a one-asset holdco. Put differently, it removes some of the fog, but it does not concentrate the whole economics of the company into one name.
That is Nasus's real analytical value. It gives the market a way to read Capital Point through something more tangible than before: a listed holding, an external price and contractual income. For a small investment company, that is not a trivial upgrade in credibility.
What It Still Does Not Solve
The new anchor is still not the same thing as free cash. Capital Point says that after the IPO it held about 575,000 Nasus shares, of which about 425,000 were restricted and could not be traded for a period set with the underwriter. In other words, almost three quarters of the holding could not be read as immediately monetizable at the end of 2025. That is the difference between a market anchor and a liquid anchor.
The income layer is also not yet deep enough to change the read of the whole company on its own. The services agreement with Nasus is real, but it is time-bounded and ends in June 2026. It adds a contractual revenue source, but it does not yet prove that Nasus has already become a durable channel for sending cash up the chain to public shareholders.
That is the core point. Nasus improves the readability of the portfolio much more than it improves the accessibility of value, at least for now. It gives Capital Point a price, a name, a contract and an anchor the market can understand faster. But as long as there is no realization, distribution or clear path by which that value becomes available cash, the improvement still sits first in the trust layer and the disclosure layer, not in the value-capture layer.
There is also a reverse risk here. Once a small holdco gets one clear anchor, there is a temptation to read the whole portfolio through it. That can become a mistake. Nasus has clearly become the focal point, but the rest of the book is still spread across many listed and private holdings. If Nasus stays strong, it can improve confidence in the broader portfolio. If it weakens, it may pull the whole Capital Point read down with it, even if the rest of the holdings did not change by the same degree. That is the price of having one especially visible anchor inside a diverse portfolio.
The Next Test
For Nasus to really change how Capital Point is read, one of two things has to happen, and ideally both. First, the market anchor has to prove durable, meaning Nasus remains a listed position whose external price continues to support how the book is read. Second, that anchor has to start becoming more accessible value, through monetization, through a services relationship that expands or renews, or through some other path by which value moves from the screen toward the shareholder layer.
Without that, Nasus will remain mostly a partial answer. A better answer than Capital Point had before, but still a partial one. It will help explain why the portfolio no longer looks like a pure black box. It will not by itself answer the main article's core question, how much of that value can really come home.
Conclusion
Nasus is probably Capital Point's most important holding in terms of how the company is read, not because it represents most of the portfolio, but because it is the clearest place where a public market, a services contract and a standalone valuation disclosure come together in 2025. That is much more than just another position.
But a new anchor is not the end of the story. It only raises the bar. Once Capital Point has one holding the market can follow relatively easily, the question is no longer whether there is value in the book at all. The question becomes whether the company can extend that pattern to more assets and, above all, whether it can turn Nasus from a cleaner valuation line into the beginning of real value capture.
Disclosure: Deep TASE analyses are general informational, research, and commentary content only. They do not constitute investment advice, investment marketing, a recommendation, or an offer to buy, sell, or hold any security, and are not tailored to any reader's personal circumstances.
The author, site owner, or related parties may hold, buy, sell, or otherwise trade securities or financial instruments related to the companies discussed, before or after publication, without prior notice and without any obligation to update the analysis. Publication of an analysis should not be read as a statement that any position does or does not exist.
The analysis may contain errors, omissions, or information that changes after publication. Readers should review official filings and primary sources before making decisions.