Suny Communications: Do the New Engines Really Reduce Samsung Dependence?

What This Follow-Up Is Testing

The main article argued that Suny’s immediate bottleneck in 2025 was cash flow, working capital, and the refinancing cycle. This follow-up isolates a different strategic question: does the new layer of activities actually build a second leg for Suny, or does it mostly widen the shelf around the same core supplier?

The report gives a fairly sharp answer. There are more business options than before, but there is still no deep economic diversification. Tech Masters, ABSEN, K.Labs, and the Samsung vacuum-cleaner line all open new directions, yet only one of them is reported separately in the numbers, and even that one is still small. The others either remain directly tied to Samsung or are still absorbed inside the core segment. Amendment 9 to the franchise agreement buys Suny time through the end of 2027, but it does not change the fact that Samsung remains the sole supplier of the core business, and that at the end of each calendar year during the agreement term either party may terminate the deal with 90 days’ prior notice.

That is the difference between basket expansion and real dependence reduction. Basket expansion can add categories, customers, or channels. Genuine de-risking requires something else: an engine that is already measurable, that does not lean on the same manufacturer, and that can carry part of the group’s economics even if the core wobbles. As of year-end 2025, Suny is not there yet.

This chart matters less because of the size of K.Labs and more because of what it says about disclosure structure. Tech Masters, ABSEN, and the broader new-category layer still sit inside the cellular and other products segment. So even after all the diversification language, the report still lets investors measure only one engine that clearly lives outside the traditional handset-and-distribution core.

Tech Masters Adds Breadth, but Not Yet Scale

Tech Masters is probably the activity that best serves the diversification narrative at the operating level. Starting in 2025, Suny says it used the subsidiary to enter parallel imports, products not regularly present in the Israeli market, and the distribution and retail of small electrical and home-electronics products that are neither mobile phones nor products competing with Samsung. That is already different from the core, and the operating model is different too: the company describes a Back to Back structure in which supplier orders are placed only after customer orders arrive.

Operationally, that is a real advantage. As of the report date, Tech Masters had an order backlog of NIS 7.186 million, and the company says the full backlog should be supplied within up to three months. The supplier structure also looks different from the old Samsung dependence: the company describes a network of about 50 end suppliers, reached through purchasing agents operating in different countries. This is no longer a single-supplier business.

But operating diversification is not automatically economic diversification. First, Suny does not provide separate revenue or profitability figures for Tech Masters, so investors still cannot tell whether this is becoming a meaningful engine or mainly an additional commercial pipe. Second, in the risk section the company says Tech Masters still has a relatively limited number of significant customers at this stage. In other words, supplier concentration improves, but customer concentration remains. Third, as of December 31, 2025, loans that Suny had extended to Tech Masters so it could meet supplier obligations stood at about NIS 12.826 million. Even if the order-first model reduces inventory risk, the activity still leans on the parent balance sheet.

The bottom line for now is clear. Tech Masters does widen the group’s supplier reach, product range, and possible customer set. It still has not proved that there is a second engine investors can rely on at the earnings and disclosure level.

ABSEN and Samsung Vacuums Widen the Shelf, but Do Not Break the Dependence

ABSEN is Suny’s cleanest attempt to bring a genuinely new brand into the system. On June 29, 2025 the company signed a distribution agreement under which Suny will serve as the exclusive distributor in Israel for ABSEN fixed-installation LED screens, for a term that begins in June 2025 and runs through the end of 2027. As long as the company meets the annual purchase targets, ABSEN may not appoint another distributor in Israel and may not market the products directly in the country, except to a limited customer list defined in the agreement.

That matters, because this is the first clearly disclosed brand expansion outside Samsung. But two things have to be held together here. On one hand, this is real diversification. On the other, it is still dependence on a single-brand agreement inside the category. The company itself says ABSEN is its sole supplier for fixed-installation LED screens. So even the newest engine is built on a structure that still resembles the core: one brand, one supplier, and distribution rights conditioned on target achievement.

The main gap is proof. The report describes the agreement, its commercial logic, and management’s goal to establish ABSEN as a leading brand in Israel during 2026, but it does not yet give a separate number that lets investors measure how much revenue or profit the activity actually contributed in 2025. For now, ABSEN looks like a real option, not yet like a balancing leg.

The Samsung vacuum-cleaner line makes the difference between shelf expansion and dependence reduction even clearer. During 2025 Samsung granted the company the right to import and market stick vacuum cleaners and robotic vacuums, with activity expected to begin in April 2026. Commercially, that could be interesting because it widens the product basket sold through the same retail platform. But this is not supplier diversification. It is a deeper commercial relationship with the same manufacturer.

Put differently, ABSEN is an attempt to build another source of growth. Samsung vacuums are an attempt to extract more value from the same umbrella franchise. Those are not the same thing, and they should not be mixed together when asking whether Samsung dependence is really declining.

K.Labs Is the Most Interesting Test, and Still a Small One

If the goal is to find an activity that genuinely sits outside the classic Samsung distribution track, K.Labs is the obvious candidate. K.Labs entered the group in May 2025 after acquiring the activity and assets of the K.Labs partnership on April 29, 2025 for NIS 2.8 million as part of an insolvency process. This is no longer about widening the same brand basket. It is a different business entirely: technology-driven creative work, digital experiences embedded in physical space, conceptual development, design, integration, and content.

K.Labs’ main advantage in this analysis is that investors do not need to guess. Unlike Tech Masters and ABSEN, it already sits in a separate segment. In 2025 the “other” segment, which represents K.Labs, generated NIS 9.867 million of revenue, NIS 3.876 million of gross profit, and NIS 773 thousand of operating profit. So there is a real activity here, with real revenue and positive operating profit. It is not just an idea.

But the numbers also impose discipline. Against a group that reported NIS 999.8 million of revenue and NIS 52.0 million of operating profit in 2025, K.Labs is still very small. Right now it matters more as a strategic option than as an economic counterweight. Even the company’s stated goal of developing products and assets from the K.Labs knowledge base that can later be replicated and distributed is still a plan, not yet a proven outcome.

The post-balance-sheet event also needs a sober read. On January 8, 2026, 25% of K.Labs, after the allocation, was issued to a company controlled by K.Labs CEO Ziv Harel in exchange for a NIS 700 thousand shareholder loan, on the same terms as the NIS 2.1 million shareholder loan that Suny had extended to K.Labs. But to enable that step, Suny itself extended a same-sized loan to Harel’s company, secured by a personal guarantee and the K.Labs holdings. That may improve managerial alignment. It is not the same thing as outside capital coming in independently to validate the business or the demand profile.

That is why K.Labs is currently both the most encouraging signal and the easiest engine to overstate. There is a real, different activity here, with positive early numbers. There is still no scale large enough to move Suny’s center of gravity.

What the Report Actually Says About Samsung Dependence

The short answer is no, not yet. What changed in 2025 is the option structure, not the center of gravity.

The first piece of evidence is the core itself. Samsung remains the company’s sole supplier for mobile phones, tablets, watches, earphones, spare parts, and accessories. Amendment 9 did extend the franchise agreement through December 31, 2027, but it kept the annual exit right for both parties with 90 days’ prior notice. That is better operating visibility than before, but it is still contractual visibility, not business independence.

The second piece of evidence is the revenue mix. Mobile phones alone contributed about NIS 654.9 million in 2025, or 66% of company revenue. The “other” line, which stood at NIS 344.8 million, includes services, accessories, spare parts, electrical consumer products, and projects. In other words, the non-phone bucket is not automatically the same thing as diversification away from Samsung, because a large part of it still sits directly inside the same brand, service, and spares ecosystem.

The third piece of evidence is the disclosure structure. If the diversification engines were already large enough to change the way investors read the company, they would probably be visible separately. In practice, only K.Labs is already visible in the numbers. Tech Masters, ABSEN, and the new category layer are still absorbed inside the main segment. That is not proof that they are weak, but it is proof that investors have not yet been given numerical evidence that they are material.

That is the heart of the story. Suny is no longer just a narrow handset importer. It is starting to look like a retail and distribution platform trying to build additional layers around itself. But as of the end of 2025, those layers are still not thick enough to change the fact that the company still lives, earns, and is valued primarily through Samsung.

What Has to Show Up in 2026 for the Read to Change

If the conclusion is ever going to be that Samsung dependence is really falling, more category announcements will not be enough. At least four proofs will be needed:

1. Proof in the numbers: non-Samsung activity will have to become large enough to appear separately, or at least to alter the revenue and profit mix in a visible way.
2. Proof at ABSEN: the brand will need to show actual sales and annual target achievement, not just a nice-looking agreement.
3. Proof at Tech Masters: the company will need to show that the activity is not built on a narrow set of significant customers and that it can grow without leaning again on meaningful parent funding.
4. Proof at K.Labs: investors need to see not only projects and collaborations, but also more scale, and ideally signs that the activity can generate repeatable revenue or replicable products.

Conclusion

Suny did do something important in 2025. It opened more than one path outside classic smartphone distribution. That is not cosmetic. Tech Masters broadens the sourcing chain, ABSEN adds a new brand, K.Labs brings in a genuinely different capability set, and Samsung vacuums widen the possible wallet around the same retail platform.

But a cold reading of the report leads to the same conclusion: this is still not a meaningful reduction in Samsung dependence, but rather an option layer being built around it. The 2026 test is no longer whether Suny can announce another new engine. It is whether one of these engines becomes large enough, measurable enough, and independent enough to change the group’s economics.