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Main analysis: Menora Miv Hon 2025: The Capital Window Reopened, but the Real Market Test Is Still Ahead
ByMarch 31, 2026~7 min read

Menora Miv Hon: How Much Of The Long Duration Really Depends On Early Calls

On paper, Menora Miv Hon's liability stack stretches to 2074. But the 2025 report already moves about NIS 299.6 million into current maturities and, in the debt-series note, presents a repayment schedule that assumes early calls beginning in 2026. So the duration here is mainly a refinancing calendar.

What The Main Article Already Established, And What This Follow-Up Is Isolating

The main article argued that 2025 reopened Menora Mivtachim Insurance's capital window, but that the real test still sits ahead in refinancing and in true outside demand. This follow-up isolates one question only, because it sits at the center of that thesis: how much of the long duration shown in the series stack is really hold-to-maturity duration, and how much is actually a call-and-refinancing story.

At first glance the structure looks very long-dated. Series H matures finally in 2036, Series Y in 2074, and even Series T runs to 2035. But the 2025 report itself already reads the structure differently. On the balance sheet, current maturities of subordinated notes stand at NIS 299.637 million, with a matching NIS 299.259 million current maturity of the deferred deposit on the asset side. And in Note 7's repayment-schedule section, the company presents the contractual principal-and-interest schedule assuming the early call right is exercised.

That is the point worth stopping on. If the repayment schedule the company itself chooses to show already depends on early calls starting in 2026, then the economic reading of duration is not classic hold to maturity. It is a refinancing reading. Under that table, by 2030 the structure already assumes NIS 1.239 billion of principal will have been called or refinanced, about 45.2% of the total principal shown in the schedule. By 2033 the number rises to NIS 1.939 billion, about 70.8% of principal. In other words, most of this apparently long-dated story shortens materially once one moves from final legal maturity to the refinancing calendar embedded in the report itself.

Three Clocks For The Same Debt

To understand Menora Miv Hon's true duration, each series needs to be read through three separate clocks: final legal maturity, first call date, and the year in which Note 7's repayment-schedule section already places the principal under the report's early-call assumption.

SeriesPrincipal in the repayment table, NIS millionFinal maturityFirst call datePrincipal year in the report's tableWhat it means in practice
V300.0002030September 30, 20262026The short end has already moved into current maturities on the balance sheet
C242.2242030October 1, 20272027Three years are shaved off the legal duration
E303.8802032June 30, 20292029The report also frames this series as a refinancing candidate, not a hold-to-final-maturity instrument
Z392.5422033December 31, 20302030The economic clock is three years shorter than the final maturity
T400.0002035March 31, 20302032Not the first call date, but still not 2035. The table places the principal before the coupon step-up date
H300.0002036July 1, 20332033Again, economic duration is three years shorter
Y800.0002074November 30, 20352035The biggest gap of all, 39 years between the legal tail and the refinancing year
The report reads the series through a refinancing year far earlier than final maturity

This chart makes clear that the long duration does not disappear, but it is also not the right frame for an economic reading. In almost every series, the year in which the report places the principal is earlier by three to four years than final maturity. In Series Y the gap jumps to 39 years. So anyone reading only the final-maturity schedule can easily miss that the structure, in practice, depends on call windows and refinancing access.

Where The Shortening Already Enters The Balance Sheet

The short end is not a theoretical idea. It is already embedded in the statement of financial position. As of December 31, 2025, the balance sheet shows NIS 299.637 million of current maturities of subordinated notes, against NIS 299.259 million of current maturities of the deferred deposit with the parent insurer. So even before reaching the Note 7 table, the balance sheet is already saying that the first series has left the "long duration" bucket and moved into the next twelve months.

And it does not stop with Series V. That repayment table does not show principal in 2036 or in 2074, even though those are the final legal maturities of Series H and Y. Instead it places principal in a different order: NIS 300 million in 2026, NIS 242.224 million in 2027, NIS 303.880 million in 2029, NIS 392.542 million in 2030, NIS 400 million in 2032, NIS 300 million in 2033, and NIS 800 million in 2035.

This is the refinancing calendar the report itself presents

That chart is sharper than any abstract phrasing. It shows that the company itself is not presenting the principal stack as if it simply stays outstanding all the way to the distant legal end dates. It presents it as a structure that needs market access again and again. That is why the long duration here is not merely a payment-table characteristic. It is an ongoing refinancing requirement.

The Series That Sharpens The Whole Point, And The Series That Adds The Nuance

It is tempting to think Series Y tells the entire story, because that is where the gap is most dramatic. Legally, the principal matures on November 30, 2074. Economically, the important station is November 30, 2035, the first call date. If the call is not exercised, the coupon stops being a fixed 5.18% and moves into a formula based on the 5-year unlinked Israeli government bond yield plus the original spread set at issuance, 1.16418%, and then resets every five years. That is the difference between a distant legal backstop and a real economic duration. 2074 tells you how far the instrument can run. 2035 tells you when the market will actually be asked to carry it again.

But Series T adds the more important nuance. Its first call date is March 31, 2030, while final maturity is September 30, 2035. If it is not called by September 30, 2032, an added coupon begins from the March 31, 2033 payment date. Yet the repayment table does not place the principal in 2030. It places it in 2032. That is an important clue: the economic duration of this funding vehicle is not always the very first optional call date. It is the last date at which the structure still looks sensible before the coupon step-up starts to bite.

That is the point that turns the discussion from legal duration into refinancing duration. In Series V, C, E, Z and H, the table almost overlaps with the first call date. In Series T it already shows that the economic question is not only "when can the company call", but "when does it stop making sense not to call". And in Series Y it shows that even for a quasi-perpetual-looking instrument, the live thesis still rests on one call station, not on 2074.

Conclusion

Menora Miv Hon did not end 2025 with only a long-dated debt pile. It ended 2025 with a long refinancing calendar. The report itself already shortens the nearest series into current maturities, and in Note 7 it places the entire principal stack on a timeline that starts in 2026 and ends in 2035, not on the final legal timeline that runs all the way to 2074.

That sharpens the main article's conclusion. If 2025 was the year the capital window reopened, then duration is not simply a comfort of time. It is a chain of market tests. By 2030 about 45% of principal already sits on assumed calls and refinancing, and by 2033 more than 70% does. So the key question is not whether the liability stack looks long. It is how much of that length really exists without an open debt market and without the ability to call the series on time.

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