Public Wrapper Versus Private Portfolio: How Much Funding Room Unicorn Really Has

What This Follow-up Is Testing

The main article identified the core debate around Unicorn, the market is giving near-full credit mainly to the cash, while the value above that layer still needs proof. This continuation isolates the other side of the same equation, not how much the portfolio is worth, but how much real funding room remains in the listed wrapper before that value starts turning into cash.

The right framing here is all-in cash flexibility, not normalized cash generation. This is not a partnership that produces operating cash and then chooses what to do with it. It is a listed wrapper that spends cash on overhead and follow-on investments, while funding itself mainly through offerings and private placements. So the relevant question is not whether there is near-term debt to refinance, but who is funding the waiting period until the portfolio delivers external validation, realizations, or distributions.

The four non-obvious findings are these:

• The year-end cash balance looks stable, but that stability was bought in the market. Actual cash uses totaled NIS 6.729 million, NIS 3.439 million in operating burn and NIS 3.29 million in investments, and the net rights offering of NIS 7.314 million covered slightly more than that.
• Without the rights offering, cash would have fallen roughly by half. A simple bridge from operating cash flow, investment outflows and FX would have taken year-end cash to about NIS 6.2 million instead of NIS 13.5 million.
• No debt does not eliminate funding risk, it only changes its form. There are no bank maturities or covenant pressures here, but the partnership itself says there is no certainty it will be able to raise funding when needed.
• Dilution is not a minor side effect. The rights offering added 2.503 million units, expanded the unit base by about 57%, and any holder who did not participate saw their relative ownership shrink by about 36%.

The Cash Balance Was Preserved Because It Was Reissued

The cleanest way to read 2025 is through the cash bridge. Unicorn started the year with NIS 13.342 million of cash and cash equivalents. During the year, NIS 3.439 million was used in operating activity, mainly overhead, and another NIS 3.29 million went into portfolio investments. That means the wrapper dropped to NIS 6.613 million before new financing. Only then did the rights offering arrive, adding NIS 7.314 million net, bringing year-end cash back to NIS 13.502 million after a negative NIS 425 thousand FX effect.

That distinction matters because it separates two very different readings. The comfortable reading says year-end closed with NIS 13.5 million of cash, only NIS 725 thousand of liabilities, and no financial debt, so there is no funding story here. The stricter reading says, true, there is no debt, but the cash balance was not preserved by the portfolio, it was preserved by an equity raise. This is not a self-funding structure that has already arrived. It is more evidence that the wrapper still depends on the capital market to buy time.

Even inside the closing cash balance, not all of the cash was fully free. At year-end, payables included NIS 339 thousand related to exercising a commitment to buy shares in a portfolio company. In other words, part of the December 31 cash balance was already matched by an investment obligation recorded in the balance sheet.

The gap between "no debt" and "no funding risk" is also explicit in the disclosure itself. On one hand, the partnership says it had no loans or external financing at the report date. On the other hand, Note 1 states that the business involves high expense levels and requires funding from different sources, equity raises, financing, or bringing in investors, and that there is no certainty such funding can be raised. Put simply, the risk here is not a banking risk, it is a market-access risk.

Regulation 10A sharpens the same point from another angle. The second half of 2025 showed comprehensive profit of NIS 811 thousand, which can sound like an operating turn. But that same half also included NIS 2.879 million of positive fair-value movement against NIS 2.053 million of G&A. So even the stronger half of the year did not create a real cash engine at the wrapper. It mainly benefited from a better accounting mark.

Wrapper Overhead Still Consumes Time

The good news is that costs fell. The less comfortable point is that they are still heavy for a structure like this. G&A came in at NIS 3.671 million in 2025. That is down from NIS 4.074 million in 2024, but it still equals more than a quarter of the year's opening cash balance.

The more interesting point is not only the total, but the composition. Salaries and related costs were NIS 1.372 million, the management fee to the general partner was NIS 819 thousand, and professional services were NIS 921 thousand. In addition, Note 12 shows that CEO pay alone was NIS 904 thousand. That means CEO pay plus the GP management fee together amounted to NIS 1.723 million, almost half of total wrapper overhead.

The counterpoint needs to stay in view as well. Unitholders did not approve the extension of the management-fee arrangement in June 2025, so from September 2025 onward the general partner was no longer entitled to that fee under the partnership agreement. In addition, Note 7 says explicitly that the GP was not entitled to the $20 thousand capital-raising assistance fee on the November 2025 rights offering. So not every shekel raised leaked back out the door.

But even after that improvement, the numbers still show a wrapper that consumes meaningful time and cash. When the partnership is not realizing holdings, not distributing, and not receiving cash back from its portfolio, that cost base is not just "head office". It becomes an actual cash use that someone has to fund.

The Rights Offering Raised Time, Not Just Capital

At the balance-sheet level, the rights offering looks reasonable enough. The partnership issued 2.503 million participation units at NIS 3 per unit, raised NIS 7.509 million gross, and incurred NIS 195 thousand of issuance costs. At the unitholder level, the picture is sharper.

By the end of 2025, total units stood at 6.878 million versus 4.375 million a year earlier. That is about 57% growth in the unit base. A rights mechanism gives all holders the ability to participate, so it would be wrong to describe the raise as if the same dilution was forced on everyone. But any holder who did not participate saw their relative stake shrink by about 36%. That is not a technical footnote. It is the financing model itself.

This is where Regulation 10C becomes the key sentence. It does not describe the proceeds as being used to repay debt, complete a realization, or fund a one-off transformative move. The wording is more important than that: proceeds were used for follow-on investments in portfolio companies and for ongoing management and operating needs. In other words, the public market did not fund only potential upside. It also funded the waiting period until that upside is proven.

That is exactly why the lack of debt does not end the story. In a leveraged holdco, the immediate risk sits with a bank or a bond. In Unicorn, the risk sits in whether public unitholders will keep financing the waiting period. As of the latest trade date, April 3, 2026, market cap stood at about NIS 20.1 million. Against that number, a gross raise of NIS 7.509 million is not marginal. It is equal to more than a third of the listed value.

How Much Room Really Remains

The fair reading is that Unicorn is not facing immediate funding distress. It ended 2025 with NIS 13.502 million of cash, only NIS 725 thousand of current liabilities, and no financial debt. Anyone looking for a near-term maturity wall will not find it here.

But this is also not a self-funding wrapper. 2025 showed that in a single year the partnership can burn NIS 3.439 million in operating activity, put another NIS 3.29 million into investments, and still report a similar cash balance only because public investors put in fresh money. If the wrapper continues to fund follow-ons and a similar cost base without realizations, distributions, or external validation that moves the portfolio closer to the market, the equity question will come back quickly.

What would make that question look less acute? First, at least one core holding has to move from a model mark into either an external price or actual cash. Second, cost discipline has to remain in place even after the management-fee rollback, rather than creeping back through other lines. Third, follow-on investments need to stay more selective, because every follow-on round is not only a statement of confidence in the portfolio, it is also a use of the wrapper's capital room.

That is the real thesis here: Unicorn ended 2025 with time, not with funding independence. No debt matters, and it matters a lot. But until the portfolio starts sending value outward, the listed wrapper remains dependent on its ability to raise equity without steadily wearing down unitholders.