Hachshara And Real Estate: How Much Of The Balance-Sheet Value Is Actually Accessible
Hachshara’s real-estate layer looks large on paper, with NIS 508.6 million classified as held for sale in the Soho Ashdod complex. But the report shows that part of that value sits against linked contracts, while another part still depends on execution, approvals, and valuation assumptions.
The main article made a simple point: 2025 improved earnings, but it still did not create a wide capital buffer. This follow-up isolates the real-estate layer, because this is where it is easiest to confuse balance-sheet value with value that can actually reinforce Hachshara’s own portfolio and capital flexibility.
On paper, the numbers are large. At the end of 2025, note 9 shows NIS 135.9 million of investment property for linked contracts, NIS 914.8 million of other investment property, and NIS 508.6 million of assets held for sale. That adds up to roughly NIS 1.56 billion. But that number is not one clean pool: part sits in the company’s own portfolio, part sits against linked contracts, and part depends on a sale process that had still not turned into a binding transaction by year-end.
That is the point a first-time reader can miss. If all of this is treated as hidden value that is equally accessible to the company, the capital picture looks cleaner than it really is. The report itself gives a more disciplined read: note 9 separates property for linked contracts from other property, note 8 shows the same mix inside the holdings structure, and the Soho Ashdod story shows how far accounting classification still is from actual monetization.
The NIS 1.56 Billion Is Real, But It Does Not Sit In One Pocket
The first mistake is to treat all of this as if it sits in the same economic bucket. It does not. Note 9 explicitly says that changes in the fair value of investment property for linked contracts do not directly affect the company’s results. That is the report’s own way of saying that not every real-estate revaluation becomes a clean addition to Hachshara’s capital cushion.
The same logic appears in note 8. Peninat Afridar, a wholly owned subsidiary, holds the Ashkelon property and part of the Ashdod property. In Ashkelon, fair value stands at about NIS 101.2 million, but book value is only NIS 99.3 million because of a tax-related impairment linked to the inability to fully depreciate the asset for tax purposes. So even on the side that clearly belongs to the company, value does not pass through untouched. In Ashdod, the fair value of the part held by Peninat Afridar stands at NIS 390.2 million, but the report immediately sends the reader back to note 9 and to the monetization question, not just the appraisal question.
The sharper example is Terra in Haifa. Hachshara owns 49% of the associate, but the note makes clear that 75% of the original investment was funded from linked-contract assets and only 25% from the company’s own portfolio. So even when there is another real-estate option outside the insurance core, it does not sit entirely on the side that can directly support the company’s own capital flexibility.
| Value layer | What the report says | Why it is not automatically accessible value |
|---|---|---|
| Peninat Afridar in Ashkelon | Fair value of about NIS 101.2 million, book value of NIS 99.3 million | There is already a tax-related friction inside the accounting value |
| Peninat Afridar in Ashdod | Fair value of NIS 390.2 million for the part held by Peninat Afridar | The economic value still depends on the Ashdod monetization path |
| Terra in Haifa | 49% in an associate | 75% of the original investment came from linked-contract assets and only 25% from the company’s own portfolio |
| Soho complex | NIS 508.6 million classified as held for sale | Only half belongs to the company’s own portfolio, and the sale route is still open |
Soho Ashdod Looks Like A Trigger, But By End-2025 It Was Still A Process
In May 2025, the board decided to publish an invitation for third-party proposals regarding the company’s land rights in the Soho complex on HaOragim Street in Ashdod. In July, the company signed an agreed procedure with Albar covering two out of the four complexes, where three plots are owned by Albar. The practical implication matters: in each shared complex, accepting an offer requires prior written consent from both sides, and each side holds veto power.
The friction did not stop there. In August, the proposal deadline was extended. In September, the structure was widened so bidders could propose not only full-complex purchases, but also specific plots, combination transactions, or mixed structures. In November, only one proposal arrived, and it was non-binding. It came from Afridar and covered only plots 202 and 212 in complex number 1, through a combination structure. The company adds that it may examine other alternatives and other third-party approaches. That is not a closed monetization picture. It is an open process.
This is exactly why classifying Soho as held for sale is not the same thing as accessible value. Starting June 30, 2025, the company classified the auctioned land rights as held for sale, and by December 31, 2025 the balance stood at about NIS 508.6 million. But the same note says half of that balance belongs to the company’s own portfolio and half to linked contracts. In other words, even if Soho is the most visible real-estate asset in the story, only half of it even sits in the bucket that can be relevant to Hachshara’s own capital buffer.
The company also recognized roughly NIS 3 million of fair-value uplift in 2025 from Soho, with half attributed to other investment property and half to linked contracts. That is another reminder that even when value rises, not all of that rise translates into the same economic benefit for the company itself.
Even After The Separation, The Value Is Still Assumption-Sensitive
The second mistake is to treat the property value as if it were fixed. Note 9 gives a clean test: a 0.5% increase in the discount rate cuts fair value by NIS 21.0 million and pre-tax profit by NIS 18.9 million, while a 0.5% decrease adds NIS 25.5 million of fair value and NIS 23.0 million of pre-tax profit. That does not mean the value is fake. It does mean that part of the apparent cushion depends on appraisal assumptions, not only on signed transactions.
The report adds another important angle. The director’s report line for items not attributed to operating segments does not look like a hidden pool of real-estate profit waiting to surface. In 2025, that bucket included NIS 37.9 million of net investment gains, financing income, and other income, but it also carried NIS 7.8 million of G&A expense and NIS 36.2 million of finance expense. The net result of that whole bucket was a pre-tax comprehensive loss of NIS 6.1 million.
The analytical takeaway is sharp: even if the company has a meaningful real-estate layer, it cannot be read as a side box of excess value that merely waits to be released. Between fair-value gains, financing costs, corporate overhead, and the fact that part of the property base sits against linked contracts, that value passes through several filters before it becomes something that materially changes the capital picture.
Bottom Line
Hachshara’s real-estate layer is real, and Soho Ashdod is clearly a meaningful option. This is not a footnote. But the right reading for end-2025 is not “there is another half a billion shekels about to land in the company.” The right reading is that there is value here, but not all of it sits in the company’s own portfolio, not all of it is ripe for monetization, and not all of it is insulated from valuation assumptions.
So, in the context of the main article’s thesis, real estate is a balance-sheet option, not a finished capital solution. If upcoming reports show a binding Soho transaction, a cleaner monetization route, or a larger portion of value moving to the company side rather than the linked-contract side, the reading changes. Until then, this value helps explain why Hachshara has assets it can work with, but it still does not justify treating them as if they had already turned into accessible capital.
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