Dorsel follow-up: 95% occupancy, where the vacancy really sits, and what it means for organic growth
The 95% occupancy headline makes Dorsel's Israeli portfolio look almost full, but the vacancy is concentrated in a handful of clear pockets. Most current NOI already comes from near-full assets, so the organic upside now depends mainly on targeted leasing in a small number of properties, led by Hamada 6.
95% occupancy, but not on a broad base
This follow-up isolates one question: what really sits behind the 95% occupancy figure in Dorsel's Israeli assets. On paper, that sounds like an almost full portfolio. At the asset level, the picture is much less even.
Three quick takeaways:
- The vacancy is not spread out. More than half of the vacant area sits in four assets below 80% occupancy, but those assets generate only about 7% of Israeli NOI.
- Concentration does not sit in exactly the same places. Omega and the Ashdod port complex are nearly full, but they still depend on a small number of large tenants.
- Hamada 6 is where the two issues meet. It is both the largest vacancy pocket in the Israeli portfolio and an asset where Marvell accounts for 62% of rental income.
The distinction between the year-end snapshot and the full-year average matters here. In the 2025 presentation, the company shows 95% occupancy in its Israeli assets. In the annual report, average occupancy in the Israeli leasing activity during 2025 was about 98%. That means Dorsel enters 2026 from a less full starting point than the annual average suggests. Anyone looking only at the average can overestimate how much broad organic growth is still left in the system.
The chart explains the gap. Much of the portfolio sits in the 97% to 100% range, but a few outliers pull the group headline down. This is not portfolio-wide vacancy. It is vacancy concentrated in a few specific addresses.
Where the vacancy really sits
If you take the company-share rentable area from the presentation and apply the disclosed year-end vacancy, you get an estimated 6.4 thousand square meters of vacant space in the Israeli portfolio. Of that, about 1.5 thousand square meters sit in Hamada 6, about 1.1 thousand in Hamada 2, and about 1.1 thousand in the Petah Tikva office building. The Azur office building adds roughly another 0.9 thousand. Those four assets alone account for about 71% of the vacant area.
The important point is the mismatch between vacancy and NOI weight. The four assets below 80% occupancy, Hamada 2, Raanana, Petah Tikva and Azur, hold a bit more than half of the vacant area, but only about 7% of Israeli NOI. In other words, a meaningful part of the vacancy sits in assets that do not currently move the operating line very much.
That is the reassuring side of the story. The less reassuring side is that the largest vacancy pocket is not one of the marginal assets. It is Hamada 6. That asset stands at 88% occupancy, generated NIS 11.2 million of NOI in 2025, and on its own represents almost a quarter of the vacant area in the Israeli portfolio. So if an investor is looking for a real organic growth lever, the place to watch is not Raanana or Azur. It is Hamada 6.
The other side of the picture is that more than 70% of Israeli NOI already comes from assets at 97% to 100% occupancy: Omega, Check Center, Maalot, Multilock House and Ashdod. That is good news for current NOI quality. It is less helpful for anyone looking for an easy path to broad occupancy-led growth. There is simply not much empty space left in the assets that carry most of the cash flow.
Concentration did not disappear, it just sits in the full assets
The five main tenants, Cellcom, Marvell, Tovet, Lubinski and Qualcomm, accounted for 43% of company revenue in 2025. This is no longer a question of one large tenant. It is concentration that runs through three core assets.
| Asset | Year-end 2025 occupancy | 2025 NOI | What concentration looks like |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hamada 6 Yokneam | 88% | NIS 11.2 million | Marvell accounts for 62% of rental income |
| Omega | 97% | NIS 14.9 million | Cellcom and Qualcomm together account for 78% of rental income |
| Ashdod port complex | 100% | NIS 14.4 million | Tovet and Lubinski together account for all rental income |
| Zim Urban Mall Maalot | 100% | NIS 9.6 million | No single tenant accounts for 20% of asset income |
At Omega, just two tenants, Cellcom and Qualcomm, generate 78% of the asset's rental income. On one hand, that is high concentration. On the other, it sits inside a 97%-occupied asset producing NIS 14.9 million of NOI, backed by relatively long contracts. The presentation also says a new Cellcom lease took effect on January 1, 2026 and is expected to secure roughly NIS 50 million of revenue over the first five years, including rent, management and electricity. In this case, concentration looks more like a cash-flow anchor than an immediate operating problem.
At the Ashdod port complex, the picture is even sharper. Occupancy is 100%, but that means two tenants, not broad diversification: Tovet accounts for 72% of rental income and Lubinski for 28%. So there is no vacancy here, but there is absolute dependence on a very small number of contracts. That matters because Lubinski also has an early termination right. In other words, 100% occupancy at Ashdod is not the same thing as low risk.
Hamada 6 is where the two issues combine. Marvell accounts for 62% of rental income, and the asset still stands at only 88% occupancy. If there is one property where both tenant retention and lease-up of the remaining space will determine NOI quality, this is it.
At the sector level, the company says 45% of NOI in the Israeli leasing activity in 2025 came from assets designated for the high-tech industry, down from 51% in 2024 and 2023. That is some easing in sector concentration, but not a full reset. A large part of the exposure still sits with big communications and semiconductor-related names.
What this means for organic growth
The first implication is that the current NOI base looks better than the vacancy headline. Most Israeli NOI already comes from near-full assets, and 100% of Israeli lease agreements are CPI-linked. So even without a big jump in occupancy, Dorsel enters 2026 with a fairly solid base of indexation and active leases.
The second implication is that the organic upside is narrower than 95% occupancy suggests. There are not many large, strong assets sitting at 85% occupancy and waiting to fill up. Ashdod and Maalot are full. Omega and Check Center are almost full. Multilock House is almost full. That means the organic upside is meaningful if Hamada 6 improves, reasonable if some vacancy in Hamada 2 and the smaller office assets gets absorbed, and fairly limited if the working assumption is that the entire portfolio will move together.
The third implication is that the market has to hold two ideas at once. Part of the vacancy sits in lower-weight assets, so it does not undermine the quality of today's NOI across the whole portfolio. But the main organic growth engine depends on a small number of specific assets, led by Hamada 6, so any improvement in occupancy is likely to be selective rather than broad-based.
In that sense, Dorsel looks less like a portfolio with a large amount of operating slack still to release, and more like a stable income portfolio with a few very specific value-add pockets. That difference matters. The real question for 2026 is not whether the company can preserve NOI, but how much of its remaining vacancy it can convert into visible growth at the group level.
Conclusion
The 95% figure is real, but it hides two very different layers. Vacancy is concentrated in a handful of specific assets, and a meaningful portion of it sits in assets that currently generate little NOI. Tenant concentration, by contrast, sits in the stronger and almost full assets.
Bottom line: Dorsel's current NOI quality looks stronger than the quality of its organic upside. To produce genuinely broad organic growth, the company first needs targeted lease-up at Hamada 6 and the remaining vacancy pockets. Until that happens, 95% occupancy is more a sign of stability than a sign of many new growth engines waiting to appear.
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