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Main analysis: Ari Real Estate 2025: The Portfolio Is Growing Faster Than Cash
ByMarch 18, 2026~8 min read

Star Eilat: Does The Completed Terminal Change The Project Economics Or Only Buy More Time

Completing the transportation terminal in Eilat moves Star Eilat from pure construction into possible partial monetization, but the project’s core economics still sit in the adjoining mall, which needs more lease-up, financing, and execution. This is a meaningful event, just not one that already closes the Eilat debate.

What This Follow-Up Is Testing

The main article already argued that Ari’s active bottleneck is not just asset value, but the path from accounting value to accessible cash. This follow-up isolates Star Eilat after the March 10, 2026 filing and asks one narrow question: does completing the terminal really change the project economics, or does it mostly improve Ari’s timing and negotiating position.

The event itself matters. Star Ari Eilat, in which Ari holds 50.2%, completed the public transportation terminal. Once construction was completed, Israel’s public housing administration notified the project company of its intention to buy the terminal, and the parties agreed to appoint a valuer. At the same time, the company updated that about 45% of the mall’s leasable area had already been signed.

But that is exactly the distinction that matters. The terminal is a financing and partial monetization event, not the economic end-state of Eilat. The project’s main economics still sit in the adjacent mall, not in the terminal itself. In the annual report, Star Eilat is described as roughly 31.1 thousand sqm of retail space versus roughly 2.05 thousand sqm of transport-terminal area. What has been completed is important, but it is not the component that carries most of the NOI story management is selling.

Four points need to be clear upfront:

  • What has advanced is a monetization path, not the whole project. The March 2026 filing matters because it moves a pre-existing contractual right into an executable valuation and sale process.
  • The core economics still sit in the mall. In the 2025 presentation, the company assigns Star Eilat ILS 85 million of forecast NOI, almost as large as Ari’s entire actual 2025 NOI of ILS 97 million.
  • Lease-up is real, but proof is still incomplete. About 45% of the space was signed by year-end 2025 and as of the March 2026 update, but all 2025 lease contracts were signed only in the fourth quarter.
  • Financing is still not closed. As of year-end 2025 no project-financing agreement had been signed, and the specific financing table shows ILS 334.3 million of short-term debt with only ILS 6.0 million of undrawn capacity.

What The Terminal Actually Changes

Completing the terminal does change something meaningful, just not the first thing investors may assume. It moves Eilat from a project spoken about only in the language of construction, marketing, and valuation into a project that now has one component that can potentially be turned into cash. That is a real difference.

It also does not happen in isolation. In the business-description section, the company itself says retail-center success depends, among other things, on public-transport access, parking, tenant mix, anchor tenants, and financing strength. The terminal directly improves the access side of the equation, and it could also release capital if the sale actually closes. So the event is not cosmetic.

But this is also where its limits become clear. The terminal is not the whole story. It does not replace tenant mix, does not create an anchor tenant on its own, and does not solve the mall’s financing requirements. It improves the project’s setup, but it does not complete the project’s proof case.

At Star Eilat the terminal is finished, but most of the economics still sit in the mall

That chart is the center of the argument. The completed component matters, but the component that still needs to become recurring NOI is many times larger.

The Positive Signal: Early Pricing Looks Fine, Scale Does Not Yet

If there is one genuinely constructive takeaway from Eilat, it is that the end-2025 data does not look like an immediate pricing problem. The signed-space ratio rose from 7% in 2024 to 45% in 2025, and annual income from signed leases after completion increased from ILS 4.6 million to ILS 41.4 million.

An even more important detail sits below the headline: average rent in leases signed during 2025 was ILS 283 per sqm, while the valuation uses representative rent of ILS 223 per sqm. That suggests the immediate problem in Eilat is not obviously ticket price. At least in the leases already signed, pricing does not look weak versus the appraisal assumptions.

But this is also where the easy conclusion breaks down. At the end of 2025 the company still had no major tenant disclosed at the asset, and the company’s own strategic framing emphasizes anchor tenants, diversified mix, and long-term leases with financially strong tenants. So there is real leasing progress, but proof remains partial. The initial pricing looks stronger than the volume and anchor mix.

Leasing is moving, but the commercial proof is still incomplete

One more detail matters here: all lease contracts signed in 2025 were signed only in the fourth quarter. That means momentum improved, but it also means the evidence base is still very young. At this stage it is easier to prove first-wave demand than to prove a fully formed and durable mall mix.

What Still Is Not Economically Solved

This is where the answer to the headline sits. Read correctly, the completed terminal changes the project mainly by potentially shortening the bridge period. It still does not make Eilat a clean value source.

By year-end 2025 cumulative project cost stood at ILS 507.8 million and fair value at ILS 585.0 million. In the 2025 presentation the company still frames Star Eilat as a project with total cost of ILS 960 million, expected completion in 2028, and forecast NOI of ILS 85 million. That is why the event is important but insufficient: Ari is already carrying a large asset on the books, but its final economics still depend on construction, lease-up, and financing that have not yet been fully closed.

The sharpest friction point remains financing. The annual report says explicitly that no project-financing agreement had yet been signed as of the report date. In the asset-specific financing section, the company shows ILS 334.3 million of short-term debt, priced at prime plus 0.8%, with only ILS 6.0 million of undrawn capacity remaining. So even after the terminal is complete, Eilat still sits on a financing structure that needs further work rather than on a project that has already been cleaned up.

Eilat still rests on financing and execution, not only on a completed terminal

In practice, completing the terminal does three things at once:

LayerWhat ImprovedWhat Is Still Open
MonetizationA real path to selling the terminal is now active, including stated purchase intent and an agreed valuerThere is still no closed price and no binding completion timing for the sale
Commercial proofLease-up reached 45%, and annual income from signed leases after completion is already ILS 41.4 millionThere is still no major tenant disclosed, and the mall remains far from fully proven occupancy and mix
FinancingA sale event could improve the source-of-funds layerThere is still no project-financing agreement, and the main debt is still short term

That is the difference between “changed the economics” and “bought more time.” If the terminal sale closes at a good value and within a reasonable timetable, it can ease the funding burden and make Eilat a much more controlled project. But until that happens, the company is still leaning on the assumption that the mall will be completed, leased, and financed broadly in line with plan. The event improved the bridge. It did not remove the need to cross it.

Conclusion

The short answer is that the completed terminal changes Eilat, but it does not yet by itself change the full economics of the project. It advances the only component that can now realistically be turned into cash, strengthens the access case, and gives Ari a better hand with funding discussions. That matters.

But the real economics of Eilat remain mall economics. As long as only 45% of the space is signed, no major tenant has been disclosed, and financing is still not locked in, it is hard to call Eilat a clean value source. It remains a large value layer that still demands execution.

So the right question for the next 2 to 4 quarters is not whether the terminal is complete. That already happened. The real question is whether Ari can turn that completion into three additional steps: a clear sale price and timetable for the terminal, visible progress on longer-term financing, and lease-up that moves beyond 45% with real anchor tenants and commercial shape. Only then will Eilat start to look less like a project asking for time and more like an asset capable of producing cleaner value.

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