Biolight 2025: How Much of the Portfolio Value Is Actually Accessible to Shareholders?
The main article already showed that parent-company cash bought Biolight time. This follow-up shows that most of the portfolio value at year-end 2025 still sits in level-3 marks, a SAFE that has not yet converted, or very early commercialization, so the value actually accessible to shareholders is narrower than the accounting number.
The main article already argued that parent-company cash bought Biolight time. This follow-up isolates a different question: how much of the portfolio value can really reach shareholders, and how much of it is still model value, SAFE value, or value that depends on an outside event.
That distinction matters because Biolight's portfolio is not one homogeneous asset bucket. At year-end 2025 it includes fair-value-through-P&L investments, one stake carried under the equity method, one SAFE that is not yet equity, and one holding already marked at zero. Anyone reading all of that as one portfolio number misses that the distance between an accounting figure and accessible shareholder value is very different from one asset to another.
Four points are worth holding up front:
- The non-consolidated investments measured at fair value through profit and loss stood at NIS 8.998 million at the end of 2025, while Peripherex was carried separately under the equity method at NIS 3.857 million. Together that is NIS 12.855 million of book value, not NIS 12.855 million of readily available cash.
- The 2025 fair-value loss, NIS 1.377 million, came mainly from a NIS 1.49 million markdown in Sanoculis, only partly offset by a NIS 113 thousand uplift in AEYE. In other words, the portfolio number already rests on one asset that was cut hard and another that moved only modestly upward.
- Revital Vision was recorded at NIS 813 thousand through a SAFE. Even the 43% ownership scenario applies only before any further financing or additional securities issuance, and Biolight cannot itself initiate the conversion.
- Peripherex is not just another fair-value line. Its year-end number is built from cumulative investment of NIS 6.552 million, FX translation, and Biolight's share of Peripherex losses, so it represents a very different accounting layer.
The Portfolio Value On Paper
That chart matters precisely because it looks deceptively simple. The fair-value portfolio cost Biolight NIS 17.903 million and is carried at only NIS 8.998 million. Add Peripherex, which cost NIS 6.552 million and is carried at NIS 3.857 million, and more than half of the historical cost base is already gone from today's accounting value.
But that still does not mean the remaining amount is accessible value. Part of it rests on level-3 models, part on a SAFE still measured at cost, and part on the equity method. The carrying number is the start of the conversation, not the end of it.
| Asset | Accounting layer at year-end 2025 | Relevant ownership | Carrying value | What still has to happen before the value becomes more accessible |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sanoculis | Fair value through P&L, level 3 | Single-digit minority holding | NIS 3.185 million | The company needs to re-establish a commercial and regulatory path after the end of the Bausch + Lomb distribution agreement and the halted FDA trial |
| AEYE | Fair value through P&L, level 3 | Single-digit minority holding | NIS 5.0 million | Commercial growth still needs to turn over time into a transaction, a validating financing round, or a real way to upstream value |
| Revital Vision | SAFE measured at cost | About 43% only in the conversion scenario, before further financing | NIS 813 thousand | A conversion event has to occur, and the ownership stake has to survive future rounds in meaningful form |
| Trisee | Fair value through P&L | Single-digit minority holding | 0 | It needs material financing and clinical progress to move off a zero valuation |
| Peripherex | Equity method | About 41% | NIS 3.857 million | Commercialization has to move beyond pilot use, first patient activity, and reimbursement feasibility into broader scale or a liquidity event |
What Is Actually Accessible
The easiest mistake in Biolight is to add the portfolio lines into one number and stop there. That is a mistake. Not every layer here represents the same kind of value.
AEYE is probably the clearest example of an asset already tied to real commercial activity. It has FDA clearance on a mobile camera, the company says its products are already used at hundreds of paying sites in the US, and it was valued at NIS 5 million at the end of 2025. Even so, Biolight still owns an illiquid asset marked with a level-3 model, after AEYE itself raised about USD 8.8 million through SAFE financings since 2023. There is genuine business progress here, but it is still not a cash layer that has reached Biolight.
Sanoculis highlights the other side of the same issue. Its value fell to NIS 3.185 million by year-end 2025 after a NIS 1.49 million markdown. That did not happen in a vacuum: during the year the exclusive European distribution agreement ended, the option to buy all of Sanoculis' assets was not exercised, and the company halted its FDA trial after the strategic agreement was cancelled. That is the heart of the story. A fair-value model can create value on paper, but it can also compress quickly when the commercial or strategic route breaks down.
Revital Vision sits in yet another category. There is still no shareholding here, only a USD 255 thousand SAFE carried at NIS 813 thousand on cost. Conversion happens only in the event of an IPO, financing round, merger, or liquidation, and the company states explicitly that it cannot decide or initiate the conversion itself. That is why the 43% figure sounds larger than it really is: it is a theoretical scenario, before follow-on financings, and before an actual equity instrument even exists in a form shareholders can think of as accessible ownership.
Trisee tells the story without any editorial help. The holding is still carried at zero at the end of 2025 even though Biolight's cost base is NIS 4.638 million, while the company also says Trisee depends on material financing in order to execute its business plans and continue preparing for the trial. Once the carrying value is zero, this is no longer a question of discount to accessible value. It means the books themselves currently assign no economic credit to that layer.
Peripherex Is Not Just Another Valuation Line
Peripherex can mislead the eye because its NIS 3.857 million carrying value sits next to the marked values of the other holdings. But it is not the same kind of number.
Peripherex is carried under the equity method. In 2025 Biolight invested another NIS 853 thousand, recorded negative FX translation of NIS 502 thousand, and recorded its share of Peripherex losses of NIS 463 thousand. So the year-end number is an accounting movement on an approximately 41% stake, not a price reset through an outside round or a transaction.
The business picture is also still early. Peripherex may already have FDA registration from October 2023 and Israeli AMAR approval from November 2025, but the 2025 story is still one of commercial pilot activity, agreements with a limited number of leading clinics, first patient use in those clinics, and reimbursement-feasibility testing. That matters, but it is still far from a stage where Biolight shareholders should read NIS 3.857 million as if it were close to becoming extractable value.
The Real Filter Is A Liquidity Event
The company itself states that the illiquid investments classified at fair value through profit and loss are exposed to the risk that they may not be realizable into liquid amounts in the short term. That may sound like dry accounting language, but it is really the entire thesis of this continuation: value on paper is not the same as accessible value.
That leads to the analytical conclusion. At year-end 2025 Biolight has a portfolio that produces valuation numbers, but almost every layer still has to pass at least two filters before shareholders feel the value. First, there has to be business, financing, or strategic proof at the level of the held company. Then that proof has to turn into a liquidity event, a transaction, an outside financing round, or real cash that can be pulled upward. Until that happens, even a NIS 5 million AEYE mark or a NIS 3.857 million Peripherex carrying value remains mostly a balance-sheet line, not a value layer that shareholders can already access.
The Bottom Line
Biolight is not trading against a holdings portfolio in which every part is equally valuable to shareholders. At year-end 2025 it has meaningful accounting value outside the consolidated subsidiaries, but that value is spread across level-3 models, a SAFE that has not yet converted, an equity-method stake, and one holding already written down to zero.
That is why the main gap at Biolight is not only between market value and portfolio value. The more important gap is between accounting value and value that shareholders can actually reach. AEYE currently looks like the closest holding to eventual realizable value, Sanoculis shows how quickly model value can shrink, Revital is an option tied to an external event, Trisee is already out of the accounting game, and Peripherex is still at a stage where it proves early commercialization more than it proves liquid value.
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