AMPA Tower 2030: How Much Value Is Left After Cost, Financing, and Leasing
The main article argued that AMPA’s capital cushion widened, but so did the queue of cash demands. AMPA Tower is the biggest item in that queue: 0% signed area, NIS 582.5 million of remaining construction cost excluding land and financing, and a carrying value that already stands at NIS 365.6 million.
The Project Is No Longer a Cheap Option
The main article argued that AMPA’s capital cushion widened, but the queue of cash demands widened with it. AMPA Tower is the largest and most sensitive item in that queue, so it deserves to be isolated from the rest of the group. The useful question is not whether the project has upside. It does. The useful question is how much value is really left once the reader counts what is already on the balance sheet, what still has to be spent, the project financing that is not yet fully in place, and the fact that signed area is still at 0%.
The superficial read can look too generous. The company presents a roughly 65.7 thousand square meter mixed-use project in Herzliya Pituach, with a 59% stake, expected NOI of about NIS 90 million, and remaining construction cost of about NIS 582.5 million, excluding land and financing. If the analysis stops there, the development spread looks wide. That is only part of the picture. The asset is already carried in the books at NIS 365.6 million. In other words, AMPA Tower is not starting from zero. Part of the value is already recognized, and whatever value still has to be created will have to pass through financing, leasing, and execution.
That makes the tower look less like a free call option on the office market and more like a long-duration execution bet. The stated delivery point is early 2030, signed area is 0%, and the financing in place at year-end 2025 still covers only the demolition, excavation, shoring, and foundation stage. So the real issue is not whether the project can be valuable. It is how much of that value can still accrue to shareholders once the tower moves from rendering to economics.
| Item | Figure | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Current carrying value | NIS 365.6 million | Part of the value is already sitting on the balance sheet before full construction |
| Remaining construction cost | NIS 582.5 million | This is only what still has to be spent, excluding land and financing |
| Pre-financing project basis | about NIS 948.1 million | Carrying value plus remaining construction cost, before one shekel of financing cost |
| Expected NOI | about NIS 90 million | This is the attractive headline, but it still depends on leasing and delivery |
| Signed area | 0% | This is the central risk point today |
This chart captures the core point. The expected NOI of NIS 90 million looks very strong against the remaining construction cost of NIS 582.5 million on its own, implying a theoretical yield of about 15.5% on the spend that still lies ahead. But that is not the whole economics. Against a pre-financing project basis of about NIS 948.1 million, the same headline implies only about 9.5%, and even that is before financing cost, before possible delays, and before lease-up risk. The project can still create value, but the real spread is tighter than the first read suggests.
The Ownership Step-Up Expanded Exposure Faster Than Visibility
Another easy miss is that the project did not just enter active construction. It also changed weight inside the group. In the investor presentation, management states that AMPA’s stake in AMPA Tower rose from 41% to 59% after the purchase of minority rights. That improves the company’s share of future upside if the project works. At the same time, it raises exposure to capital, timing, and leasing risk.
The simplest way to see this is to translate the company’s 100% project metrics into AMPA’s share. At a 41% stake, AMPA’s share of expected NOI would have been about NIS 36.9 million. At 59%, it rises to about NIS 53.1 million. That is an increase of about NIS 16.2 million. But over the same move, AMPA’s share of remaining construction cost rises from roughly NIS 238.8 million to NIS 343.7 million, and its share of the project basis before financing rises from roughly NIS 388.7 million to NIS 559.4 million. The equity exposure rose faster than the operating visibility.
This is not a criticism of the ownership increase itself. The company may well have bought a larger share of a good project at the right time. But the math has to stay disciplined. In a project with no signed area yet, every additional ownership point is not just more upside. It is also more execution burden.
The Bottleneck Is Leasing, Not Just Cost
The real yellow flag in AMPA Tower is not the size of the budget by itself. It is the gap between the project’s scale and its commercial certainty. At the end of 2025, the share of built area covered by signed lease contracts stood at 0%. That matters because this is not a small residential project that can be marketed late in the process. The company presents a mix of 42,000 square meters of offices, 9,000 square meters of hotel space, 5,500 square meters of retail, and 137 residential units over about 9,500 square meters. Put differently, most of the project is not residential. It will need real commercial absorption.
That point matters even more because in the same real estate business description the company says that, in development properties, the construction pace is generally aligned with lease contracts signed during construction. AMPA Tower does not yet have that anchor. So the NIS 90 million expected NOI is not a number already emerging from a signed pipeline. It is a target scenario that assumes the market absorbs the product, at rents and terms that justify the economics.
| Project component | Scale | What is still missing before the number becomes economics |
|---|---|---|
| Offices | 42,000 sqm | Anchor tenants or meaningful pre-leasing |
| Hotel | 9,000 sqm | A clear operating route, partner, or operator |
| Retail | 5,500 sqm | A tenant mix that supports traffic and pricing |
| Residential | 137 units, about 9,500 sqm | Planning and execution progress, but this is not the core commercial bottleneck |
That is the difference between paper value and locked-in value. As long as signed area remains at zero, it is hard to treat the expected NIS 90 million NOI as if it were already on the way into the cash flow statement. For now, it is a stabilized-project target, not near-term cash flow.
Financing Has Not Yet Cleared the Main Test Either
The financing section matters almost as much as the leasing section. In September 2025, the project companies signed a credit framework with a bank for the demolition, excavation, shoring, and foundation stage, up to NIS 50 million at prime plus 1.25%. The loan balance at year-end 2025 was only NIS 4.3 million, and the final maturity was set for September 30, 2026. The company also says explicitly that it intends to enter a full project financing agreement by then.
The implication is straightforward: AMPA Tower has not yet passed the full financing test. There is financing for the initial works, not a closed structure for the whole project. That is not a technical detail. It is the point where the credit market, not just company management, will have to validate the project economics, timetable, pace, and commercial visibility.
The timing also deserves nuance. In the aggregate disclosure table, the company presents a next-year construction budget of NIS 40 million against total remaining construction cost of NIS 582.5 million. So 2026 does not have to become an immediate full cash cliff. But that is not a reason for complacency. It simply means the project is entering a long runway, and along that runway AMPA will need to show again and again that financing and leasing are moving at a pace that justifies the rest of the investment.
So How Much Value Is Really Left
The short answer is that value is still there, but it is far from locked in. On a 100% basis, the company already carries an asset worth NIS 365.6 million, with another NIS 582.5 million of construction cost still to come before financing. On AMPA’s share, that translates into roughly NIS 559.4 million of project basis before financing against roughly NIS 53.1 million of expected NOI. That can work economically, but it no longer looks like an enormous development spread that can be taken for granted.
That is why the right reading of AMPA Tower is not “NIS 90 million of NOI against NIS 582.5 million of cost, so there must be plenty of value.” The right reading is “a large project in a strong location, with meaningful potential, but also with value already recognized on the balance sheet, full financing still unsigned, signed area still at 0%, and completion only in early 2030.” The room for error is simply smaller than the headline implies.
That also defines the market test for the next few reports. Three things would change the read quickly: a full project financing agreement, a first meaningful pre-leasing indication, and steady delivery on budget and on timetable. On the other side, if spending advances while commercial progress does not, AMPA Tower could shift in the market’s mind from an embedded value story to an absorber of the group’s capital cushion.
Bottom Line
AMPA Tower remains one of the most interesting value drivers inside the AMPA group, but as of year-end 2025 it is not a nearly finished asset. It is a project where most of the spread still has to be created. The move to 59% ownership gave AMPA more potential value, but it also gave the company more weight in the execution test. As long as signed area stays at zero and full project financing is still pending, the most important number is not the expected NOI. It is the distance the project still has to travel before that NOI becomes credible cash flow.
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