Prashkovsky Group: The 2026 Funding Map and What Has to Close for the Bridge to Hold
The main article argued that balance-sheet value had not yet become liquidity. This follow-up isolates the 2026 bridge: several forecasted sources are still external and conditional, while the private-credit layer is already secured on deep collateral and personal guarantees.
What This Follow-up Is Isolating
The main article made a simple point: Prashkovsky has more assets and more balance-sheet value, but 2026 will be judged by whether that value can turn into liquidity. This continuation strips the story down to that question alone. Not land quality, not project economics in the abstract, but the funding map itself: which cash sources are already inside the structure, which still depend on banks or capital markets, and where the real risk concentration sits.
That question matters even more because this is a bond-only listed company. There is no listed equity line giving the market a live equity read, and there is no short-interest layer adding another market signal. The market test therefore runs through a harder surface: covenants, refinancing, collateral packages, and the company’s ability to close fresh capital before projects start releasing surplus cash.
The starting point is not easy. At year-end 2025 the company had NIS 8.8 million of cash and cash equivalents, a working-capital deficit of NIS 7.1 million, and negative operating cash flow of NIS 37.4 million. Against that backdrop, management presents a two-year cash-flow forecast ending with NIS 75.1 million of closing cash at the end of 2026 and NIS 40.2 million at the end of 2027. That is the core of this follow-up: is the path from NIS 8.8 million to NIS 75.1 million built mainly on money that is already in hand, or on money that still has to happen.
The first message in this chart is that the bridge does not rest on one engine. It rests on several layers that need to work together: capital markets, a bank, private facilities, project finance, asset sales, and surplus releases from projects. The second message is that the uses are already real and heavy: NIS 60.8 million of equity investment and business development, NIS 47.2 million of regular lender repayments, and another NIS 81.9 million of repayment tied to collateral release or asset realizations. This is not a forecast where modest internal cash generation closes the gap. It is a forecast where closing the sources is the event.
What Is Already Inside the Structure, and What Still Sits Outside It
The right way to read the forecast is not only by size, but by certainty.
| Source | 2026 forecast | What the filing says | Analytical read |
|---|---|---|---|
| Opening cash | 8.8 | Year-end 2025 cash balance | This is the only cash already on hand at the balance-sheet date |
| Draw on financial-institution facility | 19.3 | A NIS 30 million facility was signed in December 2025, NIS 10 million was drawn by year-end, and the additional NIS 20 million was drawn on March 1, 2026 | This is the most concrete external layer, but it is not free cash, most of it refinanced a more expensive facility |
| Project surplus releases | 8.9 | Expected from projects completed and received in Q1 2026 | Closer-in source, but still timing-dependent |
| Convertible bank loan | 24.6 | The company is working with a bank to obtain it | This is an in-process step, not cash already closed |
| Equity or convertible issuance | 57.9 | The company is in discussions with underwriters for a 2026 public issuance | One of the central assumptions, dependent on market access and execution |
| Loan against land rights | 27.6 | The company is working on a loan against Phase B rights in Spark and assumes Ness Ziona can obtain similar terms | This is not just funding, it also assumes terms can be replicated across projects |
| Equity-completion loan | 15.0 | Intended for Kiryat Gat and Bnei Ayish until public bonds secured by surplus can be issued | This is bridge capital, not final capital |
| Secured bonds against project surplus | 101.3 | Planned only after bank accompaniment, construction start and early sales in four projects | This is the largest line in the bridge, and also the most conditional |
| Asset sales | 19.7 | The company is working to sell properties in Israel and the UK | Important, but not equivalent to cash freely available at the listed-company level |
What matters is the order of depth. On paper, the filing shows NIS 285.1 million of 2026 sources including opening cash. But the two largest lines after opening cash are NIS 101.3 million of surplus-secured bonds and NIS 57.9 million of equity or convertible issuance. Neither comes from the current operating base. Both depend on the company moving projects from planning and bridge finance into bank accompaniment, works and early sales, while also closing a new capital-markets transaction.
This chart sharpens another point: 2026 is the real closing year. The 2027 bridge is less crowded, but it still includes NIS 36 million of asset sales. So this is not a clean move from a pressure year into a comfortable year. It is a two-year map in which 2026 is supposed to open the bottleneck and 2027 is supposed to benefit from that. If 2026 does not close the large layers, 2027 arrives without much real slack.
Another important detail sits in the note on the company’s position. Management says that selling several assets in Israel and the UK is expected to produce net positive cash flow of NIS 14.2 million over the next two years. At the same time, the two-year bridge includes NIS 55.7 million of asset-sale sources, but also NIS 98.5 million of lender repayment tied to collateral release or realizations. This is the point a reader can easily miss: asset sales here do not sit on an empty table. A meaningful portion of the proceeds is already earmarked for releasing collateral and repaying debt. Realizations are therefore a funding mechanism, not a shortcut to free cash.
The Private-Credit Layer, Pricing Improved in Parts, but Collateral Went Deeper
At year-end 2025 the company had NIS 183.4 million of short-term loans against only NIS 66.7 million of long-term loans. That alone explains why management spends so much time on the cash-flow forecast. But the picture gets sharper when the non-bank and private-credit layer is isolated.
This chart is not meant to restate the balance sheet. It shows that Prashkovsky is not entering 2026 with a conservative and diffuse funding stack. A large portion of the debt remains short, and a meaningful part of it sits with private lenders and at elevated rates.
Three facilities explain the character of this layer.
The first layer: in April 2024 the company took a NIS 16 million loan, of which roughly NIS 10.7 million principal remained outstanding at year-end 2025. It carries 9% cash interest plus an additional fixed 2.5% layer that the company elected not to pay currently and therefore adds to principal. The collateral is a first-ranking pledge over the full issued and paid-up capital of P.R., alongside Arie Prashkovsky’s personal guarantee.
The second layer: in November 2024 the company signed an NIS 11 million facility linked to the Eliav property in Rehovot. By year-end, the entire NIS 11 million principal was already outstanding. The pricing is 7% cash plus 4.5% accrued, and the collateral is a second-ranking mortgage over the property together with unlimited personal guarantees by the controlling shareholders. Final maturity is December 20, 2026, with an option to extend to December 20, 2027.
The third layer, and the most important one for this follow-up: in December 2025 the company signed a NIS 30 million facility. NIS 10 million had been drawn by year-end and another NIS 20 million was drawn after the balance-sheet date, so by the time the financial statements were approved the full facility had already been used. Pricing dropped relative to the layer it replaced, 7% cash plus 4% accrued, and final maturity moved out to December 2028. That is a real improvement in cost and duration. But the structural price is a first-ranking and exclusive pledge over all of the company’s control rights in PRMO and all related rights, including distributions, shareholder-loan rights, and rights under voting agreements, together with unlimited shareholder guarantees.
That is one of the key findings in this continuation. The company did improve part of the funding cost and maturity profile, but it did so by pushing the collateral package deeper into one of its main value reservoirs. On top of that, the company undertook to use distributions from PRMO for early repayment of the facility. So even if the UK activity starts generating cash, part of that cash is already spoken for.
Replacing the August 2024 facility, which carried 15% pricing and was also secured on PRMO rights plus personal guarantees, with the December 2025 facility improves price. But it does not remove dependence. It pushes that dependence forward in time and concentrates it around the same collateral pool.
The Public Bond Is Not the Immediate Pressure Point, Which Means the Test Sits Elsewhere
The public bond is not Prashkovsky’s immediate problem. If anything, year-end 2025 looks reasonable against the trust deed.
| Covenant | Actual at year-end 2025 | Interest step-up threshold | Default threshold | What that means |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity | NIS 154 million | NIS 110 million | NIS 90 million | NIS 44 million above the interest step-up line and NIS 64 million above the default line |
| Equity-to-balance sheet ratio | 30.2% | 22.5% | 19% | 7.7 percentage points above the step-up line and 11.2 points above the default line |
| Loan-to-value, LTV | 46.8% | none | 65% | 18.2 percentage points of room to the cap |
So the public bond still gives the company time. But that should not be read too generously. It does not mean the capital structure is relaxed. It means the pressure point has shifted to other layers: private-credit rollovers, project finance, short-term bridge loans, and asset realizations.
The same logic appears in the UK layer. At year-end the relevant companies complied with a 59.6% debt-to-value ratio, while debt-service coverage was also in compliance after the bank agreed in March 2025 to reduce the ICR requirement to 120% from 175% and raise quarterly amortization. The right read here is interpretive: the covenants are not broken, but they are not untouched either. The fact that the ratios were reset once already suggests this layer has already gone through one round of accommodation.
What Has to Close for the Bridge to Hold
First trigger: at least one of the two large market-facing sources has to move from assumption to cash, either the convertible bank loan or the equity or convertible issuance. Without one of them, the bridge leans too heavily on projects that have not yet fully entered bank accompaniment.
Second trigger: the four projects behind the NIS 101.3 million line of surplus-secured bonds have to move forward. The filing spells out the preconditions: bank accompaniment, construction start, and early sales. Until that happens, the largest source in the bridge remains potential, not funding.
Third trigger: asset sales must be read net, not gross. The market may see a realization headline and assume it means fresh liquidity. That is the wrong read here. A material part of the cash is already earmarked for collateral release and debt repayment.
Fourth trigger: the company has to prevent expensive bridge capital from simply rolling forward while projects stay stuck. If that happens, project-level value can be eaten away by funding cost before surplus ever becomes accessible.
Conclusion
Prashkovsky’s 2026 funding map is not a default map, but it is not a comfort map either. It is a transition map. The public bond is not close to the wall, and after the balance-sheet date the company did complete one meaningful facility expansion and refinanced a more expensive layer. That is the part that works.
But what holds the bridge together is still not a wide internal cash engine. It is a mix of capital markets, banks, project surpluses that still need to be opened, and asset realizations whose proceeds are partly pre-allocated to debt service. So the real 2026 test will not be whether there is value on the balance sheet. That is already visible. The test will be whether the company can replace expensive and heavily secured bridge capital with cheaper and more durable sources before time itself becomes a cost.
That is exactly where a standard valuation read stops being enough. For Prashkovsky, at least over the next year, the funding map comes before the earnings map.
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