Partner TV+: Can The Commercial Upgrade Also Become Durable Fixed-Line Profitability
Partner ended 2025 with a visibly stronger TV product, a completed customer migration, and renewed sequential growth in TV subscribers in the fourth quarter. But the yes agreement also created a disclosed annual cost floor of at least about NIS 64 million plus VAT, while internet ARPU slipped to NIS 94 because of bundled offers and fixed-line margins weakened, so the 2026 test is about proving product economics, not only product quality.
The main article argued that Partner enters 2026 with better operations, but also with a discipline test. This continuation isolates one layer inside that broader thesis: is TV+ really changing the economics of the fixed-line segment, or is it mainly upgrading the commercial product while profitability is still looking for a new equilibrium?
The first point is that the commercial upgrade is real. In September 2025 Partner launched TV+, during 2025 it completed the customer migration to the new service, and by year-end 95% of internet subscribers were already on fiber. The second point matters more: the agreement with yes did not bring only a better content menu. It also brought a new multi-year cost layer.
That is why the success test for TV+ is not whether the interface is better or whether the TV base stopped eroding. The test is whether the commercial improvement can move through the fixed-line P&L without eating into ARPU, margin, and the stability of operating profit. The fourth quarter says that proof is still incomplete.
Four findings should frame the read:
- First: TV+ stopped the quarterly deterioration in TV subscribers, but 2025 still closed with 202 thousand TV subscribers versus 203 thousand at the end of 2024.
- Second: the yes agreement combines monthly consideration based on subscriber count, an app-license payment spread over 60 months, and an annual minimum expense of at least about NIS 64 million plus VAT.
- Third: the annual improvement in fixed-line profitability in 2025 is not a clean proof of TV+ economics, because commercial launch happened only in September and the year also included the closing of a VAT provision related to Netflix customers and lower salary expense.
- Fourth: in the fourth quarter, the first full quarter after launch, internet ARPU fell to NIS 94 from NIS 95 in the third quarter because of bundled value offers, fixed-line adjusted EBITDA fell to NIS 115 million from NIS 122 million in the comparable quarter, and operating profit fell to NIS 13 million from NIS 25 million.
Where The Commercial Upgrade Is Clearly Working
The fair read has to start with what did improve. Partner now has a stronger fixed-line base to build on. Internet subscribers rose to 492 thousand at the end of 2025 from 474 thousand at the end of 2024, and 468 thousand of them were fiber subscribers versus 435 thousand a year earlier. That is not a technical detail. It means the TV+ launch is not sitting on an old network or on a weak customer base, but on a fixed-line footprint that is now almost entirely fiber.
There is also a clear shift on the TV side. After falling from 203 thousand subscribers at the end of 2024 to 196 thousand at the end of the third quarter of 2025, the year closed at 202 thousand. The new service includes an interface developed for Partner, a meaningfully broader content offering, dozens of linear channels, VOD, Catch Up, and exclusive content. In other words, the product problem appears weaker. The bottleneck has now moved from product to economics.
What matters here is not only the six-thousand subscriber increase versus the third quarter. Migration was already completed during 2025, so 2026 should be a cleaner reading year. If the product improved but the next reported periods still fail to translate that improvement into stable profitability, it will become harder to blame the pressure on transition noise.
The yes Agreement: Stronger Product, Heavier Cost Base
The easy mistake is to look at TV+ only as a product upgrade. Economically, it is also a contract that replaces a meaningful part of Partner’s content and platform model with a new, long-term, fairly rigid operating layer.
| Item | What Was Disclosed | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|
| Commercial launch | September 2025 | 2025 includes only a partial launch period, so Q4 and 2026 matter more than the annual line |
| Service foundation | Joint content procurement through yes, content license covering the broadest Sting+ package except excluded content, and a dedicated app license | Product quality improved, but part of the economics now runs through an outside supplier |
| Maintenance and development | yes provides app maintenance, excluding upgrades, and Partner can make changes for its own needs | The model does not eliminate adaptation and maintenance burden, it redistributes it |
| Contract term | Five years from launch, with two one-year extension periods and up to 18 additional months of continued service | This is not a short promotional move, but a long operating layer |
| Early termination | Partner can terminate only with six months’ notice, and not before 36 months from commercial launch | If economics disappoint, exit flexibility is limited |
| Consideration mechanism | Monthly content consideration based on subscriber count and a one-time app-license amount spread across 60 equal monthly payments | The structure combines a variable layer with a multi-year amortized layer |
| Cost floor | Total annual expense will not be less than about NIS 64 million plus VAT, partly CPI-linked, and extension-period expense is not materially different | The product upgrade has to absorb a lasting cost layer, not only a launch cost |
That is the core issue. Partner did not buy only a better product. It also bought a new annual cost floor. So the question is not whether TV+ helps protect customers. It is whether customer protection, bundled offers, and better product quality are enough to bring back through revenue and margin the cost of content, the app license, and systems maintenance.
Why 2025 Still Does Not Prove Durable Fixed-Line Profitability
A quick read of the annual numbers could lead to an overly positive conclusion. Fixed-line adjusted EBITDA rose to NIS 508 million in 2025 from NIS 458 million in 2024, and operating profit rose to NIS 104 million from NIS 75 million. On the surface, that looks like a sharp improvement in profitability.
But this is exactly the read that can mislead. Total fixed-line revenue actually fell to NIS 1.313 billion from NIS 1.349 billion, and service revenue excluding interconnect fell to NIS 1.272 billion from NIS 1.282 billion. So the annual line is not telling the story of a fixed-line segment that simply grew together with TV+.
The company’s own explanation for the annual profitability improvement runs through three drivers that are not identical to “the new TV service is already economically proven”: growth in internet and business-data revenue, the closing of a VAT provision related to Netflix customers, and lower salary expense. On the other side, 2024 included about NIS 24 million of pre-tax profit from a fiber-leasing transaction with a business customer, while 2025 included about NIS 17 million of one-off expenses tied to implementation of the yes agreement, including employee retirement, content costs, and accelerated depreciation.
The implication is clear. The annual rise in EBITDA and operating profit does show that the broader fixed-line segment improved, but it still does not prove that TV+ has already moved into a stable economic run-rate. Part of the improvement comes from items that do not reflect steady-state TV economics, and part of the pressure is still buried inside a partial launch year.
This is exactly the kind of chart that deserves a pause. It does not say the improvement is unreal. It does say the annual improvement alone is not enough proof that TV+ has already built durable fixed-line profitability.
The Fourth Quarter Is The First Real Proof Test
If the goal is to understand the new economics, the focus should be less on full-year 2025 and more on the fourth quarter. This was the first quarter entirely after the September launch, so it is closer to a true reading of the new model.
Here the picture is more mixed. On the positive side, fixed-line internet kept growing, fiber penetration is already dominant, and TV subscribers rose versus the end of the third quarter. On the other side, internet ARPU declined sequentially to NIS 94 from NIS 95 because of a focus on bundled value offers following the launch of the new TV service. That is a material point. It says in plain terms that the commercial upgrade has already started to move through price.
The profit line points the same way. Fixed-line adjusted EBITDA fell to NIS 115 million in the fourth quarter from NIS 122 million in the comparable quarter, and adjusted EBITDA margin fell to 36% from 37%. Operating profit dropped to NIS 13 million from NIS 25 million, and operating margin fell to 4% from 8%. The company attributes the quarter’s pressure to one-off content expense related to implementing the yes agreement, higher systems-maintenance expense mainly tied to the app-use license, and lower profit from Hubbing.
That is the critical point for the thesis. Even if part of the fourth-quarter pressure is one-off, the quarter already shows where the real proof test sits. Not in subscriber counts alone, but in whether bundled offers, content cost, systems maintenance, and weakness in older revenue lines can coexist without pulling down fixed-line profitability.
These numbers also explain why proof of TV+ economics has to be broader than TV subscriber count alone. Partner’s fixed-line revenue is still absorbing weakness in Hubbing and in paid work, so TV+ is not operating in an isolated lab. It has to help monetization, stabilize the TV base, and support a healthier segment margin at the same time.
What Has To Happen For A Commercial Upgrade To Become Economic Proof
The good news is that the product already looks stronger, migration is complete, and the fiber base is solid. The less comfortable news is that the numbers still have not proved that this picture also supports profitability.
A cleaner economic proof would look like this:
- the TV subscriber base keeps growing, or at least holds above the end-2025 level, without another sustained drop in internet ARPU caused by bundled offers;
- internet and business-data revenue growth not only continues, but does so fast enough to cover both Hubbing and paid-work weakness and the new yes cost layer;
- launch-related one-offs disappear, but even after they disappear, fixed-line adjusted EBITDA and operating profit recover from the fourth-quarter level rather than settling at a lower base;
- the 2026 reading moves from “the product is better” to “the model is better”, meaning the improvement is no longer being bought through commercial concessions or weaker margins.
Conclusions
TV+ solved part of Partner’s commercial problem faster than it solved the economic one. The product improved, the migration process was completed, and by the end of 2025 TV subscribers were again growing sequentially. But the agreement with yes also created an annual cost floor of at least about NIS 64 million, a relatively long commitment, and limited exit flexibility.
The 2025 annual line is not enough to declare victory, because it mixes internet and business-data growth, a VAT-provision release, lower salary expense, a prior-year fiber transaction, and TV+ launch costs. The fourth quarter is sharper: TV subscribers recovered, but internet ARPU slipped, adjusted EBITDA weakened, and fixed-line operating profit was cut almost in half.
Current thesis: TV+ has proved it can improve the product and customer trend, but it has not yet proved that it can generate durable fixed-line profitability after content, app, and maintenance cost.
What changes versus the main article: there, this was a compressed warning inside the broader Partner thesis. Here the real test becomes clearer. The question is not “did TV+ succeed?” but “at what economic price did it succeed?”
Counter-thesis: one can argue that the caution is overstated because the new product already stopped the erosion, fiber penetration is nearly complete, and the one-off launch costs of 2025 should give way to a cleaner 2026.
What would change the short to medium-term read: results showing that subscriber trends keep moving in the right direction without further ARPU pressure, and that the fixed-line margin recovers once launch noise fades.
Why this matters: in telecom, a product upgrade creates value only if it can move from the customer screen into the income statement. Otherwise the company is buying commercial stability at the price of weaker economics.
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