Sunflower: Can the Development Pipeline Really Replace the MW That Were Sold
The main article argued that asset sales bought Sunflower time. This follow-up shows that the visible build-and-development stack looks large on paper, but the layer that is actually close to operation only barely approaches the MW already sold, while the larger block sits in Poland in 2027 to 2029, includes an open land issue around 75 MW and 300 MWh, and no longer has the Afcon shortcut.
What Actually Has to Replace the Sold MW
The main article already argued that asset sales bought Sunflower time and eased the balance-sheet pressure. This follow-up isolates only the next step: whether the build-and-development layer the company now shows can really rebuild the operating base after the December 2025 sale of 13.1 MW and the February 2026 agreement to sell another 4.13 MW.
On paper, the answer almost looks obvious. The company shows 16.4 MW under construction or ready to build in Israel, another 5.6 MW in development in Israel, and in Poland 208 MW and 600 MWh in development. But counting MW alone is misleading here. These are not MW of the same quality: some are already on the way to connection, some lean on existing wind-farm infrastructure, some still depend on rezoning, and on 75 MW and 300 MWh the company itself already says it cannot assess the implications of the landowner breach.
What is working is that there is finally a visible build layer that can be measured. What is still missing is a clean replacement path. 0.8 MW inside the construction table is already included in a sale agreement that has not yet closed, Sunflower Roofs is expected to remain after the Greenlight sale with 9.5 operating MW and no systems under construction, and the inorganic route through Afcon never matured into a binding deal. The real question here is therefore not whether the company can present a pipeline. It is how much of that pipeline is actually close to operation, how much of it will remain inside the group, and how much is still too far away to replace capacity that has already left the portfolio.
The chart and table below are shown on the same 100% basis the company uses in its own pipeline tables. On that basis, what has already been sold or agreed for sale stands at 17.23 MW.
What Is Actually Close to Replacing the Sold Base
The only layer that can currently be called genuinely near-term replacement is Israel. In the table of projects under construction and ready to build, the company shows 16.4 MW and 1.5 MWh, with a forecast of NIS 11.2 million of revenue and NIS 9.8 million of EBITDA in a full operating year, and estimated construction cost of NIS 52.2 million. This is no longer a distant concept: the company points to expected connections between 2026 and 2028 and also explains that it funds these systems from its own resources during construction, then draws bank credit only after connection at average leverage of about 75%.
But the fine print matters here as well. Inside that same table, the company notes that 0.8 MW of the systems under construction are already included in a sale agreement that has not yet closed. So on a gross basis there are 16.4 MW that look relatively close, but after netting out that pending sale the figure drops to about 15.6 MW. That is already below the 17.23 MW that have been sold or are on the way out. This is the key point. Even before execution risk, the closest replacement layer only barely approaches what has already been monetized.
That reading becomes sharper when looking specifically at Sunflower Roofs. The company states explicitly that after the Greenlight transaction Sunflower Roofs will be left with 9.5 operating MW and no systems under construction. In other words, part of the visible build layer does not create a story of accumulation. It creates a story of asset recycling: build, connect, and at times sell before the new layer has had time to become a stable recurring base.
| Layer | What it includes | Company timing | What it can contribute | The main yellow flag |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Israel, under construction and ready to build | 16.4 MW and 1.5 MWh | 2026 to 2028 | NIS 11.2 million revenue and NIS 9.8 million EBITDA in a full operating year | 0.8 MW are already tied to a sale agreement, and construction is funded first with company capital |
| Israel, in development | 5.6 MW and 1.5 MWh | 2027 to 2028 | NIS 4.5 million revenue in a full operating year | A relatively small layer that cannot replace the sold MW by itself |
| Poland, Cable Pooling and additional wind | 51 MW PV, about 80 MWh storage, and 7 MW wind | 2027 to 2028 | Built on existing infrastructure | Still development, not a near-term operating layer |
| Poland, early development | 150 MW PV and 600 MWh storage | 2027 to 2029 | The large headline block of the pipeline | Three projects still need rezoning, and 75 MW plus 300 MWh already carry an open land question |
The takeaway from this layer is simple. Sunflower does have a pipeline that can now be mapped in concrete numbers, but over the next 2 to 4 quarters most of the replacement burden still sits on a fairly modest Israeli block. That is not yet a base growing faster than the pace at which the company has already monetized assets.
Poland Provides the Big Number, Not the Clean Certainty
Poland is what creates the impression of scale. In the development table, the company shows 7 MW of wind, 51 MW of PV under Cable Pooling, and another 150 MW of PV plus 600 MWh of storage in development. In headline terms, that is enough to argue that the company holds a pipeline far larger than the MW that were sold. That is still too superficial a read.
First, even inside Poland there is a quality hierarchy. The Cable Pooling layer looks relatively credible because it is based on existing infrastructure at three of the company’s wind farms. It is still development, but not development on a blank sheet of paper. The additional 7 MW of wind also relies on a regulatory change that allows expansion on the basis of an existing project. That is easier to believe than a pipeline that starts only from land rights.
By contrast, the heart of the big number sits in four early-stage PV projects with potential of 150 MW and 600 MWh. Three of them are still in rezoning processes that, according to the company, are expected to be completed only by the end of 2027, and only then could the company complete environmental work and submit a grid-connection request. That is not a replacement layer for the next few quarters. It is an option layer for 2027 and beyond.
And here sits the main yellow flag. The company says that, for a project with expected capacity of 75 MW of PV and 300 MWh of storage, which underwent environmental survey work during 2024 and 2025 and was supposed to enable a grid application during the second quarter of 2026 if successfully completed, there is a breach by the landowner under the agreement governing the company’s rights in the land. This is not side noise. It sits inside the very pipeline that is supposed to turn Poland’s headline numbers into something more concrete, and the company states explicitly that it cannot assess the implications for further development.
That means the 150 MW and 600 MWh headline is not a clean block that can be taken at face value. It already includes a meaningful sub-block with an open question mark. The cost layer sharpens that point further: the table shows estimated construction costs of NIS 427.8 million for Poland’s wind and PV development components, while the storage line itself appears without a cost number. So even before discussing the land issue, this is a pipeline that requires both time and capital, not just a few more technical approvals.
Afcon Was Supposed to Be the Shortcut, and It Disappeared
That is where Afcon matters, not as a side note but as a mirror for the credibility question. At the end of December 2025, the parties were still signing a 60-day extension to the memorandum of understanding in order to complete due diligence and advance a detailed agreement. So right before year-end there was still an inorganic path that could have given Sunflower a faster step-up than the slow maturation of development projects.
But in the annual report the company already states that on January 12, 2026 the non-binding MOU expired because the negotiations did not mature into binding agreements. This is not just another failed deal. It also shows that at that point the company was pursuing not only organic development but also an external shortcut. Once that route disappeared, the burden of proof returned entirely to what is already sitting inside the development tables.
That is why Afcon matters here less for the MW it might have added and more for what it reveals about the starting point. If the existing build-and-development stack were fully convincing on its own, the need for such a clear external shortcut would have been smaller. Once the move fell away, readers should become more conservative, not less, when looking at the large development numbers in Poland.
Conclusion
On a spreadsheet, the answer is yes. On execution credibility, not yet. Sunflower has a build-and-development stack that is numerically larger than the MW it sold, but the layer actually close to operation only barely covers the scale of the disposals already completed or signed, and even that layer weakens somewhat once the systems already inserted into a sale process are netted out.
The larger replacement story sits in Poland, but there the numbers mostly arrive from 2027 to 2029, require a longer path of development, connection, and financing, and already include an open land issue around 75 MW and 300 MWh. Afcon was supposed to offer a shortcut to inorganic growth, and it disappeared as well. For now, Sunflower has proved the ability to monetize assets more convincingly than the ability to rebuild a new operating base quickly enough to replace them.
Disclosure: Deep TASE analyses are general informational, research, and commentary content only. They do not constitute investment advice, investment marketing, a recommendation, or an offer to buy, sell, or hold any security, and are not tailored to any reader's personal circumstances.
The author, site owner, or related parties may hold, buy, sell, or otherwise trade securities or financial instruments related to the companies discussed, before or after publication, without prior notice and without any obligation to update the analysis. Publication of an analysis should not be read as a statement that any position does or does not exist.
The analysis may contain errors, omissions, or information that changes after publication. Readers should review official filings and primary sources before making decisions.