Paper Value Versus Accessible Value: Millennium’s Liquidity, Warrants, and Dilution Stack
Even after the February-March 2026 rights offering, Millennium’s liquid layer only reaches about NIS 15.2 million on a generous reading, against a NIS 56.8 million private portfolio. The listed warrants can add more cash, but before that they represent another 42.3% of dilution relative to the current unit base.
The main article already established the real Millennium question: not whether there is still value on paper in the portfolio, but how much time, capital, and dilution stand between that paper value and the public unitholder. This follow-up isolates only that bridge. Not the quality of the holdings themselves, and not the valuation debate around them, but the gap between accounting value and the liquidity that is actually available before another financing event.
The answer is sharper than it first looks. Even after the rights offering, Millennium is still far from a position in which its book value is matched by a comparable liquid layer. At the end of 2025, it held NIS 1.483 million of cash and cash equivalents and NIS 6.893 million of marketable securities. If one also adds the gross proceeds from the rights offering completed in February and March 2026, about NIS 6.859 million, the total reaches about NIS 15.235 million. That is already a generous reading, because it treats the marketable-securities book as part of the accessible layer rather than only pure bank cash, and even so it reaches only about 26.8% of the private portfolio’s fair value and 23.8% of equity.
That leads to the second, and probably more important, point. The warrants are not cash until they are in the money. As of April 3, 2026, the participation unit traded at 90.4 agorot, while the Series 2 warrant strike price is NIS 1 until September 3, 2026. So the next layer of cash that investors may be tempted to treat as available is not actually locked in today. Before it becomes cash, it is first a dilution layer.
Three findings organize the read:
- The dilution has already happened. Since 18.018 million units were registered for trading at the report date, and the post-balance-sheet rights issue added 7.622 million units, the pre-rights base was only about 10.397 million units. In other words, the completed rights issue itself expanded the unit base by about 73.3%.
- The remaining dilution overhang is still large. Series 2 alone includes another 7.622 million warrants, equal to a potential 42.3% addition relative to the current unit base.
- Even full Series 2 exercise does not close the gap between accessible value and paper value. If all those warrants are exercised, Millennium would receive another NIS 7.622 million gross and the liquid layer would rise to about NIS 22.857 million. Even that would still represent only about 40.3% of the private portfolio and 35.6% of equity.
How Much Of The Value Is Actually Accessible
The easy mistake in reading Millennium is to look at NIS 56.766 million of non-traded investments and NIS 64.131 million of equity and assume that liquidity is only a temporary issue. That is part of the story, not the whole thing. Until there is a realization, a meaningful outside repricing, or a real upstream dividend from a portfolio company, public unitholders live on a very different layer: cash, marketable securities, and access to the equity market.
That is why the right frame here is all-in cash flexibility. In 2025, Millennium used NIS 2.523 million in operating activities and another NIS 2.714 million in investing activities, together NIS 5.237 million. There was no financing cash inflow during 2025. So year-end 2025 was not a liquidity point built on internally generated surplus cash. It was an endpoint at which cash had already fallen from NIS 6.720 million to NIS 1.483 million.
The picture improved after the balance sheet date, but that improvement also needs to be read correctly. The early-2026 rights offering bought time. It did not erase the gap between value inside the portfolio and value that is readily accessible. Even on a generous read that counts all marketable securities as part of the liquid layer, what Millennium can actually touch remains far smaller than the values sitting in the private portfolio marks.
| Layer | Amount | As % of private portfolio | As % of equity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and marketable securities at end-2025 | NIS 8.376 million | 14.8% | 13.1% |
| After gross rights-offering proceeds | NIS 15.235 million | 26.8% | 23.8% |
| After full Series 2 exercise, gross | NIS 22.857 million | 40.3% | 35.6% |
That chart is the core of the thesis. It shows that one does not need to settle the valuation debate around the portfolio today in order to see the active bottleneck. Even before asking whether the marks are aggressive or conservative, the immediate issue is different: there is still a wide gap between what is recorded inside the portfolio and what is liquid enough to fund time, follow-on support, and the public shell without returning quickly to the market again.
The Dilution That Already Happened, And The Dilution Still Waiting
Millennium’s capital structure matters here more than many P&L lines. At Millennium, new money does not yet come upstream from portfolio companies at a pace that investors can rely on. So every public-market financing move immediately changes the base on which the public unitholder owns the portfolio.
The first dilution layer is already embedded in the unit count. As noted, the post-balance-sheet rights issue added 7.622 million units at NIS 0.9 per unit. Since 18.018 million units were registered for trading at the report date, the pre-offering base was only about 10.397 million units. That is not a cosmetic adjustment. It is an expansion of roughly 73.3% in the unit base.
And it does not stop there. At the report date, Millennium also had 7.622 million Series 2 warrants listed for trading, each exercisable into one participation unit for NIS 1 until September 3, 2026. In addition, the report lists 321,553 employee options granted to the CEO, as well as an approved but not yet allocated option program for employees and officers that would be exercisable into 48,698 participation units.
| Dilution layer | Quantity | As % of the current unit base |
|---|---|---|
| Series 2 warrants | 7,621,537 | 42.3% |
| CEO options | 321,553 | 1.8% |
| Approved but not yet allocated program, in unit terms | 48,698 | 0.3% |
That chart sharpens a point the main article only touched briefly. At Millennium, equity financing is not only a temporary liquidity fix. It is also a permanent change in the ownership base. And when the same financing layer comes with free warrants attached, the public unitholder has to ask not only how much cash came in now, but also how much of the future upside was already pledged in order to buy that time.
Why Series 2 Is Not The Same Thing As Cash
It is easy to look at 7.622 million listed warrants and speak as if Millennium is simply holding another NIS 7.622 million on the shelf. That is not precise. For that cash to arrive, the participation unit has to trade above NIS 1 before September 3, 2026. As of April 3, 2026, the unit was still at 90.4 agorot, or 9.6 agorot below the strike.
In other words, the warrants are an option on better market perception and better company execution, not cash that already exists. If the market becomes convinced that one of the holdings is progressing fast enough, that the funding path is calming down, and that Millennium will not need another financing event before value starts moving closer to the listed vehicle, the unit price can move above the strike and the warrants can also become a real source of cash. Until then, they mainly remain a dilution layer hanging over the same unitholder who is waiting to see accessible value.
That matters especially because Millennium does not arrive at this point from a surplus position. In 2023, financing activities brought in NIS 13.929 million net from unit issuance. In 2024, they brought in another NIS 6.554 million net. In 2025, there was no financing inflow. Then in February and March 2026, Millennium completed a rights offering that raised about NIS 6.859 million gross. In other words, the capital market is not an unusual backstop for Millennium. It is a recurring part of the machine.
From that angle, Series 2 is a double test. If it moves into the money, it can bring another NIS 7.622 million gross without opening a new financing round. If it does not, Millennium will be left with the rights issue already completed, but without the additional liquidity layer that investors may be tempted to picture today.
There is also a trust layer here, not just an arithmetic layer. The report discloses a motion to certify a class action filed in May 2024 around allegedly dilutive and unfair equity offerings, with claimed damage of about NIS 107.7 million. Millennium disputes the claims and says, based on its legal advisers, that the chances of dismissal are high. That may well prove correct. But regardless of the legal outcome, the disclosure itself helps explain why, from the market’s perspective, any additional dilution event is not judged only by how much cash comes in, but also by the price paid in investor trust.
Conclusion
The main article set the right frame: at Millennium, paper value still exists, but getting to it still runs through funding. This follow-up sharpens that bridge. Even after the rights offering, the accessible layer remains small relative to the private portfolio and to equity. Even full Series 2 exercise would not close that gap. And as of early April 2026, that potential cash layer is not even in the money yet.
Current thesis: at Millennium, the warrants and the rights offering do not solve the liquidity issue in a way that removes dilution from the story. They simply buy more time by expanding the unit base again.
What changed versus the main article: the main article established that book value still depends on funding. This follow-up makes that dependency more exact. Even after financing has already been completed, accessible value remains modest, and the next possible jump in liquidity still rests first on an option layer that is not yet locked in as cash.
Counter-thesis: one can argue that this reading is too cautious, because the partnership has already completed the rights offering, still holds marketable securities in addition to cash, and Series 2 could still become a quick source of funding if one of the portfolio triggers changes sentiment around the unit.
What could change the read in the short to medium term: an outside event in one of the holdings that pushes the unit above NIS 1 and turns Series 2 from theoretical dilution into real cash, or alternatively another slide in the unit price that makes it clear the last raise bought time but did not solve the accessibility gap.
Why this matters: for a small listed holding vehicle like Millennium, the relevant question is not only how much the portfolio is worth. It is how much of that value is accessible before the next round, and how much of the future upside has already been prepaid through dilution.
Disclosure: Deep TASE analyses are general informational, research, and commentary content only. They do not constitute investment advice, investment marketing, a recommendation, or an offer to buy, sell, or hold any security, and are not tailored to any reader's personal circumstances.
The author, site owner, or related parties may hold, buy, sell, or otherwise trade securities or financial instruments related to the companies discussed, before or after publication, without prior notice and without any obligation to update the analysis. Publication of an analysis should not be read as a statement that any position does or does not exist.
The analysis may contain errors, omissions, or information that changes after publication. Readers should review official filings and primary sources before making decisions.