Horizon Inside Tectona: How Much of the Platform Really Reaches Tectona Shareholders
Horizon is the cleanest operating platform inside Tectona, but only a small slice of its scale actually reaches Tectona shareholders. In 2025, Horizon's NIS 3.837 million net profit turned into just $174 thousand in Tectona's reported profit after partial ownership, purchase-accounting amortization, and a hard separation between customer assets and shareholder equity.
Where Horizon Actually Enters Tectona
The main article already framed Horizon as the cleanest operating anchor inside Tectona. This follow-up isolates the look-through layer: how much of the platform really translates into listed-shareholder economics after partial ownership, Altshuler Shaham's golden share, purchase-accounting amortization, and the fact that some of the biggest numbers in the business do not belong to shareholders at all.
The first misleading number here is $455 thousand. That is the Horizon segment's "revenue" inside Tectona's segment note, but Tectona explicitly says that for this segment, revenue represents Tectona's share in Horizon's profit before excess-cost amortization. It is not Horizon's turnover, not customer activity volume, and not cash that sits freely at Tectona. It is already a filtered minority-owner number.
That filter is not only accounting-driven. Tectona owns 40.93% of Horizon's equity, while Altshuler Shaham keeps 51% of the voting power through a golden share. So the reader has to separate three different layers from the start: Horizon's own economics, Tectona's economic slice of Horizon, and what can actually become accessible to Tectona shareholders.
| Layer | 2025 | How to read it |
|---|---|---|
| Horizon standalone revenue | NIS 16.979 million | The full platform's activity |
| Horizon standalone net profit | NIS 3.837 million | Horizon's own bottom line |
| Horizon segment "revenue" inside Tectona | $455 thousand | Tectona's share of Horizon profit before excess-cost amortization |
| Profit recognized by Tectona from Horizon | $174 thousand | What passed through all ownership and accounting filters in 2025 |
| Dividend received by Tectona from Horizon | NIS 818 thousand | Cash that moved upstream, not an extra layer of profit |
That chart is the core bridge. Horizon ended 2025 with $1.111 million of net profit, but Tectona is entitled to only 40.93% of it. That brings the number down to $455 thousand. Then the acquisition layer steps in: $243 thousand of customer-relationship amortization and another $38 thousand of deferred-tax amortization. The result is that Tectona recognized only $174 thousand of profit from Horizon in 2025.
There is another subtle point here. During 2025 Horizon distributed a NIS 2 million dividend, and Tectona's share was NIS 818 thousand, or $231 thousand. That is real cash that moved up from the associate, but it is not an extra profit layer on top of the reported share of earnings. In the investment note, the dividend reduces the carrying amount of the investment. So anyone who counts both the $174 thousand profit and the $231 thousand dividend as two separate, independent value layers is double counting.
The Carrying Value Is Not the Same as Net Equity
The next gap sits on the balance sheet. At the end of 2025 Tectona's carrying amount in Horizon stood at $3.845 million. That sounds meaningful, but only $1.392 million of that amount is Tectona's share in Horizon's equity. The rest comes from the acquisition and the accounting wrapped around it.
The implication is straightforward: most of the carrying amount is not hard net equity tied directly to Horizon's ongoing operating base, but acquisition premium. Inside the balance sit $1.937 million of goodwill and $783 thousand of customer relationships, offset by a $275 thousand deferred-tax reserve. So if the reader looks at the $3.845 million figure as if it were simply "Tectona's stake in Horizon," the reader is again blending tangible equity, intangible assets, and deal assumptions into one number.
That distinction matters because the purchase premium is not an abstract footnote. It is already eating into what reaches Tectona. In 2025 alone, those acquisition-related adjustments cut $281 thousand from Tectona's share of Horizon's profit. Until Horizon grows its earnings fast enough to outrun that recurring haircut, listed shareholders will continue to see a much smaller number upstream than the platform's raw economics suggest.
Where It Is Easiest to Confuse Platform Scale with Shareholder Value
The biggest number in the story, NIS 301.803 million, is exactly the one that should not be attributed to shareholders. That is the fair value of customer tokens held by Horizon on behalf of its clients off balance sheet. Horizon states clearly that those tokens are not its assets, and the auditor even treated the matter as a key audit issue. So this is a real scale number. It says something meaningful about platform reach and custody responsibility. It does not say anything direct about equity value available to Tectona shareholders.
The same logic applies to designated cash. Horizon's balance sheet includes NIS 14.363 million of designated cash, with an equal liability to customers on the other side. Again, this is money passing through the platform, not money belonging to shareholders. Even Horizon's cash flow statement needs a careful read: its year-end cash and cash equivalents balance of NIS 26.504 million looks large only because designated cash is included in that total.
That chart sharpens the difference between scale and shareholder economics. Horizon looks very large if one focuses on customer assets, but shareholders have a claim on equity, on profit after all accounting filters, and on dividends if and when those are paid. They do not have a claim on client wallets, and they do not have a claim on cash that is merely parked temporarily for customer transactions.
What Actually Reaches Tectona Owners, and What Still Does Not
The good news is that Horizon already proved in 2025 that it can generate not just narrative but actual profit and an upstream dividend. Tectona also says that as of the report date it does not expect to make additional investments in Horizon. That matters because the bridge from Horizon into Tectona now looks more like a conversion bridge, from operating economics into cash, than a bridge that still requires more capital injections.
But the filtering does not stop there. Even if Horizon pays cash up to Tectona, there is still another gate before that becomes shareholder cash. Tectona itself says it did not distribute dividends to its own shareholders in the two years preceding the report date, that it has no distributable profits, and that it has no dividend policy. So even cash that has already climbed from Horizon into Tectona is still not equivalent to cash that actually reaches Tectona shareholders.
That is where the control layer matters again. Tectona is not the controlling shareholder in Horizon, and Altshuler Shaham's golden share locks in 51% of the voting rights. So even if Horizon keeps improving as an operating platform, the path by which value is distributed upward will remain dependent not only on performance but also on the control structure and the associate's own distribution choices.
Bottom Line
Horizon is a real operating asset inside Tectona, but investors should not confuse the quality of the platform with the amount that actually reaches Tectona shareholders. In 2025 Horizon proved that it can generate profit and even send a dividend upstream. But after 40.93% ownership, Altshuler Shaham's golden-share control, purchase-accounting amortization, and a clear separation between customer assets and shareholder equity, what is left for Tectona shareholders is still much thinner than the platform's headline scale.
The path to making Horizon truly accessible value now runs through three tests: repeatable profitability, additional dividends that are not one-off events, and proof that growing platform activity really turns into cash retained at Tectona rather than just better-looking numbers inside an associate.
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