Globrands Group: Do Calir and the Reorganization Really Reduce Tobacco Dependence
Calir and the year-end reshuffle lifted the lifestyle segment to 12% of 2025 net sales, but NIS 130.6 million out of NIS 133.7 million of segment results still came from tobacco. The Globrands Trade and Development reorganization sets up a cleaner 2026 perimeter, but for now it creates more comparability noise than hard proof of reduced tobacco dependence.
What This Follow-Up Is Testing
The main article already made the core point: tobacco still pays the bills at Globrands, even after a better 2025 on cash flow. This continuation isolates the diversification claim. Did the Calir acquisition and the year-end reshuffle actually move the group away from tobacco dependence, or did they mostly broaden the story without yet changing the economics?
The short answer is only partially. Revenue mix is moving in the right direction. Profit mix is not, at least not yet. The lifestyle segment rose to 12.0% of 2025 net sales from 8.0% in 2024, but tobacco still generated NIS 130.6 million out of NIS 133.7 million of total segment results. So even after Calir, and even after the perimeter changes, the group’s earnings engine remains overwhelmingly tobacco.
That revenue chart matters, but the real point is the gap between sales mix and profit mix. On a sales basis, Globrands can already look more diversified than in the past. On a segment-result basis, it still does not. Tobacco represents 76.6% of net sales, but 97.7% of segment results. That is not deep diversification. It is, for now, a wider top line wrapped around the same core profit engine.
More Revenue Diversification, Barely Any Profit Diversification
The segment note gives the cleanest read. In 2025, net sales were NIS 601.1 million in tobacco, NIS 90.0 million in sweets and snacks, and NIS 93.8 million in lifestyle. That already looks less one-legged than before. But the segment-result line flips the story: NIS 130.6 million from tobacco, NIS 2.9 million from sweets and snacks, and only NIS 144 thousand from lifestyle.
That is the number that should drive the conclusion. 2025 does reduce tobacco dependence a bit on the revenue line. It does not reduce it meaningfully on the profit line. Put the two non-tobacco segments together and the group gets NIS 183.8 million of revenue, but only NIS 3.1 million of segment result. The company therefore looks more diversified to the eye, but hardly more diversified in the earnings base that actually funds the group.
Even versus 2024, the move needs to be kept in proportion. Tobacco’s share of net sales fell from 79.2% to 76.6%. That is real progress. But the lifestyle segment only moved from a NIS 623 thousand loss to a NIS 144 thousand profit. That is an improvement from slightly negative to roughly breakeven, not proof that a second profit pillar has already been built.
Calir Broadens The Platform, But 2025 Still Does Not Show A New Profit Engine
Calir only entered the group in the second half of the year. The agreement was signed on June 26, 2025, completed on July 22, 2025, and first consolidated from July 1, 2025. From an accounting perspective, this was not an aggressive deal. Total consideration was measured at NIS 38.671 million, including NIS 32.0 million in cash and NIS 6.671 million of contingent consideration at fair value on the acquisition date. Against that, Globrands recognized NIS 35.987 million of identifiable net assets and only NIS 2.684 million of goodwill.
| Calir acquisition item | Amount | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Cash consideration | NIS 32.0m | This is the main immediate cash outflow |
| Fair value of contingent consideration at acquisition | NIS 6.671m | The earnout is tied to average net profit and EBITDA across 2025 to 2027 |
| Fair value of contingent consideration at year-end 2025 | NIS 5.496m | The liability was already marked down by NIS 1.175m |
| Identifiable net assets acquired | NIS 35.987m | Most of the purchase price sits on identifiable assets rather than open-ended goodwill |
| Goodwill | NIS 2.684m | Only about 6.9% of total consideration |
| 2025 pro forma contribution | NIS 28.3m of revenue and NIS 2.1m of net profit | Even on a full-year basis, the group-level effect is still modest |
The implication is two-sided. On the one hand, there is strategic logic here. Globrands bought an existing medical platform with recognized customer relationships and a non-compete asset, not a deal built mainly on vague goodwill. On the other hand, the 2025 numbers still do not show a transaction that has already changed the economics of the group. Even on the company’s own pro forma view, as if Calir had been consolidated from January 1, 2025, consolidated revenue would have risen to NIS 3.729 billion from NIS 3.701 billion, and net profit would have risen to NIS 54.7 million from NIS 52.7 million. That is helpful, but it is not a center-of-gravity shift.
There is another non-obvious point inside the earnout. At acquisition, contingent consideration was measured at NIS 6.671 million. By year-end it had already fallen to NIS 5.496 million, and the group recognized NIS 1.175 million of finance income from that remeasurement. In other words, the first update in the deal moved in the buyer’s favor, not the sellers’. That does not automatically make the deal bad. It does mean that part of 2025’s support comes from acquisition accounting, not from fully proven operating economics.
What Actually Grew Inside The Lifestyle Segment
It is tempting to attribute the whole lifestyle jump to Calir. The filing itself shows that this would be too simplistic. There are three very different internal moves inside the segment, and only one of them is directly tied to disposable medical equipment.
| Component inside the 2025 lifestyle segment | Year-on-year change | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Disposable medical equipment through Calir | About 10% revenue decline | The main driver was the weaker dollar, while profitability was broadly unchanged |
| Medical cannabis logistics through N.D.N Security | About 84% growth in net revenue | A meaningful part of the segment growth came from new logistics customers |
| OTC medicines and pharma products | About 21% revenue growth | This activity was sold at year-end, so it is not a clean base for 2026 |
This is the heart of the issue. Calir adds a real healthcare foothold, but the disclosed operating datapoint for 2025 is actually a roughly 10% decline in disposable-medical-equipment revenue, mainly because of the weaker dollar. The filing also says most of Calir’s sales to health funds and hospitals are in dollars, and most of its purchases from overseas suppliers are also in dollars, which is why profitability did not change materially. In other words, Calir currently looks like a platform to build on, not like a profit engine that has already reached scale.
By contrast, other parts of the lifestyle segment also drove the 2025 growth. N.D.N Security posted sharp expansion in medical-cannabis logistics, and the OTC/pharma activity grew 21% even though it is no longer staying inside the group in the same form going into 2026. So the 54.9% growth in the lifestyle segment is real, but it is not a clean number that tells only the Calir story.
That chart matters because it shows how diversification can look stronger than it really is. Revenue has climbed sharply over three years, but the segment result only moved from a NIS 4.0 million loss in 2023, to a NIS 623 thousand loss in 2024, to a NIS 144 thousand profit in 2025. The segment’s economics are still basically hovering around breakeven.
Why The Lifestyle Segment Still Barely Earns Money
The segment note gives a direct explanation. In 2025, the lifestyle segment produced NIS 30.824 million of gross profit, but its selling and marketing expenses reached NIS 30.680 million. Nearly all of the gross profit was absorbed before the segment reached the result line. That is why segment result remained only NIS 144 thousand.
The numbers say something sharper than the headline. From 2024 to 2025, lifestyle gross profit rose by NIS 9.451 million. That is strong. But selling and marketing expense rose by NIS 8.684 million over the same period. So almost all of the incremental gross profit stayed inside the distribution, coverage and selling layer. Anyone looking for a real reduction in tobacco dependence therefore needs to look beyond sales growth and ask when that growth starts to survive below the line. In 2025, that moment still had not arrived.
That is also why the diversification question has to be asked through segment result, not just through revenue. In a distribution-and-procurement model, it is relatively easy to add a category, a supplier or a platform. It is much harder to turn that into durable segment profit. For now, lifestyle shows demand, activity and strategic logic. It does not yet show that it can take the burden of profit generation away from tobacco.
The Globrands Trade and Development Reorganization Cleans Up The Perimeter, But Breaks 2026 Comparability
In December 2025, Globrands made another move that matters almost as much as Calir, but in a very different way. It reached an agreement with its partner in Globrands Trade and Development so that, effective from year-end 2025, it acquired the remaining 49% at no consideration, sold the OTC-medicines activity to the partner for NIS 1 million together with part of the employees, part of the vehicles, and equipment and inventory at reduced cost, and retained the health-food, protein-bar and pharma-product activities inside the group.
That is where the 2026 comparability problem starts. Through the end of 2025, those activities still sat inside the lifestyle segment. From 2026 onward, the protein and pharma activities move into sweets and snacks, while the OTC-medicines activity is no longer part of the group. So the 2025 lifestyle segment is not a clean base for the 2026 lifestyle segment.
| Layer inside Globrands Trade and Development | Position in 2025 | Position from 2026 | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| OTC medicines | Part of lifestyle through year-end 2025 | Sold to the partner and out of the group | The 2025 base still contains activity that does not continue |
| Protein and pharma products | Inside lifestyle | Move into sweets and snacks | Segment boundaries change, so direct comparison breaks |
| Minority ownership | 51% with a Put/Call structure | 100% with no consideration | This simplifies the structure, but it is not new growth |
The yellow flag here is not only the structural move, but also the accounting price of cleaning it up. Goodwill in Globrands Trade and Development fell from NIS 2.445 million to NIS 914 thousand. Inside that, the company recorded roughly NIS 280 thousand of goodwill derecognition from the OTC sale, plus a NIS 1.251 million impairment. Together, that is a NIS 1.531 million write-down. That already says something important: an older diversification path was not just moved around. It was partly written down.
So the reorganization has logic, but it needs to be read properly. It does make the map cleaner going into 2026, which is positive. It clarifies what stays inside the healthcare and logistics platform and what moves into snacks. But it does not prove that Globrands has already built a real alternative earnings anchor to tobacco. In one sense, it says the opposite: to create a cleaner segment map, the group had to sell one activity, move another, and write down part of the goodwill tied to the old platform.
What Has To Happen In 2026 Before This Can Be Called A Real Reduction In Tobacco Dependence
2026 looks like a proof year here, not a verdict year. To argue that Calir and the reorganization genuinely reduce tobacco dependence, three things have to happen at the same time.
First, the newly defined lifestyle segment has to produce a real segment result, not another NIS 144 thousand. Second, sweets and snacks has to absorb the transferred protein and pharma lines without further margin erosion. Third, and most important, tobacco’s share of segment results has to fall visibly, not just its share of revenue.
If that happens, Calir can start to look like the beginning of economic diversification. If it does not, then 2025 will stand as a year in which Globrands broadened its non-tobacco story without actually replacing the earnings engine.
Conclusion
Calir and the reorganization are not cosmetic moves. There is real strategic logic in both. Calir adds a medical foothold, and the Globrands Trade and Development reshuffle tries to separate activities that never really formed one coherent platform. But in 2025 this is still mostly preparatory work.
The current thesis is that diversification improved in the upper frame, not at the profit core. The lifestyle segment is larger, but still barely profitable. Calir was acquired at a price that looks disciplined, but it has not yet changed group economics in a major way. And the reorganization sets up 2026 while also making 2025 a noisy comparison base.
That is why, as of year-end 2025, it is still hard to say that Globrands has truly reduced its tobacco dependence. What can be said is that the group is now building the conditions under which that claim can be tested seriously in 2026.
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