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Main analysis: Zur Shamir 2025: Insurance Carries the Story, Credit Costs More, and the Parent Still Cannot Freely Access the Value
ByMarch 31, 2026~8 min read

Zur Shamir: Adgar Between Flat Rent, One-Off Compensation, and FX and Cap-Rate Sensitivity

Adgar returned to profitability in 2025, but rent barely moved. Most of the improvement leaned on expropriation compensation, a shift from negative to positive revaluation, and a lighter financing burden, while the asset base remained highly sensitive to FX and cap rates.

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Profit Rebounded, But Not Because Rent Took Off

The main article already argued that Adgar stopped being the drag it was in 2024. This follow-up isolates the more important question: how much of the 2025 improvement really came from the rental engine, and how much came from one-off compensation, valuation, and financial sensitivity that simply looked better this year. The answer is fairly sharp. Rent barely moved, while profit jumped for other reasons.

Rental income reached about NIS 338.3 million in 2025 versus about NIS 338.0 million a year earlier. That is an increase of only about NIS 0.3 million, while segment profit before tax jumped from a loss of about NIS 7.7 million to a profit of about NIS 156.5 million, and segment comprehensive profit before tax moved from a loss of about NIS 81.9 million to a profit of about NIS 124.2 million. In other words, anyone reading only the profit line could conclude that Adgar's operating engine came back strongly. That is not what the numbers say.

There is also a positive side, but it needs the right scale. The company explains that changes in average exchange rates reduced rental income by about NIS 11 million. On a constant-currency basis, rent did rise by about NIS 11 million, mainly because of Brain Embassy growth and occupancy improvement in Poland, together with CPI-linked uplift in Israel and Poland. But even after that adjustment, this is still only a modest operating improvement. It is nowhere near large enough to explain the full swing from loss to profit. On top of that, fourth-quarter reported rental income actually declined by NIS 4 million versus the comparable quarter, mainly because of FX.

Adgar: rent barely changed even while profit jumped

That chart is the right starting point. There is some real operating improvement inside recurring revenue, but it is far smaller than the improvement in the headline profit. So the right read on Adgar in 2025 is not "the rent engine is back." It is "the picture looks much better, but not for that reason."

What Actually Did Most of the Work

The segment bridge explains very clearly why 2025 looks so strong. Revaluation moved from a loss of about NIS 72.1 million in 2024 to a gain of about NIS 4.6 million in 2025. Other income, which did not exist in the prior year, added about NIS 66.8 million. Net investment income improved by NIS 20.1 million, and finance expense fell by NIS 5.0 million. On the other side, maintenance and G&A together actually rose by NIS 4.6 million. So even at the internal line-item level, the improvement came first from valuation, compensation, and financing, not from a sharp efficiency reset or a surge in rent.

Adgar: what really turned 2024 into a loss and 2025 into a profit

The clearest one-off trigger is the Canadian expropriation event. Adgar had already received initial compensation for Fraser 7 in 2023. After the balance-sheet date, and following a late-December 2025 understanding, a final settlement was signed on 21 January 2026 for additional compensation including interest of about CAD 69.4 million, equal to about NIS 161 million, of which Adgar's share was about NIS 80 million. The amount was paid at the end of January 2026. Yet the 2025 income statement had already booked about NIS 66.8 million as expropriation income and another about NIS 12.8 million as interest income. In other words, close to NIS 80 million of Adgar's improvement is tied to a Canadian expropriation thread, not to a rental engine that suddenly accelerated.

Revaluation also tells a more mixed story than a simple headline suggests. The table in the report shows Israel contributing about NIS 1.4 million and Poland about NIS 9.5 million, mainly because of higher income, while Canada reduced value by about NIS 3.5 million, mainly because of lower average occupancy and a lower value for residential development rights, and Belgium reduced another about NIS 2.8 million. So even in a year when revaluation turned positive overall, Canada still showed up as a weak point rather than a clean recovery engine.

There is another point the market could easily miss in the cost base. Total maintenance, G&A, and related costs rose to about NIS 111 million from about NIS 106 million a year earlier, mainly because of higher salaries and bonuses. That means the profit jump did not rest on a dramatically improved cost platform. On the contrary, part of the operating picture still became more expensive.

FX and Cap-Rate Sensitivity Are Still Very Real

Anyone focusing only on the profit bridge can miss what happened on the balance sheet. In 2025 the euro fell by about 1.3% and the Canadian dollar by about 8.2%, and those moves cut about NIS 147 million from the investment-property and investment-property-under-construction line. That number is far larger than the positive revaluation line for the whole year. So even while segment profit improved, the asset base itself remained highly sensitive to FX.

There is an important nuance here. On the financing side the company recorded about NIS 26 million of finance income from FX differences and hedging transactions, alongside about NIS 13 million of finance income related to the additional expropriation compensation. That is why the finance line does not show a collapse. But that is exactly the point: hedges and finance income can soften the P&L, yet they do not erase the sensitivity of the property base itself.

The same is true for cap rates. The company states explicitly that a 0.25% increase in the discount rate across Adgar's assets in all countries would reduce Adgar's equity by about NIS 138 million. That is not some remote tail case. It is a reminder that 2025 improved on top of assets whose value can still move sharply with the risk-free rate and broader market conditions.

The liquidity context reinforces the cautious read. In the group resource-flow appendix, Adgar ends 2025 with about NIS 491.2 million of liquid resources against about NIS 3.593 billion of financial debt, which means a net liquid-resource deficit of about NIS 3.102 billion. That is better than the roughly NIS 3.348 billion deficit at the start of the year, but it is still a heavily levered real-estate platform. So value created through compensation, revaluation, or development rights is not the same thing as accessible value.

CheckpointNumberWhy it matters
FX hit to investment propertyabout NIS 147 millionFX erased more than the year's positive revaluation added
0.25% increase in discount ratesabout NIS 138 million equity reductionAsset values remain sensitive to rates and market pricing
Adgar net liquid position at year-end 2025deficit of about NIS 3.102 billionEven after a better year, structural leverage remains heavy
Finance income from FX differences and hedgesabout NIS 26 millionThe P&L got accounting relief, but asset sensitivity did not disappear

Development Rights Are Optionality, Not a Substitute for Today's Rent

The upside Adgar presents is not fictional, but it is not current NOI either. The report details development rights across assets in Israel, Canada, and Poland, and then adds that at Bloor 120 in Toronto the company is pursuing additional residential or office rights in a range of 63.7 thousand to 106.6 thousand square meters on Adgar's 50% share basis. That is real optionality.

The problem is that the company also explains why investors should not treat it as cash flow already on the way. In the Liberty Village note, it says Adgar has not yet submitted permit applications and that the scope of rights is based on appraiser estimates. Immediately after that, the report labels the entire development-rights upside as forward-looking information that depends, among other things, on exchange rates, interest rates, the global economy, development completion, occupancy, and lease terms.

That also connects directly back to Canada. The same geography that produced the one-off compensation is also where revaluation was hurt by lower occupancy and a lower value for residential development rights. So this is not a simple story of "Canada gave both compensation and upside." It is a story of assets that carry real embedded value, but also real execution, occupancy, rate, and FX sensitivity.

What Needs To Be Measured Now

If investors want to know whether Adgar is really moving from a year of accounting relief into a year of operating recovery, four checkpoints matter:

  • Rental income has to start rising in reported numbers, not only on a constant-currency basis.
  • Canada has to stop being the place where weak occupancy and weaker development-right values weigh on revaluation.
  • 2026 profit needs to lean less on compensation, interest income, and revaluation, and more on stable recurring NOI.
  • Development rights need to progress into permits, development, or monetization. Otherwise they will remain optionality that the market discounts cautiously.

Bottom line: Adgar looks better in 2025 than it did in 2024, but not because rent suddenly accelerated. It looks better because a large one-off compensation item came in, revaluation moved to the positive side, and financing lines got help. That is real relief, but it is still not proof that the rental engine has fully taken over the story again.

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