From Project Surplus to Cash: Reik Aspan’s Real Test
Shir Tower and Hahula look like large pools of value on paper, but Reik Aspan’s own 2026 liquidity forecast assumes only NIS 50.09 million of surplus release, and even that sits inside a cash bridge already burdened by finance expense, debt service, and fresh equity needs. The real test is not projected surplus size but how much of it reaches company-level cash on time.
Project Surplus Is Not Yet Free Cash
The main article established that Reik Aspan’s problem is no longer only a balance-sheet problem. Equity was repaired, earnings turned positive, and the two core projects are advancing. This continuation isolates the link that now decides whether that repair is truly worth something at company level: how surplus from Shir Tower and Hahula is supposed to leave the project-finance accounts, pass through the debt layer, and become cash the company can actually use.
This is the easiest place to overread the story. At the end of 2025 the company showed NIS 127.4 million of expected withdrawable surplus across the two active projects. But the company’s own report shows that only NIS 50.09 million of that amount is expected to be released in 2026. The remaining NIS 77.3 million is pushed into 2027. So even if the monitoring reports prove accurate, most of the visible surplus is not expected to arrive in the year when the liquidity test is still the tightest.
Project surplus, then, is not the same thing as free cash. The company’s right to receive those funds is subordinated first to the project lender being repaid in full under the financing agreement. Beyond that, the right to receive released surplus has already been assigned to the trustee for Series A bondholders. In practice, the move from project surplus to debt service and only then to free company cash is a gated process, not a straight line.
| Project | Expected withdrawable surplus at the report date | 2026 | 2027 | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shir Tower Netivot | NIS 58.9 million | NIS 28.3 million | NIS 30.7 million | Even in the more advanced project, almost half the surplus remains back-end loaded into 2027 |
| Hahula Ramat Gan | NIS 68.5 million | NIS 21.8 million | NIS 46.7 million | Most of the cash still depends on delivery and final release steps in 2027 |
| Total | NIS 127.4 million | NIS 50.09 million | NIS 77.3 million | Only about 39% of the remaining year-end surplus is expected to arrive in 2026 |
The Cash Already on the Balance Sheet Is Not Fully Free Either
That matters because year-end cash was not especially clean to begin with. At December 31, 2025, the company had NIS 27.7 million of cash and cash equivalents, but also NIS 40.5 million of restricted deposits. Of those restricted balances, NIS 39.1 million sat inside project-finance accounts, mainly NIS 37.8 million in Hahula and another NIS 1.3 million in Netivot. So even before future surplus enters the picture, most cash-like liquidity is already tied to lenders and project-level controls.
That gap is why project surplus cannot be judged by reading the cash line alone. The company ended the year with NIS 368.9 million of current assets against NIS 645.5 million of current liabilities, a working-capital deficit of about NIS 277 million. In the background, 2025 operating cash flow was negative NIS 79.7 million. The question, then, is not whether there is economic value inside the two projects. There is. The question is how much of that value is actually free, and how much remains trapped inside the financing, collateral, and debt structure.
The 2026 Forecast Says Something Simple: Surplus Is Plugging Gaps, Not Creating Comfort
This is the core of the continuation. The company’s projected 2026 cash flow includes NIS 50.09 million of surplus release from Hahula and Shir Tower. On the surface that looks like a turning point. In reality, the same forecast also carries NIS 33.69 million of finance expense, NIS 7.5 million of HQ expense, and NIS 25.82 million of equity investment into other projects. Against that, the company includes supporting inflows of NIS 17.5 million of combination-deal advances, NIS 4.36 million of reimbursement tied to Shderot Hayeled, NIS 2 million of pledged-deposit release, and NIS 0.9 million of financing-cost participation.
Put that operating bridge together, and the NIS 50.09 million of surplus release does not create a NIS 50 million jump in free company cash. It mainly pulls the operating bucket into only mildly positive territory, roughly NIS 7.9 million. That is not a cash opening. It is breathing room.
And that is only half the picture. In the same 2026 forecast, the company assumes NIS 38.98 million of Series A and Series B bond repayments, a NIS 10 million refund tied to the Nitzanei Oz option, NIS 22.75 million of repayments to others, and NIS 99.56 million of land purchases. On the other side, it relies on NIS 93.55 million of credit secured by land, NIS 60.05 million of new non-bank borrowing, and NIS 18.61 million of proceeds tied to the Ashdod CBD cancellation. So even under the company’s own scenario, 2026 ends with NIS 36.57 million of cash, not with a suddenly abundant cash position created by successful delivery alone.
That is the real point. The NIS 50.09 million does not arrive in an empty system. It enters a structure already carrying high finance expense, fresh project equity needs, and near-term debt service. So the right question is not whether project surplus exists. The right question is whether it arrives early enough to reduce bridge funding and reduce the need to pledge the next generation of project surplus as well.
February’s Delivery Update Does Not Just Delay Handover, It Delays the Cash Bridge
The February 25, 2026 immediate report used calming language. The contractor carried out additional checks on the planned delivery dates for Shir Tower and Hahula, and the company wrote that if delays occur they are not expected to be significant and that, at this stage, no material financial effect is expected. That wording matters, but in the context of the cash bridge it is less reassuring than it sounds.
The issue is not only the size of a delay. It is where the delay lands on the calendar. Once the annual report itself builds 2026 around NIS 50.09 million of surplus release from those two projects, any shift in delivery timing or release approval can move cash between quarters in exactly the year when the company has to pay 30% of Series A principal and 7.5% of Series B principal. So even a delay the company describes as non-material can still matter a great deal for the liquidity read.
The strongest proof of that sits inside the same reporting package. The company says that in March 2026 one of the lenders approved the release of NIS 21.8 million from the project-finance account for the June 30, 2026 principal and interest payment on Series A. That is good evidence because it shows the release mechanism is beginning to work. But it also sharpens the real point: a post-balance-sheet release that is already disclosed is earmarked for debt service. It is not cash landing freely at company level.
Bottom Line
The surplus in Shir Tower and Hahula is real, and it is probably the core of Reik Aspan’s chance to move through 2026 without another liquidity event. But anyone reading the tables as if NIS 127.4 million of expected surplus equals NIS 127.4 million of accessible company cash is missing the story.
The company’s own report says something much narrower and much more useful. In 2026 only NIS 50.09 million is expected to be released. The right to receive that money is subordinated first to the project lenders and already pledged to the Series A trustee. At the same time, most of the cash-like balances at the end of 2025 were already restricted, and the projected cash flow does not show comfort. It shows tightly managed sources and uses.
So the 2026 test is not whether the projects contain surplus. It is whether Reik Aspan can turn that surplus into company-level cash fast enough to service debt, fund the next stage, and reduce dependence on new borrowing against future surplus. If that happens, the main thesis strengthens. If not, the company will still have impressive project-level surplus on paper, but not a real cash bridge.
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