Pulsenmore: What really remains of 2025 after stripping out GE
Pulsenmore’s 2025 headline was built almost entirely on the GE settlement: NIS 30.54 million out of NIS 40.0 million of revenue, and almost all of the improvement in gross profit and operating loss. Strip that out and the ongoing business is left near the same loss point, with a small and highly concentrated revenue base.
What This Follow-Up Is Isolating
The main article already made the central point: the 2025 headline ran through GE, and the real test sits somewhere else. This follow-up narrows the lens even further. It is not asking what happened to the whole company. It is asking what remains in revenue, gross profit, and operating loss once the GE layer is removed.
That distinction is not cosmetic. Without it, 2025 can look like a commercial breakout year. With it, the picture changes sharply: ongoing revenue barely grew, ongoing gross profit actually weakened, and the core operating loss stayed almost exactly where it was in 2024.
| Line | 2024 reported | 2025 reported | 2025 excluding GE | What it really says |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | NIS 9.7m | NIS 40.0m | NIS 9.5m | The operating base barely moved |
| Gross profit | NIS 3.6m | NIS 33.7m | NIS 3.1m | Almost all of the reported jump came from the settlement |
| Gross margin | 37.0% | 84.2% | 33.1% | Below 2024, not above it |
| Operating loss | NIS 42.2m loss | NIS 12.2m loss | NIS 42.7m loss | The core business did not climb out of the hole |
The one number that captures the whole story is NIS 30.54 million. That is what the company recognized in 2025 as revenue from the GE settlement, and it alone equals 76.3% of total reported revenue for the year. So every serious read of 2025 has to begin with one question: what exactly is sitting inside that number.
What Actually Entered 2025 Through GE
The easy mistake is to treat the entire NIS 30.54 million as a plain commercial compensation payment. That is wrong. The filing shows that two very different things were pushed through the same line.
The first layer: NIS 7.1 million was recognized as revenue from the resolution of the cancelled orders for 15,000 units and from the termination of the component agreement. Under the August 6, 2025 settlement, all disputes around the cancelled orders and disputed components were resolved, GE agreed to pay the company $1 million, the disputed orders were fully cancelled, and the company was not required to return the advance it had received in 2022 or transfer the purchased components to GE. That is already non-recurring revenue, but it still relates to a concrete commercial dispute.
The second layer, and the more important one: NIS 23.392 million was recognized as revenue because after the settlement the company concluded that no performance obligations remained open toward GE. The contract liability still sitting on the balance sheet was therefore released in one step into the income statement. In plain terms, 2025 did not just receive settlement revenue. It also pulled an old deferred-revenue layer, mostly created back in 2022, straight into current-year revenue.
The non-obvious datapoint sits in the backward comparison. When the original GE deal was signed in 2022, the company allocated NIS 23.457 million of the investment proceeds to a customer contract liability under the distribution agreement. By the time of the 2025 settlement, NIS 23.392 million of that balance was released into revenue. In other words, almost the entire original layer, roughly 99.7%, was still on the balance sheet until the company decided that no performance obligations remained. That does not look like 2025 sales. It looks like the opening of a balance-sheet layer created earlier.
That matters enormously for how 2025 should be read. If NIS 23.4 million of the year’s revenue came from releasing a contract liability, it cannot be read as evidence that product demand exploded in 2025. And if another NIS 7.1 million came from closing out cancelled orders and a terminated component arrangement, that cannot be read as recurring operating revenue either.
What Remains in the Ongoing Business
Once GE is stripped out, Pulsenmore’s 2025 revenue falls to NIS 9.484 million. That is not only far below the reported NIS 40.024 million headline. It is also slightly below the NIS 9.661 million recorded in 2024. In other words, beneath the accounting noise, the operating base actually declined by 1.8%.
The second key point is even sharper at the gross-profit line. Reported gross profit in 2025 was NIS 33.682 million, but once the GE component is removed and only ongoing revenue remains, underlying gross profit is just NIS 3.142 million. That is below the NIS 3.577 million gross profit of 2024, and it pulls underlying gross margin down to 33.1% from 37.0% a year earlier.
That bridge explains why the 2025 operating line looks so much better, and why it says so little about the core business. Reported operating loss improved from NIS 42.215 million to NIS 12.164 million. But if the GE component is taken out, 2025 operating loss comes to NIS 42.704 million. In other words, the core business was actually slightly weaker, roughly NIS 0.5 million worse than 2024.
This is the center of the follow-up thesis. The settlement did not just improve the operating line. It almost replaced it. The reduction in R&D expense, NIS 2.78 million, helped. But higher sales and marketing expense, up NIS 1.497 million, higher G&A, up NIS 1.337 million, and a small rise in cost of revenue absorbed much of that benefit. Without GE, this is not the profile of a company that achieved an operating breakthrough in 2025.
What Really Remains After GE Is Removed
The filing also gives a clear answer to what the revenue base looks like after the settlement. The 2025 geographic revenue split is presented explicitly excluding GE: NIS 9.087 million in Israel, NIS 188 thousand in Europe, and NIS 209 thousand in the “Other” category. That means that once the headline is peeled back, 95.8% of ongoing revenue still comes from Israel, while only NIS 397 thousand comes from outside Israel.
There is a second layer inside that. Out of the revenue generated in Israel, NIS 8.818 million came from Clalit. That means almost 93% of the entire ongoing 2025 revenue base rested on one customer. The point here is not to reopen the broader concentration discussion. The point is that once GE is removed, 2025 does not reveal a new international engine already standing on its own feet. It reveals a small, local, and highly concentrated operating base.
That is also why the NIS 23.392 million line matters even more than the NIS 30.54 million headline. Once the company concluded that no performance obligations remained, it effectively said that the historical agreement layer would no longer function as a bridge to future revenue. GE did retain non-exclusive distribution rights for the ES pregnancy product in the U.S. and Europe until June 2029 unless extended, but it gave up the favorite pricing mechanism and has no further obligation to place future orders. The company itself states that after the settlement the exercise of GE’s remaining distribution rights became remote. So the NIS 23.4 million released in 2025 is not backlog. It is mainly a table-clearing event.
Why This Changes the Reading of 2025
None of this means the GE settlement was not real. It was very real, and it reshaped both the balance sheet reading and the way 2025 looks. But it did so through two mechanisms that should not be dressed up as ongoing economics: a dispute resolution that generated NIS 7.1 million of revenue, and an almost full release of an old contract-liability layer that added another NIS 23.392 million.
That is why 2025 is not a clean commercialization year. It is an accounting reset year for the GE relationship inside the income statement. Anyone looking only at revenue sees growth of more than 300%. Anyone unpacking the filing sees an operating base that barely moved, an underlying gross margin that actually fell, and a core operating loss that stayed almost where it was.
In that sense, this follow-up does not change the main thesis. It sharpens it. 2025 did not solve the economics of Pulsenmore. It mainly closed an old account with GE, and in the same move it erased the ability to treat the contract-liability balance as a bridge to future revenue. What remains after that release is a business that still has to prove real revenue growth, real international expansion, and a real decline in operating loss.
Bottom Line
Once GE is stripped out, Pulsenmore does not exit 2025 with a larger or more profitable business. It exits with roughly the same ongoing revenue base, weaker underlying gross profit, and a core operating loss still sitting around NIS 43 million.
That is the difference between reported outcome and operating economics. The reported 2025 result looks like a jump. The ongoing 2025 economics look like a bridge year that still has not passed the proof test. The GE settlement resolved a dispute, released an old deferred-revenue layer, and cleared performance obligations. It did not yet provide a new operating base that can carry the 2026 read.
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