Temis and Mey Eden: How Much Cash Can Really Reach the Parent
Mey Eden generated ILS 70.2 million of operating cash flow in 2025, but after investment, leases, interest, and bank credit, the cash balance rose by only ILS 4.3 million. This follow-up shows why management fees are currently the only clearly visible upstream route, and why even that route is still smaller than Temis's near-term needs.
Where The Ladder Starts
The main article argued that Temis's bottleneck is not demand at Mey Eden. It is access to value. This follow-up takes that argument one layer deeper and breaks down the cash ladder itself: how much cash Mey Eden actually generated, how much of it was absorbed before the shareholder layer, and what can realistically move up to Temis.
Three findings matter most here. First: ILS 70.2 million of operating cash flow at Mey Eden is nowhere near the same thing as ILS 70.2 million of distributable cash. Second: the only route the 2025 filings explicitly quantify as moving value upward is management fees, not an ordinary dividend. Third: even that route still looked at year-end more like a claim Temis had on Mey Eden than cash already sitting in the parent's account.
That is a material distinction. Mey Eden clearly improved operationally, and the filings do support that. But in a holding company the key question is not how much cash is created at the operating layer. It is how much survives leases, credit, investment needs, shared control, and financing documents, and only then becomes cash that really belongs to the listed parent.
What Remains After Investment, Leases, And Financing
To answer that question properly, the right framing here is all-in cash flexibility rather than a normalized cash view. The filings do not disclose maintenance CAPEX separately, so there is no clean way to claim what recurring cash would have remained before discretionary uses. What the filings do show clearly is how much cash remained after the actual uses of cash in 2025.
That chart is the core of the read. Mey Eden ended 2025 with ILS 70.2 million of operating cash flow after tax, but after ILS 35.7 million used in investing activity and ILS 30.3 million used in financing activity, the cash balance increased by only ILS 4.3 million to ILS 6.3 million. On a simple 50% economic look-through, that annual cash build is roughly ILS 2.1 million for Temis's share, even before contractual restrictions and shared-control frictions.
That number matters more than the headline operating cash flow because it shows where the cash stopped. The investing layer absorbed ILS 35.7 million, almost entirely for property, plant, and equipment. The financing layer absorbed another ILS 30.3 million. So even in a year when the business worked better, most of the cash stayed inside Mey Eden's own equipment base, liabilities, and funding structure.
The financing layer makes the picture even clearer. ILS 23.9 million went to lease principal, ILS 5.5 million to interest paid, and another ILS 0.9 million to a reduction in short-term bank debt. That is almost the entire financing cash outflow for the year. The lease note adds another key point: payments against lease liabilities were ILS 30.2 million, and lease liabilities still stood at ILS 98.3 million at year-end, including ILS 22.0 million current.
That is why it is wrong to read ILS 70.2 million as free cash available for distribution. Leases sit ahead of Temis. Investment needs sit ahead of Temis. The interest and bank layer sit ahead of Temis. Strong operating cash flow at Mey Eden is therefore necessary, but still far from sufficient, for cash that can actually move to the parent.
| Step In The Ladder | 2025 | What It Means In Practice |
|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow after tax at Mey Eden | ILS 70.2 million | The business did generate strong operating cash |
| Net investing activity | ILS 35.7 million | A large part of the cash went straight back into assets |
| Net financing activity | ILS 30.3 million | Most of the outflow here is leases, interest, and short-term credit |
| Year-end cash at Mey Eden | ILS 6.3 million | There is no large idle cash pile waiting to be distributed |
| 50% look-through view of annual cash build | About ILS 2.1 million | This is the economic order of magnitude before further restrictions |
The Bank, The Security Package, And The Partner Sit Ahead Of Temis
Anyone thinking about dividends or upstream access has to stop first at Mey Eden's financing layer. The company has a bank credit framework of ILS 110 million at prime plus 1.05%, and its year-end bank credit balance was ILS 53.1 million. The bank holds a pledge over Tempo receipts from the retail activity and a floating charge over Mey Eden's assets, and the credit is repayable immediately upon the bank's demand.
That is not a technical footnote. Retail receipts are one of Mey Eden's main cash engines, and once they are pledged to the bank, not every shekel entering the company can be treated as free cash available to move upstairs. Put simply, part of the money generated by the core brand is already tied up inside the secured operating funding layer.
The ownership layer is not free either. The shareholders' agreement between Temis and Golden gives each side equal board representation at Mey Eden and requires at least a 75% majority for certain matters, including capital-related changes, related-party transactions, and Mey Eden financing. The same agreement also governs profit-distribution policy and the way management fees are paid. That means more than just having a partner. It means Temis cannot decide on its own how quickly cash moves upward.
Above all of that sits Temis's own acquisition debt. Temis's share of the loan stands at ILS 52.9 million, of which ILS 5.249 million is current and ILS 47.632 million is non-current. The borrowers undertook not to transfer or distribute amounts out of distribution proceeds or out of the borrowers' account, except for permitted management fees, and not to pay dividends or other payments sourced from those distribution proceeds. That is one of the most important lines in the whole filing set, because it explains why management fees are an explicit exception while an ordinary dividend route looks much tighter.
| Layer | Disclosed Restriction | Why It Comes Before Temis Cash |
|---|---|---|
| Mey Eden versus the bank | Pledge over Tempo receipts, floating charge, credit payable on demand | Operating cash first sits against secured funding |
| Temis versus Golden | Shared control and 75% majority on capital, financing, and related-party matters | Even if value exists, Temis cannot move it alone |
| Temis versus acquisition lender | No transfer or distribution from distribution proceeds except permitted management fees | The dividend route is tighter than the fee route |
What Actually Managed To Move Up In 2025
This is where the most interesting detail appears. Mey Eden's related-party note shows a 2025 expense of ILS 5 million for management fees to shareholders. On the Temis side, the filings show exactly ILS 2.5 million of management-fee income from an associate. Then, on March 11, 2026, Temis, Golden, and Mey Eden signed a management-services agreement at 2% of Mey Eden sales revenues and/or capital gains starting in 2026, and the same note states that management fees for 2025 amounted to ILS 5 million, or ILS 2.5 million per side.
The meaning is clear. The only route the 2025 filings explicitly quantify as moving value upward is management fees. Not an ordinary profit distribution, not a one-off extraction, but a contractual mechanism that also gets an explicit carve-out in Temis's financing documents.
But this is also where the yellow flag appears. At year-end, Temis still carried management fees receivable from an associate of ILS 2.5 million. So as of December 31, 2025, Temis's share of that upstream route still looked like a receivable, not proof of cash already collected at parent level. That does not mean the cash will not arrive. It does mean the 2025 filings still provide more proof of mechanism than proof of cash in hand.
That chart captures the gap in one glance. Even if you assume the ILS 2.5 million management-fee receivable is fully collected, it is still smaller than the current portion of Temis's acquisition loan. So the first identified upstream route matters, but it is still not large enough on its own to change the parent-level picture.
This is also the point where it helps to be precise about what it means to say that cash "can reach the parent." Yes, it can. The filings clearly show a mechanism, an expense at Mey Eden, and a matching income line at Temis. But as of year-end 2025, the real question is not whether a pipe exists. The question is how wide it is, how fast it fills, and how much remains after every lower layer takes its share first.
Conclusion
The right number to start from is not ILS 70.2 million. It is ILS 4.3 million. That is how much Mey Eden's cash balance increased in 2025 after the actual uses of cash. From there, any cash still has to move through a bank that holds security over core receipts, through a lease layer of ILS 98.3 million, through shared control, and through financing documents that explicitly carve out management fees but do not open a free dividend channel.
That leads to the sharper conclusion on Temis. As of year-end 2025, Mey Eden already looks like an improved operating asset, but the cash ladder to the parent is still narrow. What actually moved upward is mostly the management-fee mechanism, and even there Temis ended the year with a receivable of ILS 2.5 million rather than equivalent proof of cash already landed.
Current thesis in one line: cash is being created at Mey Eden, but only a small fraction of it is so far surviving all the way to the floor where Temis shareholders sit.
What has to change for that reading to improve is not another brand story and not another accounting gain. The market needs to see at least one of three things: Mey Eden consistently retaining surplus cash after leases, interest, and investment; management fees turning from a contractual claim into cash actually collected by Temis; or a broader upstream route emerging without running into the bank, the lender, or the partner.
If that happens, the gap between economic value and accessible value will start to close. If it does not, Temis will remain, even after a better operating year, a listed holding company with a good asset underneath and a cash ladder that is still too narrow above it.
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