Pulsenmore: How long can the balance sheet fund the U.S. push
This follow-up isolates Pulsenmore's funding question after 2025: year-end cash and short-term deposits stood at NIS 69.1 million, roughly equal to about two years of 2025-style liquidity erosion. The problem is that this cushion comes after a year that looked much stronger in the income statement than it did in cash.
Where The Main Article Stopped, And What This Follow-Up Is Isolating
The main article already showed that 2025 looked stronger in reported revenue and profit than it did in commercialization quality. This follow-up isolates only the funding layer: how long the balance sheet can really carry the U.S. push once the one-off noise from the GE settlement is stripped out.
The short answer is roughly two years on the 2025 cash profile, without much extra room beyond that. At the end of 2025 Pulsenmore had NIS 21.6 million of cash and cash equivalents and another NIS 47.5 million of short-term bank deposits, or NIS 69.1 million of immediate liquidity. Against that stood negative operating cash flow of NIS 32.9 million, and on a wider all-in view a NIS 34.9 million decline in cash plus short-term deposits versus the end of 2024.
This is not a cliff-edge reading. The company itself says its cash, cash equivalents, short-term deposits and anticipated operating cash flow should be sufficient for at least the 12 months following the report date. But this is also not a balance sheet that allows anyone to pretend commercialization is already self-funding. As of year-end 2025, the runway still depends mainly on what is already sitting on the balance sheet.
| Frame | NIS m | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Cash and cash equivalents at end-2025 | 21.6 | The immediately available liquidity layer |
| Short-term bank deposits at end-2025 | 47.5 | Additional cushion, but one that shrank during the year |
| Total cash and short-term deposits | 69.1 | The current funding base |
| 2025 operating cash flow | (32.9) | The operating cash-burn rate |
| Decline in cash plus deposits versus end-2024 | (34.9) | The broader all-in liquidity picture after actual cash uses |
Those figures imply a little more than 24 months of mechanical runway. But that is only the starting point. 2025 was unusually favorable at the revenue-recognition level, and that unusual support barely helped liquidity. So the key question is not whether there is cash. There is. The key question is how free that cash really is once working capital, leases and the IIA royalty layer are read through properly.
Why The Better Income Statement Hardly Became Cash
This is where the headline and the balance sheet part ways. Pulsenmore ended 2025 with total revenue of NIS 40.0 million, but NIS 30.5 million of that came from the GE settlement. That is exactly why the year looks much stronger in the filing than it does in the liquidity chart.
The split inside that amount matters. NIS 7.1 million was recognized from the cancellation of the 15,000-unit order and the termination of the component agreement. Another NIS 23.4 million was recognized after the company concluded that no performance obligations remained under the GE arrangement and released the remaining contract liability into revenue. That is real accounting income, but it is not a recurring cash engine.
At the same time, the cash flow appendix shows contract liabilities falling by NIS 27.1 million in 2025. In other words, a large part of the settlement-related revenue did not bring fresh cash into the company in 2025. It released an old contractual layer that had been sitting on the balance sheet. The bottom line is sharp: despite a year that looks much better in reported revenue, operating cash flow was still negative NIS 32.9 million and total liquidity fell by NIS 34.9 million.
There is also a strategic implication here, not only an accounting one. After the settlement there were no outstanding GE purchase orders left, and GE no longer has any obligation to place future orders. So 2025 did not just create a one-off revenue tailwind. It also closed a channel that had previously been expected to support part of the commercialization path. From here, the U.S. push has to be funded by existing balance-sheet resources and new sales, not by the tail of an old commitment.
| Layer | NIS m | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Product revenue in 2025 | 9.5 | This is the year's ongoing sales base |
| Revenue from the GE settlement | 30.5 | A one-off uplift, not a recurring engine |
| Of that, revenue from releasing the remaining contract liability | 23.4 | Not fresh cash collected during 2025 |
| Decline in contract liabilities in the cash flow appendix | 27.1 | A working-capital layer that pulled cash out |
That is the center of the story. Look only at the revenue line and 2025 resembles a successful bridge year. Look at the cash line and the balance sheet was still funding the business far more than the business was funding itself.
The Inventory Did Not Disappear, It Mostly Moved Out Of Current Assets
Another place where the balance sheet looks cleaner than the underlying economics is inventory. At first glance current inventory seems to collapse from NIS 23.1 million to NIS 6.6 million, which could look like a sharp working-capital release. In reality, most of that change did not come from turning inventory into cash. It came from a reclassification.
In 2025 the company reclassified NIS 11.753 million of raw materials and another NIS 1.584 million of finished goods, together NIS 13.337 million, from current inventory into non-current inventory. That is why total inventory fell only to NIS 19.93 million from NIS 23.09 million, a decline of just NIS 3.16 million. In other words, more than two-thirds of end-2025 inventory no longer sits in the current line, but it also still has not turned into cash.
That is critical for the funding read. End-2025 total inventory, NIS 19.93 million, was more than twice the year's product revenue of NIS 9.484 million. Even non-current inventory alone, NIS 13.337 million, was larger than 2025 product revenue. So the balance sheet is not telling a story of working capital that has already been monetized successfully. It is telling a story of inventory that management expects to realize over a longer period.
That does not make the inventory inherently problematic. But it does mean the U.S. push still has to convert this asset layer into sales and cash, not just carry it as a strategic resource on the balance sheet. Until that happens, the decline in current inventory flatters the current-asset line much more than it genuinely eases the runway question.
Even After Inventory, Other Layers Still Sit On The Cash
Two more layers define the real runway, even if they are smaller than inventory itself.
The first is leases. At the end of 2025 fixed lease obligations stood at NIS 1.6 million, of which NIS 1.0 million is payable within 12 months. In actual cash flow, 2025 already included NIS 1.177 million of lease principal and another NIS 165 thousand of lease interest, together NIS 1.342 million of lease-related cash use. That is not a thesis-breaking number, but it does narrow the room for error.
The second, and more important, layer is the IIA. Over the years the company received royalty-bearing development grants, and in 2025 it also received an additional NIS 3.65 million of grants. Against that, the recognized royalty liability at end-2025 stood at NIS 9.591 million, up from NIS 7.029 million a year earlier, while the maximum possible royalty amount had already reached NIS 15.626 million. In 2025 the company also paid NIS 397 thousand to the IIA in cash.
| Layer | NIS m | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed lease obligations at end-2025 | 1.6 | Of that, 1.0 is due within 12 months |
| Lease-related cash flow in 2025 | 1.34 | Actual principal and interest cash use |
| Recognized royalty liability to the IIA | 9.59 | A present-value liability already on the balance sheet |
| Maximum possible royalty exposure to the IIA | 15.63 | The contractual ceiling before looking at timing |
What matters here is that this liability does not run against the commercialization thesis. It travels with it. IIA royalties are calculated as a percentage of sales from products developed with grant support, so successful commercialization does not erase this layer. It activates it.
That is what drives the more conservative runway read. If one looks only at cash and deposits, end-2025 gives Pulsenmore a bit more than two years on the 2025 pace. Once one adds the fact that part of 2025's improvement was one-off, that a large portion of inventory moved without a meaningful cash release, and that leases and IIA royalties continue to sit above the cash balance, the true room for error becomes tighter than the raw headline suggests.
On April 3, 2026 Pulsenmore's market capitalization stood at about NIS 67.2 million, almost the same as end-2025 cash plus deposits. That is an important market signal. It suggests the market is still reading the company primarily through the cash runway, not through a commercialization proof that has already been delivered.
Bottom Line
Pulsenmore is not in immediate liquidity distress. The end-2025 balance sheet gives it time, and management itself says it has at least 12 months of funding. But this is time that has been bought, not a wide cushion. On the 2025 cash profile, the balance sheet gives roughly two years of runway, and that comes after a year in which the income statement got an unusual NIS 30.5 million boost from the GE settlement.
That is why the next test is no longer accounting, but cash conversion. For the U.S. push to become genuinely funded, Pulsenmore will have to show three things in parallel over the next stages: that non-current inventory starts turning into sales and cash, that product revenue grows without reopening a sharper burn rate, and that the IIA royalty layer remains manageable inside commercialization. Until then, the balance sheet is funding the story far more than the business is funding it.
Disclosure: Deep TASE analyses are general informational, research, and commentary content only. They do not constitute investment advice, investment marketing, a recommendation, or an offer to buy, sell, or hold any security, and are not tailored to any reader's personal circumstances.
The author, site owner, or related parties may hold, buy, sell, or otherwise trade securities or financial instruments related to the companies discussed, before or after publication, without prior notice and without any obligation to update the analysis. Publication of an analysis should not be read as a statement that any position does or does not exist.
The analysis may contain errors, omissions, or information that changes after publication. Readers should review official filings and primary sources before making decisions.