Y.A.Z Initiatives: Why NIS 1.663 Billion of Projected Surplus Is Not NIS 1.663 Billion of Accessible Value

The Headline That Inflates the Story

The main article argued that at Y.A.Z Initiatives the issue is not pipeline size. It is the distance between a project on paper and a project with permit, financing, and execution. This follow-up isolates the biggest distortion inside that gap: NIS 1.663 billion of projected surplus is not NIS 1.663 billion that can be treated as accessible value.

The first reason is straightforward. In the presentation's summary-project slide, the company shows 79 projects, NIS 5.75 billion of projected revenue, and NIS 1.663 billion of projected surplus. But on the same slide it also says that this surplus includes about NIS 619 million of equity that has not yet been invested in the projects. That means more than a third of the headline, 37.2%, is capital that still has to go in before the surplus can even start to look like existing economic value.

The annual report provides the cleaner anchor. In the aggregate project table as of December 31, 2025, projected surplus stands at NIS 1.044 billion, not NIS 1.663 billion. That still does not make NIS 1.044 billion accessible value, but it does make clear that the larger presentation number is a gross figure, before equity that still has to be deployed.

Even After That Deduction, the Release Schedule Is Distant

The second mistake is to treat even NIS 1.044 billion as if it were near-term value. The release-schedule slide for the 72 ongoing projects shows the opposite. The company presents NIS 1.403 billion of projected surplus for those projects, but it also discloses two details that materially cool any aggressive read.

The first is the equity burden. On the same slide, the company says that NIS 122 million of equity has been invested so far to advance the projects, while the projected surplus still includes another roughly NIS 522 million of equity that has not yet been invested. In other words, the future equity still needed is 4.3 times the equity already deployed. That does not look like value sitting and waiting. It looks like value that still needs capital and time.

The second is timing. The cumulative release schedule reaches only NIS 15 million in 2026, NIS 47 million by the end of 2027, and NIS 253 million by the end of 2028. The heavier numbers appear only from 2029 onward. Based on the period-by-period release figures shown on that slide, roughly NIS 1.15 billion, about 82% of the projected surplus of the 72 ongoing projects, is scheduled to be released only from 2029 onward. So even after stripping out future equity, most of the value still sits far away in time.

There is also a third issue. That release schedule does not even cover the full NIS 1.663 billion headline. It refers only to 72 ongoing projects, while the full summary slide adds another 7 business-development projects with NIS 259 million of projected surplus. That layer does not get a release schedule there at all. So the headline includes not only future equity, but also a meaningful component whose timing is not mapped on that slide.

What Is Closer to Money

If the goal is to understand what is closer to monetization, the more relevant layer is the schedule for binding sale contracts. Here the company shows a much smaller and much more concrete picture: NIS 311.7 million of revenue to be recognized from binding sale contracts and NIS 313.2 million of advances and payments expected to be received under those same contracts.

That still should not be confused with freely accessible surplus to common shareholders. It is the signed-sales and expected-collection layer. But precisely for that reason it is a firmer layer when the question is what is actually getting closer to money. And its message is sharp: only about NIS 73.2 million of collections are expected in 2026 from those binding contracts, while about NIS 240.0 million, 76.6% of the total, is spread across 2027 and later.

That gap matters because it shows how Y.A.Z should be read. The NIS 1.663 billion headline is a long-duration portfolio view. The signed-contract backlog is a layer much closer to monetization, and it is far smaller, much thinner in the near term, and still not equivalent to free cash.

Bottom Line

To read Y.A.Z properly, the investor has to make two mental deductions, not one. First, strip out the equity that still has to be invested. Then strip out the illusion of immediacy, because most of the release schedule sits in the later years and part of the projected surplus belongs to business-development projects that do not even get a detailed timing map here.

That is why NIS 1.663 billion should not be set against market cap as if it were value waiting to be unlocked. It is much closer to a long-duration, capital-intensive, timing-sensitive project potential than to a figure that can support a simple discount-to-value equation. Anyone trying to judge accessible value at Y.A.Z should spend much more time on the pace at which projects move into full financing and signed sales, and much less time on the surplus headline alone.