Imed Follow-up: How Much of the Portfolio Value Is Actually Accessible to Public Holders
At year-end 2025, Imed reports a $5.149 million illiquid portfolio and $2.883 million of cash, but public holders still have no distributable surplus and the proposed capital reduction of up to $1 million has been stayed. On top of that sit management fees, a full operating-cost layer, and initiative fees, so gross portfolio value is still far from holder-accessible value.
What This Follow-up Is Isolating
The main article argued that Imed's problem is not whether it has assets, but whether that value can actually reach public holders. This follow-up takes that claim one step further by separating two numbers that are easy to blur together: gross portfolio value, and value that is actually accessible to public holders.
On paper, year-end 2025 does not look bad. There are $5.149 million of illiquid investments at fair value, $2.883 million of cash and cash equivalents, and $7.855 million of equity. But public holders should care about more than the reported asset stack. The real questions are what part of that value is liquid, what part is legally distributable, what gets skimmed away by the incentive structure, and what gets delayed by litigation or regulation.
That is why the question here is not whether the report looks cheap or expensive. The real question is how much of this value can realistically turn into cash at the holder level without getting stuck with the general partner, trapped inside the partnership, or paused in court.
What matters immediately:
- At year-end 2025 there is $2.883 million of cash, but no distributable retained earnings.
- Even the attempt to return up to $1 million through a capital reduction, roughly one third of the cash balance, has been stayed in court.
- Every realization is subject to 20% to 30% initiative fees on net consideration before public holders even begin thinking about distributions.
- Even without a realization, the partnership charges management fees on the full asset base, including cash, and also bears the full operating-cost layer.
How Much of the Value Is Accessible Today
The right place to start is with the sharpest number in the filing, not the biggest one. The biggest number is the $5.149 million illiquid portfolio. The sharpest number is different: Section 5.2 says the partnership has no distributable retained earnings as of December 31, 2025. That means that even after the GNX exit and even after the rights offering, cash on the balance sheet is not the same thing as cash freely available to public holders.
| Layer | 31.12.2025 | Why it is not fully accessible value |
|---|---|---|
| Cash and cash equivalents | $2.883 million | There is no distributable surplus, so this is not ready for an ordinary distribution |
| Illiquid investments at fair value | $5.149 million | The filing classifies them as level 3 assets and explicitly flags liquidity risk |
| Current liabilities | $187 thousand | These obligations rank ahead of any distribution to holders |
| Of which payables to related parties | $85 thousand | Almost half of current liabilities are tied to related parties |
| Equity | $7.855 million | This is an accounting number, not already-accessible cash |
The practical meaning is that the immediately accessible amount under the ordinary profit test is currently zero. That is why the partnership had to ask the court to approve a distribution of up to $1 million that does not meet the profit test. Even that request did not cover the full cash balance. On February 15, 2026, the partnership said all regulatory approvals for the capital reduction had been obtained, but the decision was then stayed after an objection was filed by the plaintiff in the lawsuit against the partnership, the general partner, and the controlling shareholder of the general partner.
That is the core distinction between cash on hand and cash accessible to holders. The money exists. The legal path to sending it out is still blocked.
Why Time Works Against Public Holders
If this were a very lean structure simply waiting for realizations, it would be easier to argue that time only increases the chance that one of the assets matures. At Imed it is not that simple, because waiting itself costs money.
The partnership agreement says the partnership pays the general partner semiannual management fees of 0.4% of the partnership's total assets, including current assets such as cash and also non-current assets. That is a critical point. Not only the private portfolio carries management fees. The cash balance does too. As the treasury grows, the fee base grows with it.
In practice, management fees rose to $82 thousand in 2025 from $66 thousand in 2024, alongside an increase in total assets to $8.042 million from $7.647 million.
But that is only the first layer. The same agreement also says the partnership bears, in addition to management fees, all of the expenses of the partnership and the general partner that relate to managing the partnership: directors, employees, auditors, tax advice, lawyers, other consultants, computing, rent, office services, insurance, public relations, investor relations, and even expenses related to the partnership's R&D projects. In other words, management fees are not the ceiling on the cost structure. They are only the first line item.
Even equity raising, which on the surface strengthens holders, comes with its own payment layer to the general partner. For the rights offering completed in 2025, the partnership paid the general partner $40 thousand. In the balance-sheet discussion, the increase in current liabilities was also explained in part by a $47 thousand accrual including VAT to the general partner for assistance in the rights offering.
The good news is that the filing does show cost discipline. In January 2025, the acting CEO's role was cut to 50%, and the CFO and COO role was cut to 20% with the car benefit removed. That shows the partnership understands the issue. The less positive side is that even after those cuts, the structure still charges a recurring toll for simply waiting.
Why an Exit Still Does Not Fully Belong to Public Holders
Even anyone willing to look past the legal delay and assume another realization will happen still has to stop at the next layer. At Imed, an exit does not travel in a straight line from portfolio company to public-holder cash.
The partnership agreement includes an initiative-fee mechanism. The partnership pays the general partner and/or its controlling owners initiative fees at 20% or 30% of the net consideration from each realization event, plus VAT. Up to two times the partnership's direct investment in the relevant portfolio company, initiative fees are 20% of net consideration. Above that threshold, 20% applies up to the two-times level and 30% applies above it.
Precision matters here. "Net consideration" is defined after deducting the partnership's cumulative direct investment in that portfolio company and the tax arising from the consideration. That means that before public holders see the benefit of a successful realization, the structure already allocates part of the remaining value to the general partner.
| Mechanism | What the filing says | What it does to accessible value |
|---|---|---|
| Initiative fees | 20% of net consideration, or 20% up to two times invested capital and 30% above that | Public holders do not receive the full upside of a successful exit |
| Dividend policy | Up to 50% of net profits from realizations | Even after a realization, the policy does not automatically pass all of the profit to holders |
| Profit test and distribution law | Actual distribution only from distributable profits and subject to law | Cash on the balance sheet is not equal to immediate distribution capacity |
| General-partner board discretion | The board may update or deviate from the policy, including no distribution at all | Even the policy itself is not a binding commitment |
At first glance, the dividend policy approved in March 2025 sounds encouraging: the partnership will seek to distribute up to 50% of the net profits generated from realizations in the portfolio, in cash. But the details matter. First, that is up to 50% of net profits, not 100% of proceeds. Second, the net-profit concept is after tax and after payments to advisers, brokers, and similar parties. Third, any actual distribution remains subject to law, expected cash flows, existing and expected obligations, financial needs, and the general partner board's assessment. Fourth, the filing explicitly says the policy does not create any commitment to distribute dividends at all.
In practical terms, the path from exit to holder cash runs through four gates: realization, initiative fees, distribution tests, and the discretion of the general partner's board. That is a very material gap versus a shallow reading of portfolio value.
Why the Discount Can Persist Even If the Books Are Right
The final blocker is more external, but it matters. The partnership did meet the TASE requirements at the June 30, 2025 and December 31, 2025 checkpoints, so the participation units remained on the main list. But the preservation warning was not removed, and the conditions will be examined again on June 30, 2026.
Alongside that, the latest market snapshot points to a market capitalization of about NIS 7.7 million. That is a very small public-market wrapper, and in a wrapper that small, investors tend to apply a deep discount to value that is illiquid, not immediately distributable, and still exposed to both litigation and a fairly aggressive fee structure.
The point is not that the books must be wrong. The point is that even if the books are reasonable, the market does not have to pay for them as if every dollar belongs equally to public holders.
Conclusion
The key number at Imed is not the $5.149 million private portfolio, and it is not even the $2.883 million cash balance. The key number is how much of that can actually come out. As of year-end 2025, the conservative answer is simple: less than the balance sheet suggests at first glance.
The reason is straightforward. Cash is not ordinarily distributable because there is no distributable surplus. The proposed capital reduction of up to $1 million has already run into a legal block. Every passing quarter charges management fees on the full asset base, including cash. The partnership's whole expense layer sits above public holders. And when another realization eventually arrives, initiative fees and a non-binding distribution policy will still separate gross proceeds from cash that can actually reach the public.
That is why anyone reading Imed as a simple listed vehicle trading against portfolio value alone is missing the core point. The discount here is not only an argument about the quality of the fair-value marks. It is also the price of structural leakage, legal delay, and the fact that at Imed, value created and value accessible to public holders are not the same thing.
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