What Is Left After Givat Shaul and Hungary: A Recurring Base or a Temporary Cash Box
The Givat Shaul and Hungary disposals released about NIS 225.5 million of free cash, but they did not leave Aviv with a broad recurring income base. After Givat Shaul, the recurring earnings layer looks much thinner and more concentrated, so the real 2026 question is no longer just how much cash came in, but what can replace the NOI that was sold.
The Cash Really Arrived
The main article already established that Aviv enters 2026 in a meaningfully different position than the one implied by the 2025 numbers alone. This follow-up isolates the post-disposal question only: is Aviv left with a recurring earnings base, or mostly with a temporarily swollen cash position. The answer splits in two. Value became far more accessible. The recurring base, however, became smaller.
At the cash level, there is nothing theoretical here. The Givat Shaul sale was completed on March 16, 2026 and generated about NIS 183 million of free cash. The Hungary land sale was completed on March 2, 2026 and generated about NIS 42.5 million of free cash. Together that is about NIS 225.5 million of free cash, on top of an expected pre-tax gain of about NIS 27 million from the Hungary disposal in the first quarter of 2026.
But the starting point matters. As of December 31, 2025, the group had NIS 40.0 million of cash and cash equivalents, NIS 17.2 million of restricted cash in project accounts, and NIS 174.0 million of investment property classified as held for sale. In other words, by year-end the value was already sitting on the balance sheet, but it was not yet liquid cash. It only turned into real liquidity after the March 2026 closings.
| Transaction | Consideration | Free cash | What it means economically |
|---|---|---|---|
| Givat Shaul | NIS 216.0m | NIS 183.0m | A major yielding asset turned into actual liquidity |
| Hungary | NIS 47.4m | NIS 42.5m | A development option turned into cash without cutting current revenue |
| Total | NIS 263.4m | NIS 225.5m | A sharp move from balance-sheet value to accessible cash |
That is the crucial distinction. After years in which part of the value sat inside land, revaluations, or an investment property that had not been monetized, Aviv enters 2026 with a much heavier cash position. But cash in the bank is not the same thing as a recurring earnings layer that survives after the sale.
What Was Sold With Givat Shaul
This is exactly where the gap opens between the “cash box” reading and the “recurring base” reading. In 2025 the rental and operating-investment-property segment generated NIS 15.454 million of revenue and NIS 13.481 million of NOI. That segment is small relative to the broader development and construction platform, but it was the clearest stabilizing layer in the report.
Givat Shaul was the anchor inside that layer. At the end of 2025 the asset was carried at a fair value of NIS 174.0 million, with 86.7% average occupancy, NIS 11.677 million of revenue, and NIS 11.262 million of NOI. Put differently, Givat Shaul alone produced more than NIS 11 million of NOI out of the segment’s NIS 13.5 million. When that asset was sold, Aviv did not just sell a balance-sheet line. It sold most of the segment’s current recurring earning power.
The tenant table for Givat Shaul sharpens the quality of what was sold. This was not a marginal or vacant asset. It had six tenants at year-end 2025, 86.7% occupancy, and an anchor tenant that represented 56% of the tenant-linked area. In other words, Aviv sold a real income anchor rather than just land or a future option.
By contrast, the other directly disclosed material yielding asset is Halon Jerusalem. At the end of 2025 it carried a fair value of NIS 41.5 million, 96% occupancy, and a 7.1% yield. That is a good operating asset and a meaningful residual income source. But it is no longer remotely comparable to Givat Shaul, either in value or in current contribution.
So the key question is not whether Aviv sold well or poorly. For this continuation that is almost secondary. The real question is what remains after the sale. And the answer is that the remaining income layer is far smaller, far more concentrated, and no longer anchored by the asset that looked most like a mature yielding-property platform.
What Is Actually Left
The Hungary disposal is fundamentally different from the Givat Shaul disposal. In the geographic disclosure, the company states that all external revenues are generated in Israel because the Hungary activity had not yet matured into revenue. So the Hungary sale releases cash and creates an expected accounting gain, but it does not cut into a running NOI base. In that sense, Hungary was mainly a balance-sheet and development option rather than a live earnings engine.
Givat Shaul is the opposite story. That was the asset that carried actual recurring income. What remains on the direct yielding side is essentially Halon Jerusalem, with a NIS 41.5 million fair value and a dedicated NIS 25.631 million financing facility through May 2027. Givat Shaul’s NIS 38.8 million financing frame, which was unused at the reporting date, was cancelled in January 2026 together with the liens on the property. So the disposal did not just bring in cash. It also removed the property-specific financing layer around the sold asset.
Still, the right post-disposal reading is not “a small yielding-property company with surplus cash.” Aviv is still a development and execution company that finances projects separately, with banks approving the extraction of project surpluses only under certain conditions. Year-end 2025 working capital stood at about NIS 178.5 million and was supported, among other things, by NIS 100.6 million of land and buildings inventory. In the parent-only statements, year-end cash was just NIS 3 thousand, against NIS 112.673 million of bond debt, including NIS 56.250 million of current maturities. So the “cash box” description only becomes true after the March 2026 closings, and even then it sits against a business that consumes capital and against real bond obligations.
That is why this continuation matters. If Aviv had emerged from the disposals with both a broad yielding portfolio and more cash, the story would be a double upgrade. That is not the setup. Aviv emerges with much better balance-sheet flexibility, but also with much less recurring income that already exists today.
There is an additional development layer, of course: the company describes a cooperation agreement relating to the Bilius Center and is evaluating a broader strategic cooperation in urban-renewal projects in Jerusalem. But those are still early-stage development moves. They are not an immediate replacement for the more than NIS 11 million of NOI that went out the door with Givat Shaul.
Conclusion
The precise read on Aviv after Givat Shaul and Hungary is neither “just a cash box” nor “the same yielding base plus more cash.” Aviv realized real value and turned it into liquidity, and at the same time sold its main NOI anchor.
That leaves 2026 as a different kind of proof year. The question is no longer whether the assets were worth something. That has already been answered in cash. The question is what the company does with the cash. If the new liquidity is used to reduce debt, improve flexibility, and build a replacement earnings engine, the disposals will read as a capital-structure reset. If the cash is quickly reabsorbed into capital-intensive development without a new recurring profit anchor appearing, 2026 will remain a monetization year rather than the start of a new recurring base.
So the practical question for the next filings is very simple: not how much cash came in, but how much remains after debt service and development needs, and what steady earnings layer is being built in its place.
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