My Mall Limassol: How Much Of 2025 Came From NOI And How Much Still Sits Above Ari's Cash Layer
My Mall ended 2025 with NIS 41.0 million of NOI, 99% occupancy and fair value of NIS 571.9 million. But at Ari the asset sits behind the equity method, bank debt and shareholder loans, so only part of that improvement already reaches the layer closest to listed shareholders.
What This Follow-Up Is Isolating
The main article already made the broader point: Ari's portfolio is growing faster than its cash layer, so the key question is not only what the assets are worth, but how much of that value is actually reachable by shareholders. This follow-up isolates My Mall in Limassol because it is a particularly clean example of that gap: it is a good asset, but it does not sit at Ari the way Ashdod or Nahariya do.
At first glance the numbers can mislead. The mall ended 2025 with 99% occupancy, NIS 54.7 million of revenue, NIS 41.0 million of NOI and fair value of NIS 571.9 million. In the company's presentation the picture looks even sharper: Ari's effective share is shown as EUR 4.4 million of NOI and EUR 63.5 million of fair value. Those are strong numbers, and they absolutely support the quality of the asset.
But that is only the first layer of the story. At Ari the asset is not consolidated. It sits behind a 50%-50% joint venture in Limassol Mall, which itself holds 83% of the companies that own the mall, while a local partner keeps the remaining 17%. That leaves Ari with an effective 41.5% share in the underlying asset, and the number that finally reaches the layer closest to shareholders is reduced again by bank debt, deferred tax, shareholder loans and partner mechanics.
Four points matter from the outset:
- The asset itself is genuinely working. In 2025 My Mall's NOI rose to NIS 41.0 million from NIS 40.2 million, occupancy remained near full at 99%, and rents on newly signed leases stood at EUR 45.17 per square meter versus EUR 30.21 on existing leases.
- The 2025 headline was much broader than NOI. The mall recorded a NIS 102.9 million fair-value gain in 2025, 2.5 times that year's NOI.
- Ari's direct share is smaller than the headline. Ari's effective share is 41.5%, which means roughly NIS 17.0 million of NOI and NIS 237.3 million of look-through fair value.
- The layer already sitting close to shareholders is much narrower. At year-end 2025 Ari carried Limassol through a NIS 95.6 million equity-accounted investment and a NIS 35.5 million shareholder loan, together NIS 131.1 million.
That chart matters because it shows that My Mall did not suddenly become relevant only in 2025, and not only through valuation. NOI attributable to Ari's share rose from EUR 1.9 million in 2022, a partial year after the acquisition, to EUR 4.4 million in 2025. That is real support for the thesis, not cosmetic window dressing.
What Actually Came From NOI
To understand what My Mall contributed in 2025, the starting point has to be the operating layer. Without that, the valuation discussion is incomplete. The mall finished the year with NIS 54.7 million of revenue, NIS 13.7 million of operating costs and NIS 41.0 million of NOI. That is not a dramatic jump versus 2024, but it is not a weakening asset either. Quite the opposite: the mall remained almost fully occupied, and newly signed leases carried better pricing than the in-place book.
That is the difference between an asset that helps only through appraisal and one that also delivers real operating economics. On the 2025 numbers alone, My Mall is not just "paper value." There is rent collection here, there are lease renewals at stronger pricing, and there is an asset still running at almost full occupancy after an already strong prior year.
For Ari, though, this layer looks smaller. On a look-through basis, its 2025 NOI share stands at roughly NIS 17.0 million, or EUR 4.4 million in the presentation. That is meaningful support, but it also defines the right scale: My Mall supports Ari through NOI, but it does not sit inside Ari's own reported NOI layer as if it were a fully consolidated asset.
In other words, the mall does add operating support, but support that first passes through the holding structure. That is why it does not remove the parent-level liquidity and cash-access question. It simply strengthens the case that there is a high-quality asset underneath the listed company.
What Came From Value, And Why That Matters
The bigger 2025 story at My Mall was not NOI but valuation. The mall recorded a NIS 102.9 million fair-value gain, versus NIS 36.1 million in 2024. That is a very large number for an asset producing NIS 41.0 million of NOI, and it is exactly why the continuation has to separate two different kinds of thesis support: support from a genuinely good operating asset, and support from revaluation.
The gap in that chart does not mean the valuation is fake. It does mean that the 2025 headline leaned much more on the valuation layer than on the NOI layer. The note on the Limassol investment adds an important detail: the uplift came both from better mall performance and from residential rights amounting to 7,696 square meters. So even inside the valuation story there is a mix of two worlds, an operating world that already exists and a planning world that still has to move through time, execution and market conditions.
That matters because it explains why My Mall is both a real support line and a source of false comfort. A reader looking at EUR 63.5 million of fair value attributable to Ari's share in the presentation could easily feel that the mall has already solved a large part of the cash debate. That would be the wrong read. A large part of the 2025 improvement was booked at the value layer rather than the cash layer, and part of it came from future rights rather than rent already collected today.
Where That Value Stops Before Reaching Ari's Cash Layer
This is the core of the continuation. If the mall itself is the unit of analysis, Ari can point to a EUR 153 million asset, of which EUR 63.5 million belongs to its effective share. But once that number moves through the holding structure and the balance sheet of Limassol Mall, it looks very different.
At the end of 2025 Limassol Mall held NIS 43.7 million of cash, but it also carried NIS 244.2 million of bank debt, NIS 71.0 million of shareholder loans and NIS 58.9 million of deferred tax. On top of that sits a joint-control arrangement with Dorsel, under which key decisions are made jointly, while Ari itself recognizes the investment through the equity method rather than full consolidation.
The practical result is that the value of the mall does not translate one-for-one into Ari's parent cash layer. At year-end 2025 Ari carried a NIS 95.6 million investment in Limassol Mall and a NIS 35.5 million shareholder loan. Together that is NIS 131.1 million. That is real value, but it is materially lower than the roughly NIS 237.3 million that represent Ari's effective look-through share of the mall's fair value.
| Layer | 2025 | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| 100% mall fair value | NIS 571.9 million | Asset quality at the property level |
| Ari effective share of fair value | NIS 237.3 million | Look-through read before the Limassol balance-sheet layer |
| Ari's investment in Limassol Mall | NIS 95.6 million | The equity layer already sitting on Ari's balance sheet |
| Ari's shareholder loan to Limassol Mall | NIS 35.5 million | A claim closer to cash, but still dependent on repayment from the JV |
| Ari's total balance-sheet exposure | NIS 131.1 million | What sits relatively close to Ari's shareholders today |
That table is not meant to say there is a hole in the value. It is meant to show that My Mall's value passes through several stations before it becomes accessible to Ari's shareholders. That is the whole distinction between good value and accessible value.
That chart sharpens one more point: even the layer that is closer to cash, the shareholder loan, is not free cash sitting in Ari's own account. It still depends on the ability of Limassol Mall to keep repaying upstream without weakening itself.
2025 Did Show Cash Movement, But Not Free Movement
It is worth pausing on the Limassol Mall cash flow. In 2025 it generated NIS 31.1 million of operating cash flow. That is good. But in the same year it also paid NIS 12.4 million of interest, invested NIS 18.5 million back into the property, and repaid NIS 21.4 million of shareholder loans. At the same time it distributed NIS 6.4 million to non-controlling interests.
That does not mean cash did not move upward. It did. It does mean that the move did not come from a wide, comfortable free-cash surplus. It came inside a year in which the mall also funded investment, serviced debt and leaned on refinancing.
That takes us to the most important transaction of the year. In September 2025 Limassol Mall signed a refinancing with Bank of Cyprus that increased the secured facility to EUR 70 million, extended the term by another 7 years and reduced the margin to 3M EURIBOR + 1.1%. For asset quality that is clearly good news. For Ari's cash layer it is more nuanced. The refinancing strengthened the asset structure, but it did not turn the whole value of the mall into parent cash.
The fact that the debt is non-recourse helps frame the point correctly. On one hand, that is a real protection for Ari because the debt remains tied to the property rather than sitting as an open parent guarantee. On the other hand, it also means that value and financing remain largely ring-fenced inside the asset layer rather than automatically flowing upward.
Why This Matters For The Main Article
The implication for the main article is straightforward. My Mall is absolutely part of why Ari's thesis rests on a real asset base rather than on hopes alone. There is real NOI here, high occupancy, better pricing on new leases, and a refinancing that shows banks are willing to underwrite the asset.
But My Mall does not by itself close the question the main article left open. In 2025 it supported Ari through two very different routes: one route of real NOI, and another, larger route of valuation. What is already relatively close to Ari's shareholders is only part of that value, not the full value of the property.
So the right read of My Mall is not "this is only revaluation," but it is also not "here is the cash." It is a good asset that strengthens Ari's story, only through a layer of partnership, debt and capital-structure mechanics that slow the path from operating value to accessible value. If over the next few years the mall keeps both protecting occupancy and sending more upstream through shareholder-loan repayments or distributions, it will move from being a good asset to being an asset that also solves part of Ari's friction. In 2025 it was not there yet.
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