Prashkovsky Group: The Rishon Land and How Much of the Value Is Actually Accessible
The Rishon LeZion land pushed Prashkovsky's investment-property line up to ILS 242.1 million and added ILS 5.7 million of 2025 revaluation gain, but at year-end this was still planning value. The national committee has not yet approved the plan, no project financing source is presented, and the land is already pledged to the bondholders, so for now it strengthens the balance sheet and the collateral package more than it strengthens liquidity.
The Rishon land is the main reason the balance sheet got bigger, but not the reason liquidity was solved
The main article argued that Prashkovsky's balance sheet grew faster than its liquidity. This continuation isolates the single item that moved the balance sheet more than anything else in 2025, the Rishon LeZion land brought in through Klings, and asks a sharper question: how much of that value has actually moved beyond accounting optics and turned into value the company can really capture.
Finding one: most of the 2025 jump did not come from ongoing mark-to-market uplift. It came from moving a family-held asset into the public company. The revaluation recorded during 2025 was only ILS 5.706 million, while the larger change came from bringing the land into the group through the Klings merger.
Finding two: the ILS 117.72 million year-end value is the value of vacant land still waiting for plan approval at the national committee. This is planning value, not the value of a financed, marketable, or permitted project.
Finding three: even on the balance sheet, the value did not enter cleanly. Deferred-tax liabilities rose to ILS 49.4 million from ILS 24.1 million, mainly because of the Rishon land, and equity rose mainly because Klings added ILS 73.9 million, not because cash came in.
Finding four: the land is already working for the bondholders. As of year-end 2025 it was pledged in a first-ranking charge with no cap in favor of the Series A trustee, so today it strengthens the collateral layer first.
| Layer | What was recorded in 2025 | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Fair value of the land | ILS 117.72 million | A material asset on the balance sheet, but still based on appraisal and planning assumptions |
| Annual revaluation gain | ILS 5.706 million | Some planning progress, not monetization |
| Deferred-tax liabilities | ILS 49.4 million versus ILS 24.1 million in 2024 | Part of the value has already come with a balance-sheet friction, mainly because of Rishon |
| Equity | ILS 154.0 million versus ILS 103.9 million in 2024 | The equity improvement relies mainly on adding Klings, not on new free cash |
What actually entered the company in 2025
To understand the Rishon value, it helps to start with the mechanics. Klings held parcel 510, which it had acquired from the company back in 2021 for ILS 3.3 million. Aryeh Prashkovsky held the adjacent parcel 507, land acquired in the 1970s and carried by him as investment property. In March 2025 the share-swap merger was signed, in May the tax ruling was received, and on June 25 the company received 100% of Klings in exchange for issuing 253 shares to Aryeh.
That matters because it changes the read on the 2025 "jump." This was not just a market uplift story. It was first a structural transfer inside the control group. At the balance-sheet level, the company itself explains that investment property rose to ILS 242.1 million, mainly because roughly ILS 112 million of the Rishon land was included through the first-time consolidation and another roughly ILS 5.7 million came from the year-end revaluation. At the same time, ILS 50.8 million of Ness Ziona moved out of investment property and into inventory, so even the balance-sheet net effect already shows a more complex accounting move than simply "another ILS 117.7 million of new value."
The equity line tells a similar story. Total equity rose to ILS 154.0 million, and the company explains that the main driver was roughly ILS 73.9 million from including Klings, offset by the period loss. In the statement of changes in equity, that contribution appears as a business combination under common control. So the value was absolutely captured in the balance sheet and in equity, but it did not arrive through a sale, a partner transaction, or free cash generation.
That chart matters because it separates two different stories. There is a real multi-year valuation increase. But in 2025 the annual move itself was relatively modest compared with the amount of value that was brought onto the balance sheet through the merger. A reader looking only at the ending number can easily over-attribute the whole step-up to fresh value creation in 2025.
The ILS 117.7 million value is still sitting at the planning stage
The land itself is still far from a stage where it can be read as accessible value. This is vacant land with an undefined 3,843 sqm area in southern Rishon LeZion, currently designated as metropolitan recreation land. As of year-end 2025, the objections process for plan 43/21/3 had been completed, and the company was waiting for the national committee to convene and approve the rezoning from metropolitan area to urban development area. Only on the basis of that plan can local and district plans then be submitted for residential and commercial rights.
That means the ILS 117.72 million value is not the value of a permitted project. It is not even the value of a financed project. In the property table the company states explicitly that there is no material interim use, no identified financing source for the project, and no required completion investment disclosed. That is critical. The filing knows how to appraise the potential, but it still does not show the monetization path.
The complexity does not stop there. The rights are not a small self-contained site ready for development. They are an effective share inside a much larger planning envelope: 3.98% of parcel 507 out of roughly 99.5 thousand sqm and 5.47% of parcel 510 out of roughly 81.5 thousand sqm. The valuation model reflects that structure. It assumes 191 housing units and 383 sqm of commercial area at the company share, an average land value of ILS 1.47 million per housing unit, and a shortened plan-approval period of 30 months versus 30 to 32 months a year earlier. At the same time, the discount rate used for development costs fell to 6% from 8%.
That is exactly why the sensitivity table matters more than the headline number. The 2025 uplift was ILS 5.706 million. But under the company's own sensitivity analysis, a further four-year delay in plan approval would cut value by ILS 24.475 million, and a 10% reduction in density would cut value by ILS 9.966 million.
The implication is straightforward. In 2025 the Rishon land moved in the right direction, but it is still moving inside a sensitivity range that is larger than the annual progress recorded this year. So this is an important asset, but it is not yet a closed one.
How much of the value is actually accessible
The right way to read Rishon is to separate four different layers of value.
| Value layer | What the filing supports | What the filing still does not support |
|---|---|---|
| Accounting value | ILS 117.72 million of fair value and ILS 5.706 million of annual uplift | That this amount can be monetized in the near term |
| Balance-sheet capture | Roughly ILS 112 million added to investment property and roughly ILS 73.9 million added mainly through Klings to equity | That this balance-sheet uplift is equivalent to accessible cash |
| Collateral value | First-ranking charge with no cap in favor of the Series A trustee | That the land is free to become shareholder flexibility |
| Cash value | No financing source, monetization budget, or sale path is shown yet | That the company already knows how to convert the appraisal into withdrawable value |
That leads directly to the answer in the headline. It is wrong to read ILS 117.7 million as if it were accessible value today. What is accessible already is mainly the balance-sheet effect: more investment property, more equity, and stronger collateral for the debt market. What is still not accessible is the layer equity investors care about most, value that can be financed, advanced, and then actually withdrawn or monetized.
The operating environment is working against any shortcut here. The business section of the annual report describes tighter bank-credit conditions, longer bank-accompaniment approval processes, full-underwriting requirements, and restrictions through the end of 2026 on 10/90 and 20/80 structures and on bullet or balloon housing loans. That matters specifically here because Rishon is still before the permit and financing stage. So even if the land creates value on paper, the path from planning value into a financeable and marketable project has become harder, not easier.
Put differently, Rishon currently has three proven uses: it expands investment property, it adds an equity layer, and it supports the collateral package. But it still has only one unproven use: releasing cash to the company within a reasonable time frame.
Conclusion
The Rishon land created real value for Prashkovsky. This is not an accounting mirage. But as of the end of 2025 that value sits mainly in three layers: appraisal value, accounting equity, and bondholder collateral. It has not yet become a proven liquidity path.
Bottom line: if the question is how much of the value is truly accessible, the filing mainly lets us answer in the negative. This is not ILS 117.7 million of free value. It is a material asset still waiting for final planning approval, still with no disclosed project-financing route, still highly sensitive to planning assumptions, and already pledged in a first-ranking charge that puts the debt market ahead of common shareholders in the queue. For that read to change, the company will need to show not another revaluation line, but planning approval, a financing route, and a move from theoretical value to a real monetization path.
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