Prashkovsky Group: The UK Assets, Value Engine or Parent-Level Leakage
Prashkovsky's UK layer still contains real assets and one meaningful development project, but by the end of 2025 most of that value still sits below the debt stack. At 130 Old Street the expected margin narrowed, the loan turned recourse, and the surplus expected at the company's own share is only about GBP 1.5 million.
The UK layer sharpens the same question, who gets to the cash first
In the broader Prashkovsky read, the same question keeps coming back: how much of the accounting value can actually climb up to the parent company. The UK layer makes that gap much clearer. As of December 31, 2025, it sat on the balance sheet through the equity-method line, mainly about NIS 32.9 million in PRMO and about NIS 0.8 million in Willesden. But in the same year that same layer also fed a material part of the equity-method loss line, which reached NIS 9.256 million and was driven mainly by PRMO financing expense and a decline in UK investment-property values.
That is the core of this follow-up. The question is not whether there are assets in the UK. There are. The question is whether, in 2025, those assets are already working for shareholders, or whether they are still working first for lenders, mezzanine providers, and project partners on the way up.
- Finding one: most of the exposure sits in PRMO, not in Willesden. PRMO is the larger platform, and it also generates most of the loss.
- Finding two: 130 Old Street can still create value, but in 2025 the margin narrowed and the debt stopped being a project-only issue.
- Finding three: even on the company's own math, the cash that could be released from the UK layer to Prashkovsky itself looks modest, only GBP 1.502 million from its share of Old Street.
- Finding four: after the balance-sheet date, parent-level financing was already locked onto the PRMO shares and the related cash rights, so even if cash starts moving upward, it already has a clear first claimant.
| Layer | Effective stake | Balance-sheet anchor at 31.12.2025 | What stood out in 2025 | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRMO | 37.5% | About NIS 32.9 million | On a 100% basis: NIS 9.637 million of revenue, NIS 5.914 million of investment-property impairment, NIS 21.756 million of net finance expense, and a NIS 24.048 million annual loss | This is the main UK layer, but for now it still consumes far more than it distributes |
| Willesden | 25% | About NIS 0.8 million | Loan extension in January 2025 and ongoing apartment sales, but still a small exposure | This can be monetized gradually, but it is too small to reset the thesis by itself |
That chart explains why the UK layer is still not functioning as a clean value engine. There is some revenue improvement, but it is simply too small relative to financing cost and property write-downs. At the Prashkovsky level, the result is not value realization yet. It is still absorption of profit and equity.
130 Old Street is the asset that matters, and also the bottleneck
Old Street is the asset that can actually move the picture, which is exactly why it needs to be read carefully. The building has been under construction since mid 2022, engineering completion reached 85.5% by the end of 2025, and completion is expected in April 2026. Marketing has already started, but as of December 31, 2025 no sale agreements had been signed. That matters because, at this point, the thesis still rests on internal estimates rather than on executed market prices.
On a 100% project basis, expected revenue fell from GBP 41.5 million to GBP 40.0 million, expected project cost fell only slightly to GBP 35.977 million, and expected gross profit dropped from GBP 4.913 million to GBP 4.023 million. Total gross margin fell from 13.4% to 11.2%. The project is still expected to be profitable, but the cushion is no longer wide. The sensitivity table adds that a 10% increase in remaining construction cost would reduce the unrecognized gross profit to GBP 3.58 million from GBP 4.023 million.
The bigger issue is financing. At December 31, 2025, the bank loan balance stood at GBP 17.375 million out of a GBP 20 million facility. The loan was subject to an LTV cap of 60% and an LTC cap of 65%, and the company states explicitly that it did not meet the covenant set for the debt ratio. As a result, on February 5, 2025 the financing agreement was amended: the facility was increased from GBP 18 million to GBP 20 million, maturity was extended to June 2026 with an option for another 12 months, and the spread increased from SONIA plus 3.32% to SONIA plus 3.5% from the extension date. At the same time, the PRMO shareholders, including Prashkovsky, provided a guarantee to the bank, and the financing became recourse.
This is not a footnote. The moment the bank demanded recourse and a shareholder-level guarantee, the risk migrated from the asset itself up to the sponsor layer. Old Street may still work. But the path there is now levered at the parent-support level, not just at the property level.
The value may be created below, but it is already pledged on the way up
This is where the continuation thesis really bites. On paper, the PRMO shareholder agreement includes a distribution policy under which 100% of distributable profits are meant to be distributed each year, subject to law, cash flow, and budget. In practice, the company also says that some associates are restricted from paying dividends or repaying shareholder loans until financing arrangements are satisfied. In other words, there is a formal upstreaming policy, but lenders still have real priority.
The Old Street surplus table shows how heavy that priority already is. The company's share of the project reflects expected accounting gross profit of GBP 1.509 million, but after measurement differences only GBP 0.57 million of expected economic profit remains. On the other side sit already-invested equity, repayment of an excess shareholder loan to Caesarea of GBP 1.062 million, and repayment of mezzanine and equity-support loans of GBP 4.196 million. At the end of that chain, the expected withdrawable surplus is only GBP 1.502 million.
The cash does not stop there. On August 14, 2024 the company took a non-bank NIS 20 million loan whose main collateral was a first-ranking pledge over the PRMO shares, the dividends, the voting-agreement rights, and the rights to receive money from that UK holding. That loan was repaid early on March 1, 2026, but even before that, on December 1, 2025, the company had already signed a new NIS 30 million facility. As of December 31, 2025 only NIS 10 million had been drawn, and after the balance-sheet date another NIS 20 million was drawn, so by the approval date the full NIS 30 million facility was in place. The company states that most of those proceeds are meant to repay the older facility, and it also committed to use distributions from PRMO for early repayment of the new loan.
That leads to the key conclusion of this follow-up: even if Old Street is completed on time and even if sales close around the assumed prices, the first cash does not necessarily improve common-shareholder flexibility right away. It is likely to serve the lender stack first, in both the UK and Israel.
Willesden is a small tail asset, not the rescue case
Willesden is different from PRMO on almost every parameter. This is only a 25% exposure, with a much smaller balance-sheet anchor. The acquisition loan balance stood at GBP 1.168 million at the end of 2025, and the loan was extended on January 17, 2025 for another five years. Two apartments were sold in 2024, and by late 2025 the vehicle had started the process of selling another apartment for GBP 1.05 million, a process expected to be completed in early 2026. At the same time, the company says it is still working to sell the remaining apartments.
That is useful progress, but it needs to stay in proportion. Willesden looks more like a gradual cleanup and monetization asset than like a platform that can solve the parent-level UK bottleneck on its own. If it exits well, it helps. It is just too small to reset the broader read by itself.
Conclusion
Prashkovsky's UK layer is not a story of nonexistent value. It is also not a story of value that has already climbed up to the parent. As of the end of 2025, this is mainly a story of value sitting at the asset layer, surrounded by bank debt, mezzanine, shareholder support, and an Israeli non-bank facility already secured on the PRMO stake and the related upstream cash rights.
Bottom line: the UK is still an option on value, but in 2025 it is a mortgaged option. For that reading to change, valuation language and expected profits will not be enough. What needs to appear in the numbers is completed construction at Old Street, executed sale contracts, real distributions from PRMO, and actual debt reduction at the parent level driven by that realization rather than by another refinancing round.
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