Follow-up to HomeBiogas: How Much of the Carbon Backlog Is Actually Close to Revenue
HomeBiogas's carbon backlog looks large, but most of it still depends on approvals, financing, and installation pace. This follow-up breaks down Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda to separate contractual visibility from revenue that is actually getting closer.
The main article already made one point clear: the big number in HomeBiogas's backlog is not a classic systems backlog. It is mainly a carbon backlog. This follow-up isolates the more practical question: how much of that backlog is actually close to revenue, and how much is still contractual visibility that depends on approvals, financing, and installation pace.
The short answer is fairly sharp. Near the report date, backlog stood at about $43.13 million, of which $42.485 million was tied to carbon credits. But only about $10.61 million of that amount was scheduled for recognition in 2026-2028, while about $32.52 million sat in 2029-2031. The headline number is real, but most of it sits in a long-dated layer where any delay in approvals, financing, or rollout immediately pushes revenue farther out.
That matters because this is not a simple ship-and-bill model. For backlog to become revenue, the company needs a full chain to work: system installation, monitoring, regulatory approvals, issuance of carbon credits, and in some cases external financing that explicitly determines whether systems can be deployed at the required pace. So the same backlog number actually contains very different quality buckets: voluntary Kenya, where installation and issuance have already been proven; Ghana and regulatory Kenya, where there are contracts and a clear economic route but critical execution conditions are still open; and Rwanda, where there is commercial potential but the route is still far from fast revenue conversion.
What the big number actually contains
This chart is the core of the story. HomeBiogas's backlog looks large not because it has a thick layer of near-term revenue, but because the late-year portion is massive. Even if the agreements remain in force, the three quarters sitting in 2029-2031 still need to clear several steps before they become recognized revenue.
The mix matters just as much. Near the report date, almost all backlog, about $42.485 million out of roughly $43.13 million, was tied to carbon credits. So the question is not only when systems get installed. It is also when the recognition conditions of a product that depends on regulatory approval, issuance, and a qualified institutional buyer actually mature. That is not the same level of certainty as a normal product backlog.
Ghana: the biggest contract, and the tightest bottleneck
Ghana is the best example of the gap between contractual visibility and revenue proximity. On paper, it is the most impressive project: 20,000 systems, potential reduction of 1.6 million tons of emissions over 10 years, and a binding agreement with Klik to purchase all carbon credits generated through the end of 2030 in a deal that could reach $28.8 million, plus an option for up to another $17.5 million from 2031 onward. That is the center of the big backlog number.
But as of the financial-statement approval date, only about 170 systems had actually been installed. The company had completed surveys at more than 1,000 farms and built a list of hundreds of farmers waiting for installation, but that is exactly the difference between an execution pipeline and revenue. Until rollout moves materially faster, the economic value of the contract remains conditional.
The more important point is buried in the note, not the headline. Under the original agreement terms, if the required approvals from Ghana and Switzerland were not completed within 180 days of signing, the buyer would gain a cancellation right. As of the approval date of the financial statements, those approvals had still not been obtained, which meant the agreement had already become cancelable from Klik's perspective, even though the company said the parties had agreed to continue their cooperation in its current form. That is not a collapse of the contract, but it is also not the same level of certainty implied by reading the headline value alone.
The February 2026 prepayment of up to $770 thousand does not solve that gap either. It clearly improves commercial confidence in the project, but it is not revenue, and it is not free cash. It is recorded as a liability, it offsets future invoices, and if by September 30, 2028 the company has not supplied carbon credits equal to that amount, the remaining balance must be repaid to Klik within 30 days, without interest. More than that, starting in the second quarter of 2027, Klik may adjust the size of its commitment based on project progress and expected credit volume. In plain terms, the prepayment proves seriousness, but it also ties the company directly to execution. If installation lags, the size of the contract itself can shrink.
What has improved in Ghana? The Swiss technical approval received in December 2025 is a real step, not a cosmetic one. The technical review was completed successfully, and a Swiss inter-ministerial committee was expected to discuss and approve the project while a parallel process continued in Ghana. But even after that step, the company still states explicitly that its ability to deploy systems and recognize revenue depends on securing financing for project implementation. That is probably the core bottleneck: Ghana has already moved beyond the question of whether there is a buyer, but it has not fully moved beyond the question of whether there is a financed path to deploy at the pace required to satisfy the contract.
Kenya: closest to monetization, but not on the same backlog economics
Kenya needs to be split into two very different stories.
The first is the voluntary Gold Standard project. Here, about 7,200 systems were already installed, and the company had already sold and delivered carbon credits under its agreement with SKOOT. This is the closest route to real monetization anywhere in the company's carbon activity, because it has already passed the installation and issuance test. But it is still not a straight line. The SKOOT agreement is expected to end in the second quarter of 2026, and the company also says that a methodology change in one Gold Standard parameter may reduce the number of credits attributed to each installed system. Management hopes the same change will also improve quality labeling and support a higher selling price, but the practical result is that the most mature route is also the one where credit volume per system is no longer fully stable.
The second story is the regulatory Klik project. Here, there is already a binding agreement from December 2025 to purchase carbon credits generated in 2026-2030 from the installation of about 17,000 systems in 2026-2028, with potential value of about $13.3 million from carbon credits plus about $6.8 million from system sales. Economically, this looks more attractive than the voluntary market, and the company says it intends to focus installation efforts on this route once approvals are complete because the commercial terms are better.
Kenya's advantage over Ghana is that there is already a proven operating base on the ground, and in February 2026 the company also received two LNO approvals from Kenya's environmental ministry: one for the regulatory route linked to Switzerland, and another for converting the existing voluntary project into a regulatory framework. Those are meaningful steps because they reduce the distance between existing activity and a higher-priced, richer regulatory route.
But the company also leaves no room for fantasy here. In the LNO report, it explicitly says there is no certainty that the projects will actually be registered under the regulatory frameworks or that carbon credits will be issued in any amount or at any timing. It ties execution to participant recruitment, receipt of all approvals, corresponding adjustments, continuity of Article 6, existence of a liquid and realizable market, and the company's own ability to meet its obligations to Klik on time. So Kenya is probably the most operationally advanced route, but even there the move from carbon credits on paper to large-scale regulatory revenue is not complete yet.
Rwanda: an interesting commercial route, not near-term revenue
At first glance, Rwanda looks like an attractive growth story: a project with potential for 100,000 systems and 10 million tons of carbon over 10 years, a preliminary approval received back in December 2024, and a January 2026 MOU with a global energy company to submit a bid in a Singapore government tender for carbon credits from the company's Rwanda project.
But this is exactly the kind of case where it is easy to confuse a commercial route with near-term revenue. The MOU does not create a sales agreement. It only places the project into a tender process: a first stage in the first quarter of 2026, a possible move to commercial proposals, and a stated intention by Singapore to conclude commercial engagements by the end of 2026. Until then, there is no sales agreement, no closed financing for broad deployment, and even a mild constraint because the company committed not to place the project in a competing bid for that tender.
What brings Rwanda closer to the ground? Two things. First, the company expects to complete installation of about 440 systems in the second quarter of 2026 under the UN arrangement, while the carbon rights from those systems remain with the company. Second, management states explicitly that progress in approving and selling carbon rights from already installed systems could support broader commercial contracts later on. So Rwanda currently looks more like a route to create commercial proof points than like a backlog layer that should be treated as 2026-2027 revenue.
The conversion test: what is actually close to revenue
| Route | What already exists | What is still open | Closeness to revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary Kenya | About 7,200 installed systems, carbon credits already sold and delivered to SKOOT | A contract ending in Q2 2026 and a methodology change that may reduce credits per system | The closest among the carbon routes, but still on a smaller scale |
| Regulatory Kenya with Klik | Binding agreement, two LNO approvals, and a route that promises better pricing and terms | Full approvals, actual registration and issuance, and execution against timelines and obligations | Medium |
| Ghana with Klik | Large contract, Swiss technical approval, up to $770 thousand of prepayment, and 170 installed systems | Final approval, financing for rollout, installation pace, and the risk of commitment adjustment or prepayment repayment | Low to medium |
| Rwanda | Preliminary approval, a Singapore tender route, and about 440 UN-backed installations expected by Q2 2026 | Tender success, a commercial agreement, registration and sale of credits, and financing for wider rollout | Low in the near term |
The practical conclusion from that table is clear: not every dollar in HomeBiogas's carbon backlog carries the same quality. The layer that is actually close to revenue sits mainly where active systems and already sold credits exist, which means voluntary Kenya, and perhaps later the first Rwanda installations. By contrast, most of the big headline number rests on Ghana and regulatory Kenya, where revenue still depends on moving from contractual visibility to financed and approved execution.
Conclusion
This follow-up does not weaken the claim that HomeBiogas has real commercial interest around its carbon activity. If anything, it strengthens it. There are buyers, there are contractual frameworks, there is regulatory progress, and there is even proven activity in Kenya. But it also makes clear that the backlog should not yet be read as a pool of near-term revenue.
Today, the backlog is best understood as a pool of commercialization options at very different maturity levels. At one end sits a smaller but more proven route. At the other sit much larger contracts that are also much more sensitive to approvals, financing, and installation pace. Until those three variables close, the large carbon backlog remains first and foremost long-dated commercial visibility, and only after that something close to revenue.
Disclosure: Deep TASE analyses are general informational, research, and commentary content only. They do not constitute investment advice, investment marketing, a recommendation, or an offer to buy, sell, or hold any security, and are not tailored to any reader's personal circumstances.
The author, site owner, or related parties may hold, buy, sell, or otherwise trade securities or financial instruments related to the companies discussed, before or after publication, without prior notice and without any obligation to update the analysis. Publication of an analysis should not be read as a statement that any position does or does not exist.
The analysis may contain errors, omissions, or information that changes after publication. Readers should review official filings and primary sources before making decisions.