Kamada: Will the Plasma Collection Ramp Really Improve the Economics

What This Follow-Up Isolates

The main article already established that Kamada is entering 2026 with growth back in the model, but without full proof that the growth is also turning into higher-quality cash. This follow-up isolates the plasma-collection ramp because it is supposed to do two things at once: open a new revenue stream from third-party NSP sales and reduce part of the company's dependence on externally purchased hyper-immune plasma for selected products.

This is no longer a slide-deck thesis. By year-end 2025, Kamada had three operating plasma-collection sites in the United States. Beaumont is the established and approved base. Houston already cleared the FDA gate for NSP in August 2025. San Antonio opened operationally in March 2025, completed an FDA site audit in February 2026, but was still waiting for approval at the reporting cut-off. At the same time, the company says it expects to begin NSP sales only in the second half of 2026.

That leads to the opening judgment: the plasma ramp can improve the economics, but it has not proved that yet. Today it looks more like a proof year than a harvest year. The platform is already built, but the four real economic tests are still ahead of it: approval, donor throughput, customer contracts, and the ability to turn collection into revenue and savings without building too heavy a fixed-cost base.

• Beaumont is the operating anchor, not the new revenue engine. It is a company-owned 237 square meter facility acquired in March 2021 and focused on collecting hyper-immune plasma for WINRHO SDF, KAMRAB and KEDRAB. The site passed an FDA inspection in January 2024 with no critical observations.
• Houston is the first commercialization gate. The lease was signed in March 2023, collection began in September 2024, and the site received supplemental FDA approval for NSP collection in August 2025.
• San Antonio is the closest trigger. The lease was signed in May 2024, collection began in March 2025, the prior approval supplement was submitted to the FDA in June 2025, the site audit was completed in February 2026, and the company expects approval in the first half of 2026.

The Three Sites, and What Each One Really Contributes

The lease note also says the company has reasonable certainty that the extension options in Houston and San Antonio will be exercised in order to avoid a significant adverse impact on plasma-collection activities. That matters. It means the ramp is no longer a short experiment. In management's framing, the two new sites are already part of the medium-term operating base, not an easily reversible option.

Where the Money Is Supposed to Come From

Kamada assigns two distinct value layers to Houston and San Antonio.

The first layer is new revenue from NSP sales. Here the promise is explicit: once fully ramped, each site is expected to contribute $8 million to $10 million per year from NSP sales. If both sites reach that target, the implied annual revenue opportunity is $16 million to $20 million.

The second layer is indirect savings through partial substitution for externally purchased hyper-immune plasma. This is not new revenue. It is an attempt to improve raw-material economics and give the company more supply-chain flexibility.

But this is where it is easy to get ahead of the evidence. The double-digit revenue promise is not yet visible in the filing as a proven commercial run-rate. The company does say that Proprietary Products revenue includes income from plasma collected and sold to third parties, but it does not break that number out as a standalone line. In practice, the entire bucket of "other Proprietary Products", which also includes KAMRHO and antivenoms sold to the Israeli Ministry of Health, was only $1.7 million in 2025, down from $2.8 million in both 2024 and 2023. So there is still no clean disclosed NSP run-rate. What exists today is a target, not a demonstrated pace.

The company reinforces that reading when it says it is in active discussions with potential customers regarding long-term NSP agreements and expects to initiate NSP sales in the second half of 2026. So even if San Antonio is approved on time, the revenue contribution still sits relatively late in the year.

What the Ramp Can Replace, and What It Does Not Solve

One of the easiest places to overreach is on the question of supply independence. The plasma ramp does not make Kamada self-sufficient across the full chain. It can improve the picture in a few specific products, but it does not erase third-party dependence across the whole portfolio.

That is the core read. If Houston and San Antonio work well, Kamada can improve its position in KEDRAB, KAMRAB and, to some extent, WINRHO SDF. But anyone reading the ramp as if it also solves CYTOGAM or GLASSIA is reading more than the filing actually says.

The Real Bottlenecks

Approval and compliance are not technical footnotes

In a new plasma site, first approval is only the first step. The filing explicitly says the centers have to comply on an ongoing basis with cGMP and evolving regulatory requirements, and that an unsatisfactory inspection can prevent a new site from being established or put an existing registration at risk. More than that, if noncompliance is detected only after affected plasma has been pooled with compliant plasma, the damage can reach not only the collected inventory from one site but also entire plasma pools, in-process materials and final products.

That is why San Antonio approval matters, but post-approval discipline matters just as much. In a platform like this, a regulatory failure is not only a delayed revenue event. It can also turn into inventory destruction and a supply-chain problem.

Donors and pricing will matter more than the leased square footage

The filing is unusually direct on this point. Donor availability and eligibility, donor reimbursement rates, competition for donors, macro conditions, donor loyalty, and even a misread of the demographic potential of a region can all hurt collection efficiency. Beyond that, the company explicitly says there is no assurance it will actually collect enough plasma at a lower cost than buying from third parties.

That point needs to be stated plainly: an $8 million to $10 million site-level revenue target is not a margin target. If donor compensation, direct collection costs and competitive intensity rise too quickly, a site can generate revenue without generating an attractive economic return.

On the customer side, this is not a broad open market either

The company warns that the global plasma market is highly concentrated and dominated by a few large players, including CSL Behring, Grifols and Takeda. That means the ramp could replace one kind of dependence with another: less dependence on plasma suppliers, more dependence on a small number of NSP buyers. If one of them cuts purchases, prefers internal collection, or pushes pricing, the NSP leg can look far less attractive than the headline opportunity suggests.

The accounting treatment of NSP is unforgiving

The filing states that NSP collected in Houston and San Antonio is measured at cost, including donor-related collection fees and other direct collection costs, and then carried at the lower of cost and net realizable value. That means the new sites cannot stop at collecting. They also need to sell at a price that clears the economics of collection.

The company does not tie the 2025 inventory write-down directly to NSP, so it would be wrong to fuse those points as if they referred to the same inventory. But the policy still matters because it shows how sensitive the platform is to the combination of pricing, sell-through and inventory quality. And in a company that already recorded a $13.5 million inventory impairment at the group level in 2025, that is not a throwaway detail.

Why the Upgrade Will Not Show Up in Cash Right Away

This ramp has already required real money. Investing cash flow was $10.7 million in 2024, mainly for the construction of the Houston and San Antonio centers and for equipment and facility upgrades. In 2025, investing cash flow was $9.8 million, mainly for San Antonio and for additional upgrades, including a new filling line in Beit Kama. Not every dollar of that CAPEX belongs directly to plasma, but the filing itself presents the new centers as a principal driver of the two-year investment cycle.

Put simply, Houston and San Antonio are not a free option on a better future. They are a cost base and a commitment base that now have to prove their return. When the company itself pushes first NSP sales into the second half of 2026, the reasonable conclusion is that the platform enters 2026 as an operating and commercial proof year, not a full monetization year.

Bottom Line

Kamada's plasma-collection ramp has already moved beyond the idea stage. Three operating sites exist, Houston is already approved for NSP, and San Antonio is the next obvious trigger. That means there is real infrastructure here, not an experiment.

But infrastructure is not yet economics. The economics improve only if two things happen together: Kamada signs NSP sales at prices that justify the cost base, and at the same time uses the platform to reduce external purchasing in the products where that is actually possible. Until then, what exists is a double-digit revenue opportunity on one side and a longer fixed-cost and commitment base on the other.

The bottom line of this continuation is fairly sharp: the ramp can improve the economics, but it has not changed them yet. Beaumont provides the base, Houston provides the first gate clearance, and San Antonio is the next approval milestone. Anyone who wants to treat this as a proven engine still needs more than site openings. They need approval, contracts, volume and price.