Sure-Tech Investments in 2025: The Value Is Still in the Portfolio, but Access to It Has Narrowed

Getting To Know The Company

Sure-Tech is not a technology company in the usual sense. It is a listed limited partnership that holds a basket of private fintech and insurtech investments, so its economics are not driven by a recurring sales engine or by an operating margin that can be tracked from quarter to quarter. They are driven by three different questions: how much value is really being built inside the portfolio companies, how much cash is left at the partnership level to support them, and how much of that value is actually accessible to public unitholders rather than remaining trapped in the books.

What is still working here? The portfolio is not empty. At the end of 2025 the partnership carried private investments worth NIS 32.05 million, cash of NIS 6.63 million, and partnership equity of NIS 39.66 million. The portfolio also still contains names that were not simply marked up on hope alone: Antidote rose to NIS 10.1 million, Heka increased to NIS 5.37 million after a round that also included Barclays, and Sequence was marked higher after a new funding round. In other words, the whole portfolio did not collapse.

But that is not what the public market is seeing on screen. On the last trading date the unit implied a market capitalization of about NIS 7.46 million, on turnover of just NIS 7,909. That is not just a discount to book value. It is a signal that the market is refusing to pay full weight for the reported value because it is not convinced how much of that value is monetizable, how much of it rests on Level 3 private marks, and how much of it still has to pass through governance disputes, follow-on funding, and time.

That is also the active bottleneck going into 2026. This is not a classic debt crisis. The partnership has almost no financial liabilities, and total liabilities stand at just NIS 1.31 million. Management of the general partner even says it has sufficient sources to continue as a going concern. The problem is different. Cash is far lower than it was a year earlier, the freedom to widen the portfolio has weakened, and the legal dispute has now reached the basic question of who is even authorized to approve follow-on investments. That makes 2026 look less like a breakout year and more like a bridge-and-proof year.

The economic map at the end of 2025 looks like this:

A superficial read could stop at one point only: equity of NIS 39.7 million against a market capitalization of NIS 7.5 million, and therefore an apparently obvious gap. That is the wrong read. Sure-Tech is no longer being judged mainly on whether it has NAV. It is being judged on how credible that NAV is, how liquid it is, and how much of it can actually reach unitholders without another round of legal friction, follow-on funding, or further markdowns.

Events And Triggers

GeoX moved from upside trigger to the center of the problem

The biggest event of 2025 was not simply “a loss.” It was the sharp change in GeoX’s place inside the portfolio. At the end of 2024 GeoX was carried at NIS 26.94 million. At the end of 2025 it was down to NIS 7.20 million, after a NIS 19.74 million markdown. That was not just another internal valuation swing. It was the hit that turned Sure-Tech from a waiting story into a damage-control story.

There is a concrete reason behind that markdown. In 2024 GeoX raised a round of up to $13 million at a post-money valuation between $61 million and $65 million. Sure-Tech itself invested the first tranche, about $616 thousand, and was expected to participate in the second. But in 2025 a dispute emerged between the lead fund and other investors on one side and GeoX on the other around representations related to 2024 results, the first half of 2025, and post-investment conduct. The practical result was that the second closing did not happen, the fund did not transfer the remaining investment, and Sure-Tech also held back its own second-leg funding.

That was not the end of it. On September 14, 2025, one investor from that round, with a $1.5 million ticket, filed a lawsuit in the Tel Aviv District Court against GeoX and certain officers, alleging false representations and breach of duties. GeoX denies the claims, but the damage to Sure-Tech’s read was already done: the value of one of the partnership’s most important assets moved from a dream multiple to a much more fragile scenario-based value.

Antidote, Heka, and Sequence stopped the portfolio from becoming a one-name disaster

The other side of 2025 is that the entire portfolio did not converge toward GeoX’s path. Antidote rose to NIS 10.10 million and became the partnership’s largest holding. Sure-Tech invested about NIS 4.01 million in it during 2025 and another $750 thousand on January 1, 2026. The year-end fair value relies on the December 2025 SAFE round and on a milestone achieved in January 2026 that determined the conversion mechanics.

This deserves a pause. Antidote’s increase is not just another paper mark-up. Based on information Antidote provided to the partnership, which is not audited, 2025 revenue reached about $37 million, free cash available for operations stood at about $46 million at year-end, and by February 2026 the company already had roughly 36 thousand insured members for the 2026 operating year. In addition, according to the same disclosure, the company raised about $30.8 million during 2025 through SAFE agreements. That does not make Sure-Tech’s stake liquid or proven at the public-unitholder level, but it does mean the portfolio contains at least one asset whose 2025 story rests partly on expanding business scale rather than only on a theoretical valuation framework.

Heka also supplied a more meaningful outside signal. In May 2025 Heka completed a roughly $6.5 million round at a $30 million pre-money valuation, with Barclays joining as a new investor. Sure-Tech invested another $1.2 million, and the holding finished the year at NIS 5.37 million. Sequence completed a roughly $7.2 million raise in April 2025 led by Aleph and Emerge at a valuation above the one at which Sure-Tech had invested, and the holding was marked to NIS 2.84 million.

So 2025 was not a year in which the entire portfolio shut down around one failure case. It was a year in which the portfolio split more clearly into names that can still attract capital and add proof points, and names that have become much more dependent on financing, litigation, or uncertain commercialization assumptions.

The control dispute moved from the margins into the operating layer

The third trigger, and maybe the most dangerous one at the public-structure level, is that the conflict among unitholders, the supervisor, and the general partner is no longer just background noise. In December 2024 the court issued an interim order that blocked the rights offering the partnership had published. During 2025 the parties moved into mediation. At the same time a motion to approve a derivative claim was filed and later withdrawn in December 2025, and additional motions were filed around the funding of the supervisor’s legal costs and around the scope of authority over follow-on investments.

The important point here is not just that the dispute exists, but what the dispute is about. The supervisor argued, in effect, that from May 2, 2024 the partnership could no longer make certain follow-on investments in companies not explicitly listed in the partnership agreement without unitholder approval. The general partner rejected that interpretation and relied on legal opinions. The court rejected a temporary motion in December 2025 that aimed to stop those investments, but on March 9, 2026 the supervisor had already notified the partnership that he intended to file a claim on the issue in the immediate term.

This is not a formal quarrel. For an investment partnership, it goes to the core value-creation mechanism: whether it is allowed to keep supporting existing portfolio companies, and with what flexibility. If in 2024 the dispute could still be read as governance noise, in 2025 it looked much more like an operating risk around capital allocation.

There was also an internal attempt to show cost discipline. In May 2025 CEO Ran Tsur voluntarily gave up 15% of his salary and deferred an additional portion, so that the current monthly gross payment during March through December 2025 was reduced to NIS 21.8 thousand. In February 2026 Doron Gedalyahu stopped serving as a director, and Yitzhak Yehana was appointed in his place. Those steps matter, but they do not solve the access-to-capital issue or the question of who ultimately controls follow-on decisions.

Efficiency, Profitability, And Competition

With Sure-Tech, you first need to break down earnings quality before you talk about “results”

The first thing to understand is that Sure-Tech’s 2025 profit and loss does not describe an operating business that lost money. It describes an investment portfolio whose value fell, was partly cushioned, and left behind very little recurring income at the listed-entity level. Advisory revenue was only NIS 51 thousand. Against that stood an operating loss of NIS 24.86 million. In other words, there is almost no recurring earnings engine at the public-entity level. What exists is value movement.

The total fair-value decline on financial assets measured at fair value through profit or loss was NIS 21.60 million. Of that, NIS 19.74 million came from GeoX. Embedded inside that line were also foreign-exchange expenses of NIS 4.4 million, compared with FX income of NIS 3.13 million in 2024. So the dollar moved against the partnership in 2025 as well, not just the valuations of specific holdings.

But there is a less obvious point here: the reported result is softer than the underlying economic damage. Management and carried-interest expense dropped sharply to only NIS 283 thousand, compared with NIS 3.12 million in 2024, partly because of a reduction in the accrued success-fee layer tied to GeoX. In addition, the deferred-tax liability was closed, so the tax line showed income of NIS 1.62 million. That means the net loss of NIS 23.43 million already benefited from two shock absorbers: reversal of part of the future incentive-fee burden and a non-cash tax benefit. Without both, the picture would look worse.

Portfolio profitability sits on models, not on partnership-level revenue

KPMG identified the fair-value measurement of illiquid investments, totaling NIS 32.05 million, as a key audit matter. That is not technical filler. It is the auditor’s way of showing the reader where the largest judgment layer in the statements sits. The audit firm even used valuation specialists to test methodology, discount rates, and assumptions.

This is where one of the most important points in the entire filing appears: the standard quantitative sensitivity disclosure does not really capture the main economic risk. The financial-instruments note presents relatively small sensitivity to changes in the volatility assumption for GeoX and Antidote. But in GeoX, the key risk does not sit mainly in the volatility input of the OPM model. It sits inside the DCF assumptions, and that picture is much more binary.

The annual report says GeoX has no dependence on a single customer and that its financial resources should be sufficient for more than 18 months. At the same time, the attached valuation report explicitly states that the fair value relies on an optimistic scenario in which the company signs a very material client in the near term, and that under a downside scenario in which that contract does not happen and the legal process continues, the fair value could approach zero. Those are not necessarily mutually exclusive statements. But together they show that the carrying value in the books rests on a much narrower success path than a quick read of the portfolio-company chapter might suggest.

Competition matters at the portfolio-company level, but public unitholders only receive what can travel up a layer

GeoX still lists meaningful customers such as Geoscape Australia and MS&AD, and according to its own disclosure it is the only provider offering full US coverage in its specific activity layer. Antidote operates a model that tries to combine health insurance, telehealth, and AI, and it obtained insurer licenses in Ohio and Arizona. Heka managed to bring in Barclays, and Sequence brought in well-known venture names.

But for Sure-Tech that is still not enough. The right question is not just whether portfolio companies have competitive advantages. It is whether those advantages are becoming durable value, and whether that value can eventually become cash that moves up to the listed partnership. That is exactly where the gap opens between value created and value accessible to unitholders.

Cash Flow, Debt, And Capital Structure

In Sure-Tech’s case, the right frame is all-in cash flexibility

It is not useful to analyze Sure-Tech through “normalized” cash generation as if it were a mature software company. There is no recurring operating cash engine that can serve as a clean basis for judging earnings power. At the listed-entity level, advisory income is negligible, and the real economic question is how much cash remains after what the partnership actually did to sustain itself and its portfolio companies. That makes the correct frame here all-in cash flexibility, not a theoretical maintenance-cash view.

That picture is stark. The partnership started 2025 with NIS 18.80 million of cash and ended the year with NIS 6.63 million. Operating cash flow was negative NIS 3.07 million, investing cash flow was negative NIS 8.24 million, and exchange-rate effects took away another NIS 857 thousand. In total, cash declined by NIS 12.17 million in a single year.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge what is not showing up as an immediate balance-sheet problem. There is no debt wall here. There are no tight covenants. Total liabilities are only NIS 1.31 million, versus NIS 4.02 million in 2024. That is exactly why it is easy to misread the situation and conclude that financing risk has fallen sharply. That is only half true. For an investment partnership, the question is not just whether it has debt, but whether it still has enough cash to keep backing the names worth backing without having to fall into a pressured capital raise or another legal fight over capital deployment.

In that sense, the market discount says a great deal. The implied market capitalization is only about NIS 2.13 million above year-end net cash after total liabilities. In other words, the market is currently assigning very little accessible value beyond year-end net cash, despite the books carrying NIS 32.05 million of private investments. That does not automatically mean the market is fully right. It does mean the market is reading Sure-Tech primarily as an access-to-value problem, not a size-of-value problem.

And the freedom to rebuild the cash layer does not look clean either. The December 2024 rights offering was blocked by an interim court order, and the dispute over the general partner’s authority to continue investing adds another layer of uncertainty over any future capital move. So a debt-light balance sheet does not automatically equal financial flexibility here. It only means that if pressure returns, it will return through cash erosion and disputed capital allocation rather than through bank leverage.

Outlook

Finding one: 2026 opens not as a year of building a new portfolio, but as a year of sorting and deciding inside the existing one.

Finding two: GeoX remains the most important variable, even after the markdown, because any stabilization or further deterioration there will reshape the reading of the whole portfolio.

Finding three: Antidote is the main counterweight, but its value still sits far above the common-unitholder access layer.

Finding four: If the legal and governance conflict does not calm down, even good portfolio news may struggle to close the discount.

GeoX is the biggest proof test in 2026

It is hard to overstate GeoX’s importance for the year ahead. On one hand, GeoX has not been written out of the portfolio. It still has meaningful customers, has told the partnership it has no single-customer dependency and that its resources should last more than 18 months, and Sure-Tech still owns about 15.09% of it on a fully diluted basis. On the other hand, the valuation report supporting the NIS 7.2 million carrying value explicitly uses an optimistic scenario in which the company signs a very material client in the near term. Without that, and with the legal process continuing, the same value could deteriorate sharply.

The material sitting below the surface also looks more like a proof year than a stable year. The valuation report says 2025 was a difficult year in which GeoX dealt with significant internal difficulties, lost key personnel, withdrew from the Japanese market, and restructured headcount from a peak of 44 employees down to 26 in the third quarter. According to the same report, 2026 includes three more cuts alongside six strategic hires. That does not look like a business entering 2026 on autopilot.

For Sure-Tech, GeoX is therefore not just another portfolio company. It is a live test of how much confidence should be placed in the reported value layer. If GeoX signs the major contract, stabilizes investor relations, and preserves its financing path, it can move from being the name that damaged 2025 to being the name that repairs the read. If not, 2025 may turn out not to have been the cleanup year, but only the first leg down.

Antidote can improve the story, but it cannot solve it on its own

If GeoX is the main risk center, Antidote is the main source of optimism. Based on information Antidote provided, which is not audited, the company no longer looks like a typical pre-revenue venture name. It reports about $37 million of revenue in 2025, about $46 million of cash available for operations, and no need for additional investment over the 12 months following the report date to fund ongoing activity. By February 2026 it already had about 36 thousand insured members for the 2026 operating year.

This is very different from the GeoX layer. Externally, Antidote also raised about $30.8 million through SAFE structures in 2025, and the partnership itself participated with about $1.25 million during the year plus another $750 thousand at the start of 2026. So this is an asset the private market is still willing to fund, and one in which Sure-Tech itself chose to deepen exposure.

But this is exactly where readers need to stop before jumping to a comfortable conclusion. Sure-Tech’s value in Antidote is still a value in a private company. It sits on a SAFE conversion framework and a milestone-triggered mechanism from January 2026. It is not a dividend, not an exit, and it does not yet solve the question of how value inside a US private portfolio company becomes accessible cash for a tiny listed partnership in Tel Aviv. Antidote can therefore improve the quality of the portfolio, but it does not cancel the access-to-value constraint.

This is a bridge year for the partnership, not a breakout year

In management-language terms, 2026 looks like a transition year with a very clear proof test. The partnership no longer has fully clean freedom to build a fresh portfolio without going back to the unitholders, one rights offering has already been stopped, and the cash profile does not allow it to behave as if every portfolio company has unlimited time. In that setting, the real test over the next two to four quarters is not how many new dreams the partnership can open, but whether it can prove that at least two major assets hold up without once again asking the market to trust a model more than a result.

What has to happen for the thesis to improve? GeoX needs to move the investor-and-client story from open risk to something more closed and bankable. Antidote needs to show that revenue growth and insured-member growth actually translate into an operating track rather than just another SAFE round. At the same time, Sure-Tech itself needs to get through a period without another legal escalation over investment authority and with clearer visibility on how the remaining cash will be managed.

The market in the short-to-medium term probably will not wait only for the next annual report. Any update on GeoX litigation, any sign that the dispute with the supervisor is calming, and any indication that the SAFE conversion at Antidote has moved from a technical event to business proof can reshape how the portfolio is read well before another full P&L arrives.

Risks

Portfolio concentration and Level 3 valuation risk

The three biggest holdings, Antidote, GeoX, and Heka, together make up about 70.8% of the portfolio. That is very high concentration for a structure this small. When that is combined with the fact that the entire layer sits on Level 3 private marks, even a modest assumption change in one of the large holdings can move the whole equity story.

Uneven disclosure quality across the portfolio companies

The material supporting the valuations is not always audited material. GeoX itself says the 2025 revenue estimate is based on budget tracking, not prepared under regular accounting rules, and not audited or reviewed. Antidote provided revenue, cash, and insured-member data that are also not audited. That does not mean the data are false. It does mean that a meaningful part of the read on portfolio value comes through management-provided information rather than through full audited subsidiary financial statements.

Governance and capital-allocation risk

The conflict between the supervisor, the limited partner, and the general partner has stopped being a cosmetic governance issue. It now directly affects the ability to make follow-on investments, raise capital, and run the partnership without interim orders, motions over legal-cost funding, and competing interpretations of the partnership agreement. If the dispute deepens, it can destroy value even if some of the portfolio companies improve.

FX and market-liquidity risk

The dollar fell 12.5% against the shekel in 2025, and the partnership already felt that through FX costs embedded in the revaluation line and through net financing expense. On top of that, trading turnover of only a few thousand shekels per day means that even if the economic read improves, the price response can stay slow, uneven, and at times irrational.

Financing risk through portfolio survival, not through leverage

The partnership does not have a covenant problem, but it ended 2025 with only NIS 6.6 million of cash. That may be enough to survive. It is not necessarily enough to stay aggressive in follow-on support, and certainly not enough to be wrong too many times. In some portfolio names, including AIO and HSO, the filing already states explicitly that the need for substantial financing or failure to meet plans affected the valuation. That is a reminder that even without leverage at the listed level, Sure-Tech remains exposed to the health of private capital markets.

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Conclusions

In 2025 Sure-Tech moved from being a discount-to-NAV story to being an access-to-NAV story. What still supports the thesis is the fact that the portfolio continues to include names that can attract capital and show progress, mainly Antidote and Heka. What blocks a cleaner thesis is that this value layer now sits against cash reduced to NIS 6.6 million, a control dispute that has not calmed down, and one major asset, GeoX, that has turned from a potential jewel into a test of credibility for the whole reported layer.

The market’s short-to-medium-term reaction will be driven less by the accounting question of “how much equity is in the books” and more by three concrete events: whether GeoX can close its financing-and-trust gap, whether Antidote continues translating SAFE financing into a real operating business with visibility, and whether the partnership can manage the remaining capital without another court-driven interruption.

Current thesis: Sure-Tech still has a portfolio with meaningful reported value, but the market is now pricing mainly the question of access to that value rather than its nominal size on paper.

What changed: In 2024 it was still possible to read the story through “a private portfolio waiting for exits.” After 2025 the story shifted. The portfolio is now split between names that are still progressing and a major asset that rests on a fragile scenario, while cash and control both narrowed.

The strongest counter-thesis: One can argue that the market has become too extreme. Even after the GeoX write-down, the partnership still holds more than NIS 32 million of private investments, has almost no debt, and Antidote plus Heka provide signs that not all of the value layer is theoretical. If GeoX stabilizes and the legal friction eases, the current discount may look too deep.

What could change the market’s reading: Resolution or a major-client win at GeoX, more operational proof at Antidote beyond SAFE funding, and lower legal friction around investment authority and future capital raising.

Why this matters: In a small listed investment partnership, the real value is not the value written in a note. It is the value that can survive revaluation, financing, and governance friction long enough to become liquid. That is the whole Sure-Tech question now.

What must happen over the next two to four quarters: GeoX has to move from model risk toward proof, Antidote has to keep proving that its growth is not just financing-led, and the partnership has to preserve the remaining cash while avoiding another legal stop on deployment or fundraising. Another material write-down, another blocked capital move, or another escalation over investment authority would weaken the thesis quickly.