Supergas Power: The Electricity Reserve Stack Is Growing, But When Does It Become Profit
Supergas Power is building a credible electricity reserve stack through Prime, EDF, Tzabar and the 55 MW tender, but the 2025 filing shows that reserve capacity by itself still does not generate profit. The real question is no longer volume, but whether gross spread and customer mix can cover the platform's cost base.
The issue is no longer access to power, it is spread
The main article already made the core point: electricity is the growth engine, but profit proof is still missing. This follow-up isolates the next question. What does the new reserve stack, Prime, EDF, Tzabar and the 55 MW tender, have to do in order to become gross and operating profit rather than just more reported volume?
The number that organizes the whole discussion is straightforward. The electricity segment almost doubled revenue in 2025 to NIS 380.3 million, up 88.6%. In the same year, though, it moved from NIS 2.7 million of gross profit to a NIS 0.6 million gross loss. Even after the revenue jump, the segment still finished the year with an operating loss of NIS 16.6 million. This is no longer a volume question. It is a spread question.
The filing also explains why. In the electricity activity, customer pricing is derived from regulated tariff components, net of the discount the company gives the customer. The company explicitly warns that this discount does not always match the discount it receives from power producers or from Noga. That is the core economic friction. A bigger procurement stack does not automatically mean a better gross margin.
And this is happening in a market that is clearly opening up. By the end of 2025, roughly 320 thousand residential meters were already attached to virtual suppliers, and the regulator even opened a temporary mechanism for direct availability-certificate purchases because competitive supply was scarce. Demand is there. What is still missing is proof that Supergas can turn its reserve stack into economic surplus.
The reserve layer is getting harder to dismiss
This is an important distinction. Supergas is no longer at the idea stage. As of the report date, it had already assigned generation facilities from Energix, Enlight and EDF to itself as a private supplier, and it was already selling that electricity to customers. EDF, specifically, moved in 2025 from signed agreement to live supply. The problem is that the new reserve layer being built on top of that base still does not prove that future volume will become future profit.
| Layer | Status | Hard disclosure | What it is supposed to add | What is still open |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EDF | Live from July 2025 | 10-year agreement, all generated electricity is purchased and sold to customers | First live proof that signed procurement can become active supply | The selected documents do not disclose the exact MW contribution or margin contribution |
| Prime | Expanded in January 2025 | 100 MW AC, 500 MWh of storage capacity, estimated cumulative electricity purchases of NIS 1.6 billion to NIS 1.7 billion, 22-year term | A large long-duration procurement layer | Regulatory approvals and bank financing are still closing conditions |
| Tzabar | Signed in November 2025 | About 65 MW AC, estimated cumulative electricity purchases of about NIS 1 billion, 20-year term | Another storage-backed peak-hours layer, mainly for residential supply | Approvals, financing and commissioning pace; first facilities are only expected to be assigned by the end of Q2 2026 |
| Electricity Authority tender | Won after the balance-sheet date, in January 2026 | 55 MW through December 31, 2029, roughly NIS 165 million excluding indexation, with a right to return all or part of the capacity mid-period | A near-term regulatory bridge that expands available supply | It still has to be proven that this capacity can be placed with customers at profitable terms |
The chart below includes only the layers for which the selected documents disclose explicit MW figures. EDF is already live, but its capacity is not disclosed in those documents, so it does not appear here.
Where the economics still break
Gross spread has not turned
In 2024, the electricity activity still produced NIS 2.7 million of gross profit, a 1.35% gross margin. In 2025, on revenue that was almost twice as high, the gross margin flipped to negative 0.16%. That is the most important point in the entire continuation. Even before selling, service and operating expenses, the supply layer did not yet produce a healthy gross spread.
The economic bottleneck the filing points to is very concrete. Electricity revenue is affected by time-of-use tariffs, seasonality, demand-hour clusters and customer discounts. On the procurement side, both the producer agreements and the system mechanisms are also shaped by those same demand windows, but not necessarily at the same commercial spread. So the real question is not how many megawatts Supergas can line up. It is whether it can buy and sell them under matching hourly and commercial conditions.
The investor presentation does not contradict that. It sharpens it. Management is already presenting the electricity activity as growing, EBITDA positive and benefiting from lower procurement costs. That may be true at the operating-management level. But in the audited filing, the segment is still gross-loss and operating-loss making. Until that gap closes, the story remains incomplete.
Even getting back to 2024 would not be enough
Hold the 2025 cost base constant and the picture becomes even sharper. The gap between gross loss and operating loss implies that the activity still needs about NIS 16.0 million of annual contribution just to reach segment operating break-even. On 2025 electricity revenue, that translates into a gross margin of about 4.2%.
Set that against 2024. The electricity segment's gross margin that year was only 1.35%. In other words, even if 2025 had been earned at the 2024 gross margin, the segment still would have posted roughly a NIS 10.9 million operating loss, assuming a similar cost base. That is why more capacity and more customers do not solve the problem on their own. What is required is a much better spread, a leaner operating structure, or both.
The reserves still need the right customer mix
Prime and Tzabar are meant to add meaningful storage-backed supply, and the 55 MW tender adds four years of procurement with the right to return all or part of the capacity mid-period. That matters because it gives the partnership not just more volume, but some flexibility. Still, the filing explicitly says that the company's ability to expand electricity supply depends, among other things, on customer mix.
That point is critical because most agreements with commercial customers are based on actual electricity consumption over the contract period. Profit, therefore, will not come from lining up more procurement alone. It will come only if Supergas can fill that reserve layer with customers whose load profile fits the peak-hour structure, seasonality and selling-side discounts embedded in the model. Without that fit, the reserve layer grows faster than profit.
The 55 MW tender also carries another implication. The company itself describes the regulatory mechanism behind it as a temporary solution created because competitive capacity is scarce. That is an important bridge for growth. But a regulatory bridge is not the same thing as proven structural profitability.
What has to happen next
Trigger one: the electricity segment has to return to positive gross profit and hold it for several quarters. Without that, the growth story remains a revenue story only.
Trigger two: Prime and Tzabar have to move from conditional agreements to actual commissioning and assignment. In both cases the company explicitly lists regulatory and financing conditions, and in Tzabar the first assignment target is only the end of Q2 2026.
Trigger three: customer additions and captured load have to improve spread, not just reported sales volume. As long as customer discounts consume the procurement advantage, a larger reserve stack simply pushes more electricity through the same economic bottleneck.
Trigger four: the 55 MW added after the balance-sheet date has to show up in coming quarters not just as a procurement commitment, but as a commercial tool that is being deployed into the customer book on better terms.
Bottom line
Supergas Power's electricity reserve stack now looks materially more serious than it did a year ago. EDF is already flowing, Prime has been expanded, Tzabar has been added, and the company won another 55 MW through the end of 2029 after the balance-sheet date. From a procurement perspective, this is a real platform.
But the 2025 filing also makes the next question unavoidable. The issue is no longer whether there will be more electricity available. The issue is whether that electricity can be sold at a spread that also covers the platform's operating cost. Until the segment shows consistent positive gross profit and then meaningful operating-loss compression, electricity remains a growth engine with a profit option, not a proven profit engine.
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